By Stephen Blank

While Central Asian cohesion and regional cooperation grow; the South Caucasus is fragmenting. This process increasingly affects the nature and scope of regional interactions with key international actors. Russian influence has declined precipitously in Armenia, which is turning to the West, and Azerbaijan, which is expanding its circle of partners. However, in Georgia the state increasingly resembles Russia in its autocratic and legal structure and thus its state practices.

BACKGROUND:

Writing in 2024, the Azeri scholar Gulshan Pashayeva observed that a defining feature of the Caucasus was its fragmentation. This fragmentation is deepening and in effect, relationships between the South Caucasus and key external actors have quickly grown and assumed new shapes in 2025. Georgia’s dependence on Russia has grown, whereas Russian influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan has visibly declined as these states are turning to Washington and Europe. 

Georgia is paying the supreme price of colonial status as it over time loses territory to Russia as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia virtually included in the Russian Federation. The Russian-driven borderization whereby Russian or pro-Russian forces either overtly or surreptitiously move border posts demarcating Russian-controlled from Georgian territories to expand Russia’s holdings occurs with impunity.

The mounting discord between the Georgian government and the EU also exemplifies Georgia’s regression. Georgia’s government, possibly at Moscow’s behest, is trampling upon processes necessary for Georgian admission into the EU and frustrating both Brussels’ conditions and the continuing support for EU membership among a majority of the Georgian population. 

Armenia’s government is implementing a program of democratic reform and ultimate membership in the EU while striving to make a conclusive peace with Azerbaijan and normalize ties to Turkey despite staunch resistance by domestic, diasporic elements, the Church and Russian influencers. None of these groups supports peace and many of them, including Russia, fear democratization as signaling a decisive political defeat at home as well as a threat to Russia. It is no surprise that the Church with Russian backing emerged as the leader of an attempted coup in 2025 to replicate Russia’s success in Georgia and reverse Yerevan’s turn to the West.

Azerbaijan’s case is even more striking. Beyond its military-diplomatic success in forging an alliance with Turkey and partnership with Israel to strengthen its military capability, it neutralized Russian support for Armenia while improving ties with key European states and the U.S. The Trump Administration has now built a permanent monument to its military-economic presence in the Caucasus, namely the Trump International Road for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This project brings Washington into the Caucasus as a permanent player and checks Iranian threats to Azerbaijan and links to Armenia, while giving Yerevan a tangible reward for its pro-Western and anti-Russian policies. Meanwhile, Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani airplane in 2024 and attacks on Azerbaijani residents in Russia have generated enormous resentment in Azerbaijan. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Caucasus has become a battleground where the great powers and their favored local governments are not only on opposite sides, but where these powers’ rivalry also spills over into trade routes. The TRIPP has duly triggered Georgian apprehension since that project’s inauguration may well push aside Georgia as a preferred partner in the Middle Corridor project that ties together China, Central Asia, and ultimately Europe. But the significance of TRIPP far transcends its potential impact upon Georgia.

This project is only the latest manifestation of the declining Russian influence in the Caucasus and the parallel ensuing fragmentation of the region. While Moscow still holds many levers of influence and has no scruples about using them; they are fewer, less potent than before, and Russia faces a greater and more sustained foreign presence in the Caucasus than at any time since the disintegration of the USSR. Neither is this foreign influence strictly economic as in China’s case and as seen in its sponsorship of the Middle Corridor trade and transportation route through Azerbaijan that bypasses Russia. Türkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan is of an explicitly military nature that provides an enduring supply of weapons, training, and presumably logistical and intelligence support for Azerbaijan. Türkiye also buttresses this support by providing the primary terminus for Azerbaijan’s increasing energy exports to Europe. Beyond these increasingly deep-rooted connections to Azerbaijan, through the Organization of Turkic States Türkiye now also has an institutional base for enduring outreach to Central Asia and the provision of all manner of military and economic ties to that region. 

