By Sudha Ramachandran
June 26, 2018, the CACI Analyst
A day after Taliban fighters stunned the world with photographs of themselves embracing and celebrating Eid with personnel of the Afghan security forces, the Taliban leadership announced its decision not to extend the ceasefire. This dashed the hopes of millions of Afghans who were looking forward to a respite from the war. While the Taliban’s refusal to extend the ceasefire is disappointing, it is not the end of the road for the peace process. In recent months, Afghanistan has witnessed powerful demonstrations calling on the government and the Taliban to end the fighting. President Ashraf Ghani must draw on these peace constituencies to keep the peace process alive.
By Huseyn Aliyev
May 23, 2018, the CACI Analyst
Since December 2017, following the military defeat of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), several hundred Russian citizens, mostly from the North Caucasian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, have been brought back to Russia from Syria and Iraq. The returnees are families of ISIS fighters from the North Caucasus. So far, authorities have detained and prosecuted many returnees upon their return to the North Caucasus. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has masterminded the return of North Caucasus nationals from the Middle East, using the opportunity to boost his image as a regional leader.
By Sudha Ramachandran
November 13, 2017, the CACI Analyst
The attack at Mirza Olang village in Sayad district of Afghanistan’s Sar-e Pul Province on August 5 is reported to have been a joint operation by the Taliban and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the local branch of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Khorasan is an old name for the region that includes parts of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia). If the Taliban and ISKP did indeed join forces to carry out the attack, this is bad news for the Afghan government and people. However, given the huge differences and tense relations between the two armed groups, cooperation, if any, is likely to be local, tactical and short-lived.
By Huseyn Aliyev
April 26, 2017, the CACI Analyst
A 300-strong battalion of Ingush military police, assembled from among Ingush Special Forces, was dispatched to Syria in February as announced by the head of the Ingush Republic Yunus-bek Yevkurov. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, Ingush soldiers will replace Chechen military police sent to support pro-Assad forces in and around Aleppo in December 2016. However, in a recent statement, Chechen security officials confirmed that the Chechen units would most likely remain in Aleppo until August 2017. As ceasefire violations between pro-Assad forces and the Syrian opposition become more frequent, reinforcements from Ingushetia may indicate Russia’s intentions to increase its ground troops in Syria.
By Emil Souleimanov
March 24, 2017, the CACI Analyst
At the turn of 2016 and 2017, events took place in parts of Chechnya that again challenged the triumphant statements of local pro-Moscow and federal authorities that the jihadist-inspired insurgency in this North Caucasian republic was eradicated. Aside from illustrating the latent character of armed conflict in the region in general and in Chechnya in particular, the recent upsurge of violence in Chechnya contains particularities that may have far-reaching consequences. Sporadic attacks against the Kadyrov regime will likely recur in the years to come and intensify should the regime’s grip on power weaken.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.