Wednesday, 20 June 2001

GANGSTER WARS IN ABKHAZIA

Published in Field Reports

By Maia Mindorashvili, a Tbilisi-based independent expert (6/20/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Since Spring 2001 the representatives of the Russian "peacekeeping forces" have been acting in concert with Georgian and Abkhazian criminals to redistribute spheres of influence in Abkhazia. These key players need to keep a fragile "stability" in the Gali region of Southern Abkhazia, and to bring the region's Georgian population under absolute control. These intentions are well illustrated by the clashes that arose between criminals groups in April and May in Gali.

Since Spring 2001 the representatives of the Russian "peacekeeping forces" have been acting in concert with Georgian and Abkhazian criminals to redistribute spheres of influence in Abkhazia. These key players need to keep a fragile "stability" in the Gali region of Southern Abkhazia, and to bring the region's Georgian population under absolute control. These intentions are well illustrated by the clashes that arose between criminals groups in April and May in Gali.

In April of 2001, a conflict over smuggling emerged between the 'Forest Brothers', a Georgian partisan group operating in Abkhazia (led by David Shengelia) and Abkhazian separatists. The reason of the conflict was the illicit traffic of goods. The separatists had captured a vehicle loaded with contraband tobacco belonging to the Georgian partisans, and they tried to seize the goods themselves. With the Forest Brothers' response, a serious clash took place between the two groups. The Abkhazians killed two Georgians and captured three hostages. The partisans, in turn, captured five hostages. But the conflict brought with it a unpredictable outcome: the population of Gali, exhausted by hard socio-economic conditions, crossed the Inguri Bridge, and interfered with the illicit traffic. The conflicting parties realized that the situation was getting out of their control, and their economic interests dictated they arrive at a solution as soon as possible. That’s why the conflicting parties reached an agreement without difficulties: the hostages were exchanged and the interests of both parties were regulated.

Smuggling is a prosperous business in Abkhazia, especially in the Gali region. Contraband goods (tobacco, fuel, non-ferrous metals) flow to Abkhazia mainly from Turkey (by the sea) and from Russia, who have essential interests in the region. Besides the smuggled goods, the drugs trade is also important in Abkhazia. From the breakaway republic of Abkhazia, contraband regularly flows to the rest of Georgia. The illicit traffic is controlled not only by the Abkhazian governmental representatives and militaries, but also by the Georgian partisans, former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the paramilitary groups who supported ex-president Gamsakhurdia. Russian peacekeepers and Georgian policemen are also involved in the process. They receive shares from Georgian and Abkhazian smugglers, which allows the latter to pass checkpoints without problems. Economic reasons, interwoven with political ones, make it desirable for the Russian peacekeepers to engineer conflicts before their mandate runs out, thus enabling them to extend their presence in the region.

The Gali region and its population came to be a milk cow for international forces who participate in the contraband business - forces that operate in cooperation. And since the region is the main source of their benefits, either the escalation of the situation or the resolution of the conflict does not meet with their needs. Smuggling brings high incomes.

By Maia Mindorashvili, a Tbilisi-based independent expert.

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