Azerbaijan is also increasingly tied to the Middle East through its long-running defense and economic ties to Israel, their mutual collaboration against Iran and its membership in both the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s Board of Peace. Likewise, the EU and Azerbaijan have embarked upon a mutually rewarding series of ties independent of Russian influence and also primarily based on Azerbaijani energy exports in return for EU investment and political support.

Moreover, the advent of the TRIPP has launched what looks like a sustained U.S. presence in the Caucasus. This project is taking physical shape and Vice-President Vance’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that sustained interest. Under this project, “American companies could develop railways, roads, and pipelines linking Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave via a corridor through the south of Armenia’s Syunik Province.” Since Azerbaijan is now providing Armenia with energy, a formal peace treaty terminating the state of war over Nagorno-Karabakh under U.S. auspices seems likely. Beyond those signs of U.S. influence, President Trump has just stated that Vance’s tour will, “strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, a beautiful Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Armenia, Deals for our Great Semiconductor Makers, and the sale of Made in the U.S.A. Defense Equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.” If this lasting multi-domain U.S. presence materializes, it will represent a major blow to Russian ambitions but also codify the fragmentation of the Caucasus and exclude Georgia from the growing and long-term international competition in the region for a long time to come.

CONCLUSIONS:

Russia certainly still has cards to play. It has a long-term military base at Gyumri, Armenia, and well-established connections among the Armenian opposition that is both unreconciled to the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to the Pashinyan government’s democratizing reforms and efforts to join the EU. Russia also has substantial economic connections to Georgia and what looks like a secure base of influence in Georgia’s government. 

Nevertheless, it is a declining power economically if not militarily and cannot stop the rising foreign presence in the Caucasus. Indeed, it depends on trade coming from Armenia and Central Assia to circumvent Western sanctions and access vital Western goods. Iran, whose back is to the wall due to combined U.S., Israeli, and European military-economic pressure, cannot bail it out. Nor will China, the primary sponsor of the Middle Corridor, rescue it in the Caucasus. Despite the Russo-Chinese “no-limits” partnership, Beijing has never lifted a finger to allow Russia to become a viable economic competitor across Eurasia or regarding inter-continental trade, transport, and connectivity issues.

Therefore, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus and the heightened presence of competing major international actors is likely to continue. Central Asian states, in contrast, forge ahead with mounting cohesion and collaboration. Indeed, those states, recognizing Azerbaijan’s critical geographic position and rising heft, have now included it in what used to be the 5+1 relationship with Washington, transforming it into a 6+1 formation. This development will also contribute to regional fragmentation. Azerbaijan is increasingly a power whose perspectives must embrace Washington, Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, not just the Caucasus.

The ethnopolitical rivalries that made the Caucasus a zone of conflict for a generation after 1991 may, however, be coming to an end as the new ties between Baku and Yerevan and greater foreign connections show. To the extent that Georgia can be helped to resolve its ethnic and other domestic cleavages that Russia continues to exploit, it may become possible for the South Caucasus to emulate the discernible regional cooperation now appearing in Central Asia.

That outcome would be to the benefit of the entire Caucasus as well as to its neighbors and interlocutors. While disappointing to Moscow, its regional clients and those “dead-enders” who wish to rekindle the fires of ethnic conflict, that way has been tried and founds wanting in the balance.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org.)

By Eldaniz Gusseinov & Sardor Allayarov, 

Following the conclusion of a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, three key trends are likely to shape the South Caucasus within broader global geoeconomic processes. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may facilitate the emergence of the South Caucasus as a more integrated regional entity, rather than three distinct states occupying a shared geographic space. The region’s future can be understood through three interrelated dynamics: the expansion of overland infrastructure, intensified competition for markets, and increasing complexity in its geoeconomic architecture.

BACKGROUND:

An initialed peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was announced on August 8, 2025, under U.S. mediation, formally ended the protracted conflict and aimed to normalize bilateral relations. Despite sharing a common geographic space, the South Caucasus states differ markedly in their political, economic, and security orientations, which has historically constrained regional integration. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) while simultaneously expressing aspirations for EU membership. Georgia has maintained a broadly pro-Western orientation, though less pronounced than in the past, whereas Azerbaijan prioritizes integration within the Organization of Turkic States. At the same time, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have expressed interest in joining the SCO. Additionally, Azerbaijan has attained permanent status among the consultative meetings of the Central Asian heads of states. 

