Wednesday, 07 November 2001

GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS

Published in Field Reports

By Johanna Petersson, a visiting researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International (11/7/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze dismissed his entire government on Thursday November 1st. This followed a turbulent week as the people of Tbilisi took to the streets and demonstrated, initially against what they saw as a breech of the principle of free speech after the ministry of state security (Georgia’ s post-Soviet version of the KGB) attempted a raid on the independent and hugely popular TV station Rustavi 2. However, the demonstrations soon turned into a protest against Shevardnadze and the current regime.

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze dismissed his entire government on Thursday November 1st. This followed a turbulent week as the people of Tbilisi took to the streets and demonstrated, initially against what they saw as a breech of the principle of free speech after the ministry of state security (Georgia’ s post-Soviet version of the KGB) attempted a raid on the independent and hugely popular TV station Rustavi 2. However, the demonstrations soon turned into a protest against Shevardnadze and the current regime. On Wednesday, over 10,000 people demonstrated in front of the parliament, some demanding the resignation of Shevardnadze and the Minister of Interior Kakha Targamadze; some calling for new legislative elections. Though Shevardnadze admitted that the action taken by the state security police was wrong, he openly defended the Minister of Interior, saying that if Targamadze, and the general prosecutor Gia Meparishivili, would be forced to resign, then so would he. After parliamentary chairman Zurab Zhvania’ s resignation and the dismissal of the entire government, the demonstrations outside the parliament have largely petered out.

Shevardnadze also promised swift constitutional changes last week; the creation of a more parliamentary style of government in Georgia with a cabinet of ministers and a more powerful Prime Minister. On Monday, he indicated that the Prime Minister would be in charge of economic affairs whilst the right to appoint and dismiss ministers would stay with the president. These changes can be seen as concessions to his opponents who have long demanded a more limited role for the president. However, by dismissing the government Shevardnadze has managed to hold at least part of the initiative in a very volatile situation. 

As usual in the Caucasus, where conspiracy theories flourish and politics sometimes take Byzantine forms, the question many analysts ask is if the dismissal really was a result of last week’s demonstrations outside the parliament or a carefully orchestrated manipulation. Many theories and rumours are circulating, the main theory being that this was largely organised to give legitimacy to a new government and, more importantly, perhaps to an heir to Shevardnadze’s throne. Many also feel that Shevardnadze had not expected the strong public support the demonstrations and his opponents enjoyed, that things were getting out of his control – hence it is argued that the instability now prevalent in the country was not planned.

Also as a result of last week’s turmoil, the already divided Citizens’ Union of Georgia has been divided into even further factions and during the last few days there have been signs that Shevardnadze is seeking support and forming a new alliance with the authoritarian leader of the autonomous republic of Ajara. Aslan Abashidze, Russian-leaning and widely perceived as corrupt, is also a member of the Revival of Georgia faction, besuides his post as head of Ajara. Abashidze was re-elected last weekend in an election with no opponents; official sources claims that there had been a 96 % turnout and that 99% voted for Mr. Abashidze. 

Shevardnadze visited Adjara on Saturday the 2nd of November. During his visit, Abashidze was asked to act to head the efforts to solve the Abkhazian conflict, an interesting choice since the Ajara region is run largely without control from the government central government in Tbilisi. Fears have been long present that it too could opt for even greater autonomy or independence. Abashidze is also seen by some as a candidate to the post of Prime Minister, however, due to fears of being assassinated, Abashidze has not visited Tbilisi for ten years and a more likely candidate might be someone else closely linked to him.

Former parliamentary chairman Zhvania's future role is also still unclear, he is of course mentioned as a strong candidate to the post of prime minister. Keeping him and former Justice Minister Mikhail Saakashvili out of the government can be a very risky step due to the recent public display of popularity for these outspoken reformers.

The next two weeks will indeed have great impact on Georgia’s future economic and democratic development, as Shevardnadze’s choice of government and especially prime minister will become clearer. Indications have come from the president that the government will be basically similar to the last, with the exception of the ministers most closely linked to the Rustavi 2 affair - Minister of State Security Kutateladze, and Minister of Interior Targamadze. Until last week, Targamadze and the interior forces were largely seen as Shevardnadze's closest allies within the government, and Shevardnadze is widely regarded as not having strong control over the military. Part of his power base has always been within the interior forces and the National Guard, not the ministry of defence. This makes the choice of Prime Minister even more interesting. 

The demonstrations carried out last week were one of the first large-scale displays of public dismay during the ten years or so of Shevardnadze regime. Shevardnadze is now faced not only with the need to balance the different interests within the region, the government, and the parliament but also that of the Georgian people.

Johanna Petersson, a visiting researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi.

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