By Richard Weitz
March 18th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
The states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are in for a rough ride if recent Russian national security documents and speeches genuinely represent the Kremlin’s worldview. Not only do these texts veto their membership in NATO, but they exclude mutually profitable partnerships for these countries with the European Union and other Western institutions, constrain their domestic development, and encourage the suppression of civil liberties by warning of fictitious Western plots to change their regimes under the guise of democracy promotion and human rights.
By Umida Hashimova
February 10th, the CACI Analyst
Uzbekistan and Russia are working to develop a governmental agreement on organized job placements for potential labor migrants from Uzbekistan to Russia. Such agreements usually mean that future employees will have an agreed job, salary, place to live, insurance, and all permission papers for employment before they leave their home country. Some have interpreted this as a sign of warming relations between the two countries by which Russia is easing the conditions for about two million migrants from Uzbekistan in exchange for some sort of concessions by Uzbekistan’s government.
By Vladimer Papava
October 29, 2015, The CACI Analyst
A new Russia-Kazakhstan regional project, named the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), was launched in 2015. Specifically, as of January 1, 2015, integrated economic processes among Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are governed by the EAEU Treaty. As of January 2, Armenia joined the EAEU and as of May 21, Kyrgyzstan also became a member. In 2011, after the President of Russia declared the establishment of the Eurasian Union, some politicians and experts perceived it as a final victory of Eurasianism ideology in Russia. Under such circumstances, there is a need to analyze the economic models of Eurasianism and the Eurasian Union for a better understanding of their future.
By Tomáš Baranec
October 2nd, 2015, The CACI Analyst
According to a recent survey by the U.S. National Democratic Institute, support for membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has doubled in Georgia since 2014, to 31 percent. Simultaneously, support for the trade agreement between Georgia and the EU fell from 80 percent before the Ukraine crisis to 68 percent in April 2015. Many commentators have linked this development with a temporal disappointment among Georgians with the country’s slow western integration following the Eastern Partnership (EaP) summit in Riga. Others stress the Russian “soft offensive” on Georgia conducted through Russian-sponsored media and NGOs. However, the underlying reasons for why increasing numbers of Georgians become receptive to demands for reorienting the country towards Russia may be deeper, less temporal and much more serious.
By George Tsereteli (05/08/2015 issue of the CACI Analyst)
On July 10, Russian military personnel moved border markers further into Georgian territory from the breakaway region of South Ossetia, in the process positioning the new “border” even closer to the strategically vital East-West highway and placing more of the Baku-Supsa pipeline under Russian control. As a result, the Georgian government has been criticized by opposition groups for not doing enough to prevent such incursions, and for not responding adequately. As prescribed by contemporary Russian military doctrine, Russia’s recent actions in Georgia, as well as in other parts of the world, are manifestations of a new warfare strategy.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.