Similar processes can be observed in Central Asia, where the resolution of several border disputes enabled intensified cooperation through the integration of transport routes and energy hubs. Comparable developments may emerge in the South Caucasus, as border openings are likely to necessitate infrastructure expansion, followed by the harmonization of tariffs and customs procedures.

IMPLICATIONS:

At the initial stage, the institutionalization of meeting formats among South Caucasus leaders is likely to occur, both within a trilateral framework and through a 3+3 format involving other key regional actors. The Central Asia–South Caucasus format also appears promising, as the two regions are increasingly interconnected through the development of transport corridors.

The first trend is the growing demand for overland transport corridors driven by increased tensions between China and the U.S. Following significant progress in the normalization of Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, the South Caucasus, together with Central Asia, is likely to be perceived by Beijing as a relatively stable region for investment. In Central Asia, the development of overland routes is already well advanced. Kazakhstan, for example, has launched the second track of the 836-km Dostyk–Moyinty railway, increasing capacity fivefold to 60 pairs of trains per day. With a cost of nearly US$ 1 billion, it is the largest railway project undertaken since independence and a key enhancement of China–Europe transport connectivity. 

However, China’s westward transport expansion through Central Asia and the South Caucasus will also underscore the need for enhanced security cooperation. In this context, Beijing may seek deeper engagement within the SCO, potentially conflicting with Georgia’s and Armenia’s aspirations to strengthen cooperation with NATO and with Azerbaijan’s efforts to advance the military dimension of integration within the Organization of Turkic States.

Kazakhstan became the second country after Russia to utilize the opening of transit routes to Armenia via Azerbaijan. The new corridor (Kazakhstan/Russia–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Armenia) reduces logistics costs and enables regular deliveries, with Kazakhstan planning to transport up to 20,000 tons of grain per month.

In parallel, construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is advancing rapidly. These dynamics are likely to extend to the South Caucasus as China and the EU seek to expand overland connectivity to facilitate trade and access stable markets. This process will further link Central Asia and the South Caucasus and will require enhanced coordination to improve connectivity among major economic centers, giving rise to a second trend: the increasing complexity of the region’s geoeconomic architecture.

Despite these developments, the South Caucasus continues to consist of three states sharing a common geographic space but pursuing distinct foreign policy orientations. A comparable situation previously existed in Central Asia and did not prevent regional consolidation, as multiple institutional platforms were leveraged to advance regional interests. Similarly, the EAEU can support trade with Russia, the SCO can provide additional security frameworks for transport corridors, and both the EU and China can serve as key financiers of transport infrastructure.

The third and most significant trend is that the opening of transport links in the South Caucasus will further liberalize the market and intensify competition. For Armenia, this is likely to result in more active competition between Russian and European food producers. Modeling-based studies suggest that Russia’s effective market share will decline as Armenia’s borders open, with Europe and Turkey gaining ground. The central challenge will be to maximize the benefits of this competition by creating conditions that allow actors who compete bilaterally to nonetheless engage in trade and pursue joint projects within the South Caucasus.

Armenia’s largest solar power plant, Masrik-1, with a capacity of 62 MW, was developed by FRV and commissioned in June 2025 in the Gegharkunik region, supplying clean energy to more than 21,000 households. The project was financed with support from international banks and an EU grant, while the main construction works were carried out by the Chinese state-owned corporation CMEC. This project represents one of the clearest regional examples of cooperation among competing powers and may serve as a model for other South Caucasus states.

