COMPETITION VS PARTNERSHIP: UZBEKISTAN-KAZAKHSTAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT

By Nargiza Umarova

Recent geopolitical crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have created favorable conditions for the development of intercontinental land trade routes, significantly enhancing the role of Central Asia as a transit region linking major Eurasian markets. This shift was anticipated to improve intraregional transport connectivity and facilitate the integration of Central Asian republics into global supply chains – both essential for the region’s economic growth. However, unity among the five Central Asian states on these initiatives remains elusive. Currently, these countries prioritize the creation of international transit corridors over local connectivity. Low coordination between them leads to duplication of projects, and the focus on their own interests becomes a source of unhealthy competition. Rivalry is particularly evident in the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, each seeking alternative access to Turkish and European markets via the Caspian Sea.

BACKGROUND:  In 2018, the Central Asian states initiated a mechanism for regular Consultative Meetings aimed at enhancing multilateral cooperation in transport communications. A key priority identified was the alignment of national transport systems, a crucial prerequisite for boosting mutual trade and expanding the transit potential of the region’s countries. To facilitate this alignment, plans were proposed to establish a Regional Center for the Development of Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations, to develop a Strategy for Regional Transport Corridor Development in Central Asia, and to adopt a Regional Program for Transport Communication Development. However, years later, these initiatives remain unimplemented, although some positive developments have occurred. In 2018, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resumed railway service along the critical Galaba-Amuzang-Khoshadi route, resulting in nearly a twofold increase in mutual trade. A similar outcome was observed between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan following the launch of the multimodal corridor Tashkent-Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam-Kashgar in the same year.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated considerable activity in advancing local transport projects. As the largest economies in Central Asia, these nations account for nearly the entire volume of intraregional trade, motivating them to develop new mutually beneficial freight routes. In 2021, the two countries agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda road and railway, which will connect Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region with Uzbekistan's industrial Navoi region, effectively reducing the distance between them by more than three times. Additional plans include the construction of the Darbaza-Maktaaral railway line and the Beineu-Shalkar road. Despite successful cooperation within the region, Astana and Tashkent occasionally find themselves in competition in the external transport and logistics arena, which can be characterized as a conflict of interests. A prominent example of this rivalry is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. Following the onset of the war in Ukraine, demand for the Middle Corridor among global cargo-generating centers in both the East and West has surged significantly. This land trade route from China to Europe traverses Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and Turkey. The TITR serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor, whose operations are hindered by anti-Russian sanctions. The route is experiencing robust development, with transportation volumes reaching 2.7 million tons in 2023 and projected to increase to 4.2 million tons in 2024. Since the start of this year, container transit from China through the Middle Corridor has increased by a factor of 14. Within a few years, the route’s capacity could expand to accommodate 10 million tons of cargo annually. With appropriate infrastructure improvements and enhanced terminal capacities, the Trans-Caspian route is projected to become 35 percent faster and 40 percent more cost-effective than the Northern Corridor in the near future.

IMPLICATIONS:  It is important to emphasize that nearly all Central Asian countries are involved in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), not solely Kazakhstan. According to experts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), there are three primary transit routes within the Middle Corridor: the northern route, which passes through northern Kazakhstan; the central route, which traverses southern Kazakhstan; and the southern route, which runs through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan occupies a uniquely advantageous position within the Central Asian segment of the China–European Union–China supply chain. This strategic edge stems from its shared borders with both China and Russia. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is also striving to establish a significant role in transit transportation between China and Europe. Uzbekistan’s involvement in multimodal transport routes such as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Caspian Sea–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Black Sea region, or Georgia–Turkey–European Union (part of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, TRACECA), as well as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey–European Union, supports its ambitions in this area. It is relevant to highlight the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, which allows cargo from China to reach Uzbekistan in two days, compared to the ten days required via Kazakhstan. Plans are underway to construct a railway along a similar route, which would considerably enhance the positions of Tashkent and Bishkek in railway freight transportation from China to the Middle East, thereby bypassing Kazakhstan’s current monopoly. At present, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with railway checkpoints on its border with China. In the development of trans-Caspian transport routes toward the West, Central Asian states operate as both partners and competitors. Partnership is evident in their collaborative efforts to develop connecting routes that enable the nations of the region to link up with various transit branches of the Middle Corridor. For instance, as noted earlier, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda railway, which will be integrated into the Kazakh section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). In 2019, Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, launched an alternative trade route to Europe via the Caspian Sea, known as the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia+) corridor. Recently, the participating countries agreed to establish a consortium—a specialized body to coordinate the activities of this route. This development marks the project’s advancement to an institutional level, which provides a solid foundation for enhancing its competitive potential and boosting the transit capabilities of both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is also worth noting that, as early as 2014, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia institutionalized the Middle Corridor by first forming a Coordination Committee, which later evolved into the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.” These instances highlight the ongoing fragmentation among Central Asian states in the development of extra-regional transport routes. This fragmentation carries the risk of fostering unhealthy competition, which could generate discord among the countries in the region.

CONCLUSIONS:  Given the growing trend of deepening intra-regional ties in Central Asia, driven by the current geopolitical realities, it is increasingly crucial for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to integrate their transport project potential and establish joint coordination mechanisms. A coordinated approach to managing transit transportation through the Caspian Sea along the China-Europe-China axis is necessary, grounded in principles of equality and mutual benefit. Ensuring that the interests of one party do not overshadow those of the other is key to fostering balanced cooperation. Moreover, harmonizing the activities of the CASCA+ corridor consortium with the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” appears essential, with the goal of ultimately merging both structures into a unified coordinating body with legal status. Developing common approaches to international transport corridors and accelerating the adoption of the “Strategy for the Development of Transport Corridors in Central Asia,” which was first proposed in 2018, is equally important. Additionally, the proposal to establish a Regional Centre for Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations remains a pertinent issue.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan” (Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Her research activities are focused on studying the developments of Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors.

By Farkhod Tolipov

August 21, 2024

During a state visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Uzbekistan in May 2024, after his re-election, it was officially announced that the long-anticipated construction of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received a green light. A corresponding agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan. This decision caused wide public debate about the NPP, regarding its expediency, the environmental and security risks, as well as the geopolitical consequences associated with it. At the same time, the project signifies Uzbekistan’s growing dependence on Russia and a more pro-Russian drift in Tashkent’s foreign policy. 

BACKGROUND: The first signals of the possible construction of an NPP in Uzbekistan appeared several years ago. It was then stipulated and justified with reference to the lack of sufficient gas reserves in the country. This pretext surprised many economic experts, political analysts as well as the public since Uzbekistan has for a long time, even during the Soviet period, occupied the highest positions in international rankings of gas reserves and gas production.

The issue of dwindling gas reserves is a big and ambiguous question because neither the government nor specialists have provided convincing explanations for the exhaustion of gas fields in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, frequent blackouts have become a “normal” phenomenon during last two-three years – roughly corresponding to the period during which the NPP project has been officially promoted. Sudden and frequent blackouts taking place across the country have created the suspicion that they are not so much caused by the inability of existing energy infrastructure to satisfy the country’s growing energy needs and a lack of gas reserves, but are man-made and deliberate in order to convince people that there is no alternative to an NPP.
However, the overall agreements between Uzbekistan and Russia regarding the NPP, including the costs of the plant, environmental aspects, the disposal and utilization of nuclear waste, and many other concomitant questions of interest to the public and media remain opaque and secretive. It was in this context that Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev announced the official start of the NPP construction project.

Initially, the NPP project was intended to consist of 2 large reactors of 1.2 Gigawatt each, at a cost estimated to US$ 11 billion. However, it has now been decided that the NPP will be a small plant consisting of 6 small reactors of 55 Megawatt each. Overall, the electricity that will be produced by the NPP is supposed to constitute about 15 percent of the total energy produced in the country. The NPP is supposed to become operational in 2033.

IMPLICATIONS: Proponents of the NPP construction argue that nuclear energy is widely used in the world, pointing to France, Germany, Japan, the U.S. and others. According to them, constructing the NPP is in Uzbekistan’s strategic interests and an instrument of sustainable development, since it will positively affect both economic growth and the population’s living standards. Moreover, they say that nuclear power is the only source of energy generation that meets all three pillars of the so-called energy trilemma established by the International Energy Agency – reliability of energy infrastructure; availability of energy for the population and industry; and no harmful effect on the environment.

While these assertions seem aimed to calm the excited public opinion, they do not withstand critical counterarguments. Numerous physicists, environmentalists, energy experts, political scientists and public activists have raised their voices against the NPP. In particular, according to estimates, it will be more expensive to produce electric energy in small reactors than large ones. Uzbekistan will face a large financial burden that will be carried by consumers. Also, according to estimates, Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sources can fully satisfy the country’s energy needs even without the NPP.

Meanwhile, multiple questions related to the construction and operation of the NPP as well as its geopolitical implications have not been addressed and no transparent calculations of key aspects of the NPP’s operation have been provided. These include the enrichment of Uranium from U²¹⁸ to U²³²; the system for cooling the reactor; the utilization of nuclear waste; the overall cost of the project; security aspects; as well as the increased reliance on a Russia that wages a war of aggression against Ukraine and threatens other former Soviet republics with its neo-imperial policy. In addition, the digitalization of the NPP operation raises questions regarding possible cyber-security aspects of the plant, which will definitely be exposed to such threats.
Importantly, this type of small NPP does not exist even in Russia itself, which uses small reactors only for icebreaker engines. Thus, the NPP in Uzbekistan will in fact constitute a first experiment with a number of risks attached.