CONCLUSIONS:

In sum, the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia constitutes a critical turning point for the South Caucasus, positioning the region as an increasingly important transit and connectivity hub linking Central Asia, Europe, and East Asia. The region’s future trajectory will be shaped by its capacity to manage a more complex geoeconomic architecture involving multiple external actors with overlapping interests. Divergent foreign policy orientations among regional states may create opportunities to leverage a wide range of institutional platforms and investment sources. Ultimately, the impact of the peace agreement will depend on whether the regional states can translate improved connectivity and heightened competition into cooperative economic projects. The long-term success of the regionalization process will therefore hinge on the ability of regional states to manage diversity in external partnerships by preventing geopolitical competition from obstructing economic cooperation. If effectively managed, the South Caucasus can move beyond a legacy of protracted conflict and emerge as a stable, competitive, and strategically significant component of broader Eurasian geoeconomic processes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is a Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul.

Sardor Allayarov is an International relations expert with a research focus on theories of international relations, international order, China, Eurasia, and foreign policy. He currently serves as a Research Assistant at Urgench State University in Uzbekistan.

By Emil Avdaliani

On December 19–20, 2025, the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takachi in the C5+1 format. This marked the fifth such summit involving Central Asian leaders in 2025. Japan’s growing engagement with the region is driven primarily by interest in mineral extraction and processing, sectors that have attracted increasing competition from major Asian and Western powers. Tokyo’s evolving approach reflects broader global dynamics and heightened tensions over supply chains. Rather than seeking to exclude other external actors or assume a leading security role in Central Asia, Japan is pursuing a pragmatic strategy centered on economic cooperation. Through economically attractive initiatives, it aims gradually to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region.

BACKGROUND:

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.

A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.

Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.

For Japan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out because of their geographic position, economic potential, and human resources. However, Tokyo is also deepening engagement with other regional actors. Turkmenistan, for example, concluded eight investment agreements with Japanese firms. In Tajikistan, Japan has expressed interest in developing logistics and transport infrastructure, as well as in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements.

Japan and the Central Asian states also established cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and medicine. The parties proposed the creation of a Central Asia–Japan digital hub to promote collaboration in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the Internet of Things, and digital technologies.

Following the summit, a multilateral business forum was convened at which several joint projects were announced. These included the construction of solar power plants in Uzbekistan by Sumitomo, Chubu Electric Power, and Shikoku Electric Power, supported by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI); the establishment of a medical center by Sojitz; and critical minerals mining projects involving the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).

IMPLICATIONS:

For the Central Asian states, closer ties with Japan form part of a broader strategy to pursue a more multi-aligned foreign policy, extending beyond reliance not only on Russia and China but also on the EU and the U.S. Japan is regarded as a reliable and responsible source of investment, particularly in sectors such as green energy and infrastructure. With its considerable technological expertise and development experience, Tokyo is in a strong position in the competition for influence in Central Asia.

Japan nevertheless faces structural constraints as an investor that limit its geopolitical weight in Central Asia. Geography constitutes the primary obstacle: there are no direct overland or maritime routes linking Japan to the region. Central Asia’s landlocked position, combined with its considerable distance from Japan, will continue to impose significant constraints on bilateral relations. Consequently, Japan is unlikely to emerge as a major geopolitical actor in the heart of Eurasia. It will remain structurally disadvantaged especially vis-à-vis Russia and China, but also in comparison to the EU and the U.S. 

Second, Japan interest in security and military cooperation in the region is limited. Instead, it has primarily relied on soft power as its principal instrument of influence in Central Asia. For example, Tokyo has long supported Kazakhstan in assisting victims of Soviet-era nuclear testing by providing medical and technical aid, particularly to residents of the Abay region, where the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site is located. Other Central Asian states likewise receive substantial financial assistance from Japan. Notably, Tokyo offers various forms of partnership that are not formally conditioned on requirements related to democracy or human rights reforms.

Tokyo has demonstrated particular openness to cooperation in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). This focus reflects the heightened global attention Central Asia has received in recent years due to its resource base, which is critical for global supply chains. Japan seeks to diversify its mineral and REE imports away from China. This is not the first indication of Japanese interest in the region’s rare earth sector. In the 2010s, Tokyo participated, albeit briefly, in the Stepnogorsk project in Kazakhstan before withdrawing from the initiative. The December summit, however, signaled a renewed commitment to the mineral sector, underscored by a pledge to invest approximately US$ 19 billion over the next five years in developing supply chains in the region.

In this context, Kazakhstan introduced the Next-Generation SmartMining Plus initiative, aimed at digitalizing the mining industry. Discussions also addressed the first-ever shipment of gallium, a rare metal used in electronics and semiconductors, from Kazakhstan, a development of particular significance given China’s dominant position in global gallium production.

The intensifying competition for Central Asia’s REEs and other critical minerals forms part of a broader contest over the region’s resource base. The EU, Russia, China, the U.S., and other actors all perceive substantial untapped potential in Central Asia.

Although Japan is a relatively late entrant into this competition, its pledge to invest US$ 19 billion is notable, as no other external power has committed a comparable sum. The closest parallel is the EU’s plan to mobilize €12 billion under its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to enhance connectivity across Eurasia and strengthen the Union’s competitiveness vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Tokyo is capitalizing on Central Asia’s preference for engaging a wide range of external partners. It has also identified sectors in which the region remains particularly vulnerable and receptive to external support. One such domain is the rapidly evolving landscape of Eurasian connectivity.

In the context of the war in Ukraine and the increasing efforts by the EU, India, China, and other actors to develop alternative overland trade routes, the so-called Middle Corridor, linking the Black Sea to China’s western region of Xinjiang, has gained strategic prominence. Japan’s support for strengthening east–west connectivity in Central Asia reflects an effort to reduce Russia’s historically entrenched influence over the region’s infrastructure and economic networks. This strategic logic underpins Tokyo’s commitment to further development of the Middle Corridor.

CONCLUSIONS:

Japan’s expanding engagement with Central Asia reflects both its own foreign policy recalibrations and the intensifying competition among Asian and Western powers for access to the region’s strategic resources. Rivalry among Asian actors in particular has grown more pronounced, with China, South Korea, India, and several ASEAN member states all seeking to deepen their ties with Central Asia.

Compared to Russia and China, however, Japan’s ambitions remain more cautious. Rather than pursuing dominance, Tokyo aims to position itself as a facilitator of existing regional dynamics. Support for the expansion of the Middle Corridor and for the extraction and processing of REEs and other critical minerals aligns with Japan’s objective of mitigating Moscow’s and Beijing’s potential monopolistic influence in these sectors.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Rafis Abazov

For more than three decades, economic integration in Central Asia has been shaped by ambitious declarations, multilateral communiqués, and periodic summit diplomacy. Yet tangible outcomes have often lagged behind political rhetoric. The emerging shift from abstract integration models toward corridor-based, infrastructure-driven cooperation marks a potentially decisive turning point. Recent developments between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—notably the revival of the Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the creation of industrial and logistics hubs along their shared border—suggest that Central Asia may finally be moving from declarative regionalism to functional economic integration.

BACKGROUND:

Since independence, Central Asian states have repeatedly endorsed the idea of regional economic integration. Initiatives ranging from customs cooperation to Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) were designed to lower barriers, stimulate trade, and create a single economic space. In practice, however, these frameworks often lacked operational depth. Divergent regulatory regimes, weak cross-border infrastructure, and limited coordination between national development strategies constrained their impact. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan provide a revealing case. Despite geographical proximity and strong historical ties, economic cooperation long remained below potential. According to official data, bilateral trade turnover remained under US$ 2.0 billion in 2025, yet this figure still represented only a fraction of what integrated logistics, industrial cooperation, and value-chain development could deliver. Another indicator underscores this gap: more than 70 percent of bilateral trade consisted of raw materials and low value-added goods, highlighting the structural limitations of existing trade patterns. Against this backdrop, corridor-based integration has emerged as a pragmatic alternative. Rather than attempting to harmonize entire economies at once, economic corridors focus on specific geographic axes where infrastructure, trade facilitation, industrial policy, and investment can be aligned. This logic underpins the renewed focus on the Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor, one of the most densely populated (with population about 4.4 million people) and economically dynamic cross-border zones in Central Asia. The Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor (ABEC) was initially conceptualized in the mid-2010s as a pilot for cross-border integration. Supported by the ADB, the corridor connects two major urban agglomerations—Almaty and Bishkek—located less than 250 kilometers apart. Together, they account for a significant share of both countries’ GDP, population, and industrial capacity.