When journalists and pundits began to inquire about the details of the NPP project and requested relevant information from governmental agencies, they received no response. To the contrary, media organizations were told by authorities that they should refrain from highlighting topics relating to the NPP. Despite the reluctance of government agencies to communicate information on the NPP and attempts to curtail media coverage, social networks and independent experts do discuss the issue and seek to keep it on the public agenda. A special group was even created on Facebook titled “Uzbekistanis are against the NPP.” Simultaneously, a similar NPP project is being discussed in Kazakhstan. In contrast to Tashkent, Astana has officially made it clear that a referendum will be held on NPP construction. However, in Uzbekistan, the decision comes before its justification.
The social and political drama related to the NPP has created the impression that the project corresponds to Russia’s interests rather than those of Uzbekistan. The enthusiasm with which Russia promotes this project cannot be considered and understood independently from the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Indeed, the NPP will serve triple objectives for Moscow. First, it will constitute political leverage for exerting pressure upon Uzbekistan. Second, it will provide one among very few instruments for mitigating economic decline and crisis in Russia due to international economic and financial sanctions. Third, it will help creating a false image that Russia is not isolated in world politics and has partners and allies. Given the establishment of a partnership in nuclear energy, Uzbekistan will hardly vote against Russia at future UNGA sessions.

It should be recalled that since 1997, Central Asia is proclaimed a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The NWFZ by its nature and essence is a broad concept; its ultimate goal is to safeguard the region against any form of nuclear threat. The question therefore arises whether the NPP can be considered a dual-purpose object, which could in certain circumstances be transformed into a weapon? After Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP, this question cannot be ignored and obscured.

Instead, Uzbekistan’s government seems to reiterate Napoleon’s saying: “One jumps into the fray, then figures out what to do next,” or “You commit yourself, then you see.”

CONCLUSIONS: While a number of countries utilize NPPs to produce electricity, most countries resolve their electricity needs by developing alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro. Many countries are also cancelling their nuclear energy programs in favor of renewable sources. The straightforward and very simplistic attempts by proponents of Uzbekistan’s NPP to propagate for the project, in combination with the secrecy displayed by Uzbek authorities, are not only unconvincing but also raise suspicions that Tashkent engages in a mutual geopolitical gamble with Moscow.

The agreement signed between Tashkent and Moscow on the NPP lacks due scientific elaboration and national debates concerning all aspects and risks involved in the deal. Many experts, media as well members of the public are now raising their voices against the project, claiming that Uzbekistan is losing its sovereignty and independence and falling into dependence on Russia.

Indeed, this issue is far from routine and conventional, just like a nuclear weapon is considered a non-conventional weapon. Accordingly, policy in this special area also should be unconventional, taking into account the vital national interests of the country.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

Svante E. Cornell

May 22, 2024

Turkey and Uzbekistan are the two largest countries in the Turkic world. As a result, the rela- tionship between them is a determining factor for the prospects of Turkic cooperation. For most of three decades, the difficulties in the bilateral relationship was a key impediment to Turkey’s influence in Central Asia. Since 2016, however, the arrival of a new leadership in Uzbekistan coincided with Turkey’s turn in a nationalist direction to provide a major boost toward a more fruitful and cooperative relationship. While Turkey’s relations with Uzbekistan have much ground to make up compared to its ties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the two states have made it priority to do just that.

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Slavomir Horak

January 19, 2024

Turkmenistan underwent a serious rapprochement with Russia in recent years, particularly after the establishment of a ruling tandem with Serdar Berdimuhamedow as a formal president and his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who retained significant influence in Turkmenistan’s domestic and foreign policy. Due to a few viable alternatives, Russia represents the balancing factor for Turkmenistan towards the increasing Chinese influence over the country and the principal supporter of the regime. On the contrary, Turkmenistan remains a loyal partner in the region for Russia, where the most significant players (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) expressed their cautious approach towards Russia's advance in Ukraine.

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Richard Outzen

December 8, 2023

There has been a rapid intensification of Turkish relations with Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the past decade. The creation of the Organization of Turkic States in 2021 was a major milestone, but in the bilateral realm a significant shift has taken place as the Turkish defense and security ties to regional states have intensified – particularly with Azerbaijan, with whom Turkey has a defense treaty, but also with Central Asian states. This development could be a net strategic gain for the West in an era of Great Power Competition, if appreciated rather than ignored and engaged rather than sidelined.

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