IMPLICATIONS:

The renewed political momentum behind ABEC is notable. In 2025, the official visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Kyrgyzstan elevated economic corridor development to the level of strategic priority. The visit reaffirmed both governments’ commitment to moving beyond symbolic cooperation toward concrete joint projects, particularly in logistics, agri-processing, and light manufacturing. Perhaps the most innovative element of the new integration model is the creation of joint industrial trade and logistics complexes (ITLCs) along the Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan border. Unlike traditional free trade zones, these hubs are designed as shared economic spaces, with coordinated infrastructure, customs regimes, and investment incentives. The first pilot hub in the Kordai area represents a qualitative shift. It is not merely a transit point but a platform for joint production, storage, processing, and distribution. By co-locating enterprises from both countries, the hub aims to shorten supply chains, reduce logistics costs, and encourage value-added manufacturing. Early estimates suggest that efficient corridor operations could reduce cross-border transport costs by 15–20 percent, significantly improving competitiveness for small and medium-sized enterprises on both sides, create thousands of jobs, and increase bilateral trade turnover to US$ 3.0 billion by 2030. Importantly, these hubs are embedded in a broader political framework. Their creation followed mutual state visits, meetings of the Kazakh–Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council, and sustained high-level engagement. This alignment between political leadership and technical implementation has been largely absent in earlier regional initiatives.

The shift from declarations to corridors carries broader implications for Central Asia’s integration trajectory. First, it reframes free trade agreements as enabling instruments rather than endpoints. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) alone do not generate trade; infrastructure, logistics, and industrial cooperation do. The Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan experience suggests that FTAs are most effective when embedded in spatially defined economic corridors with clear investment pipelines. Second, corridor-based integration offers scalability. Success along the Almaty–Bishkek axis could be replicated along other strategic routes, linking Central Asia more effectively to South Asia, China, and the Caucasus. In this sense, corridors function as building blocks for a wider regional economic space. Third, the model strengthens resilience. By promoting regional value chains and reducing dependence on distant markets, corridor integration can buffer Central Asian economies against external shocks. For landlocked countries, improved cross-border connectivity is not a luxury but a strategic necessity. Finally, the political economy dimension is crucial. Sustained leadership engagement—illustrated by the 2025 presidential visit and repeated intergovernmental consultations—signals a recognition that economic integration requires long-term commitment, institutional coordination, and trust-building. This is a departure from the episodic diplomacy that characterized earlier phases of regional cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS:

ADB-supported assessments emphasized several corridor advantages: proximity to markets, complementary labor and production structures, and existing transport links that could be upgraded at relatively low cost. Recent investments have focused on modernizing border crossing points, improving road and logistics infrastructure, and harmonizing customs and sanitary standards. These “soft infrastructure” reforms are as critical as physical upgrades, reducing transaction costs and uncertainty for businesses. 

This ADB’s evaluation illustrates the choices for Central Asian republics. The region can continue to produce integration declarations with limited practical impact, or it can invest in functional mechanisms that deliver measurable economic outcomes. The evolving partnership between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan suggests that the latter path is increasingly viable. By anchoring integration in corridors, logistics hubs, and targeted industrial cooperation, the two countries are experimenting with a new model of regionalism—one that is pragmatic, incremental, and results-oriented. Supported by institutions such as ADB and reinforced by high-level political will, this approach moves integration from aspiration to implementation. If sustained and expanded, corridor-based integration could redefine economic cooperation across Central Asia. It offers a way to translate geography into advantage, proximity into productivity, and political goodwill into shared growth. In doing so, it may finally allow the region to move from declarations to durable economic corridors—and, ultimately, toward a genuinely integrated economic space.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), An Effective Project Manager (2025) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.