By Marat Iliyasov

Ramzan Kadyrov, Kremlin-backed Chechen leader, faces serious allegations. A German NGO, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, accuses him of leading LGBTQ+ purges in Chechnya; Georgia alleged that he plotted journalist Giorgi Gabunia’s murder; while Ukraine accuses his forces of committing war crimes. Reports also link him to kidnappings, torture, and the murder of Chechen opposition figures and bloggers across Europe and Turkey. These accusations could place Kadyrov alongside internationally tried criminals such as former president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević or the Deputy Führer of the Nazi Party Rudolf Hess. But…, is this scenario plausible?  

Photo source: tatarstan.ru

BACKGROUND: To begin with, it is important to examine how the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc tribunals are formed, who can submit a case to the ICC, and which individuals can be indicted.

The establishment of international tribunals and ICC are rooted in international law and the broader aim of creating a more just and accountable world. This development began after WWII, when military and political leaders from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were tried for their war crimes. These tribunals set a crucial precedent purported to halt crimes against humanity that concern the international community.

The Cold War (1946-1991) between the US and the USSR severely curtailed the enforcement of international justice. Crimes committed during this era often went unpunished because the perpetrators had the backing of these superpowers, which could effectively obstruct investigations or prosecutions via the UN Security Council. Without the willingness and cooperation of world powers and the countries involved, tribunals either could not be created or lacked enforcement mechanisms. For example, it took decades to try the Khmer Rouge’s crimes committed in 1970s in Cambodia. It became possible only when the Cambodian government finally supported the idea of establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC).

The fall of Communism in 1991 triggered more international armed conflicts and consequently war crimes. It also created new opportunities for international justice. The tribunals for former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone strengthened the possibility of prosecuting high-ranking officials for crimes against humanity. Notably, these courts succeeded in convicting former Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević and former Liberian President Charles Taylor—figures once deemed untouchable. These trials, same as the tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Liberia were made possible by key shifts in the internal power structures of these countries.

Even today, the willingness and collaboration of the domestic power structures remain the most important element in determining the feasibility of initiating a case. To prosecute Kadyrov, such cooperation would be required from Russia, which has consistently demonstrated its unwillingness to collaborate with the international bodies. Therefore, building a case against Kadyrov could potentially achieve only limited success, similar to the international tribunal for Lebanon. Established in 2009 to prosecute Hezbollah members for the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, this special tribunal convicted and sentenced the identified culprits in absentia. This means that they can be punished only if captured, which renders this trial largely symbolic.

IMPLICATIONS: Various actors could theoretically initiate proceedings against Kadyrov, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), prosecutors from the International Criminal Court (ICC), national governments appealing for UN intervention, international organizations such as Amnesty International, and supreme courts of foreign countries invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals.

However, the likelihood of any of these actors successfully leading such an initiative against Kadyrov and bringing him to justice remains low. The UNSC could act only if Russia, as a permanent member of the Council, either refrains from using its veto or initiates the process itself—both of which are highly unlikely. Russia has a long history of misusing its veto power in the UNSC and is a country where the rule of law is frequently breached. Moreover, given Kadyrov’s strong ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is nearly inconceivable that Russia would support or initiate such efforts.

Initiatives could also come from international organizations, the ICC, national governments, or national courts of foreign countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction. To build a case, these initiators must gather substantial evidence and secure the cooperation of experts and witnesses. The ICC’s 2023 indictment of Vladimir Putin for war crimes demonstrates the institution's willingness to take bold action, such as cases initiated by Ukraine for war crimes committed on its territory by the Russian military. However, this does not guarantee that Kadyrov will be brought to court. The ICC's arrest warrant for Putin demonstrates the limitations of international justice. The warrant has neither been enforced, nor has it prevented him from visiting countries where he should have been arrested.

Another question to consider is: what crimes could Kadyrov be prosecuted for? He has long been accused of systematically violating human rights in Chechnya and beyond. Journalistic investigations and witness testimonies suggest that he has personally overseen or ordered acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, the persecution of LGBTQ+ individuals (including the execution of dozens during an alleged "purification" campaign), enforced disappearances, and repression of dissent. If substantial evidence—including testimonies, forensic analyses, and classified documents—supports these claims, he could be directly prosecuted.

However, gathering such proof would be extremely difficult. Despite the existence of survivors and witnesses, most would be reluctant to testify due to fears of retaliation against themselves or their family members still living in Chechnya. Given that witness protection programs in the EU and the US do not cover the relatives of witnesses, it is hard to imagine any foreign government taking the risk of extracting multiple family members from Chechnya, resettling them elsewhere, and supporting them financially. Without such assurances, convincing people to testify against Kadyrov and prove his involvement in these crimes would be an immense challenge.

Another set of crimes Kadyrov could potentially be tried for are war crimes in Ukraine. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kadyrov’s forces—known as the Kadyrovtsy—have faced multiple accusations of violating the rules and regulations of international humanitarian law, known as jus in bello. These allegations could support the building of a case against Kadyrov under the principle of command responsibility. However, given difficulties of documenting of documenting crimes during wartime, it is unlikely that sufficient evidence implicating Kadyrov in issuing direct orders to commit war crimes will ever be found.

Lastly, it is important to note that Kadyrov's troops are part of the broader Russian military. This means that any tribunal would need to address not only Kadyrov, but also the entire Russian military command and political leadership. This brings us back to the minimal likelihood of such a scenario, given the strong political resistance from the Russian leadership against international justice.

CONCLUSION: Establishing an international tribunal against Kadyrov faces considerable legal, technical, and political obstacles. The biggest of these is the lack of willingness and cooperation from the Russian leadership, which shields Kadyrov from legal consequences both domestically and internationally. The likelihood of Russian collaboration, even if international bodies were to initiate a case against Kadyrov, is minimal. This is largely because Kadyrov’s case cannot be investigated in isolation from the Russian political leadership. Therefore, creating an international tribunal for Kadyrov is a highly unlikely scenario. It cannot happen without a significant overhaul of Russia's power structures, as historical examples of successful international tribunals demonstrate.

AUTHOR BIO: Marat Iliyasov is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the College of the Holy Cross. His focus is post-Soviet politics and conflicts in wider Eurasia.

By Mushtaq A. Kaw

March 9, 2022

The recent U.S. ban on Xinjiang imports in reaction to the "widespread, state sponsored forced labor" and "mass detention" of the ethnic Muslim minorities in China’s far-western and strategically important Xinjiang province denotes a marked U.S. contribution to the international protest against Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang. However, international opposition is unlikely to make any dent on China, which has an ambitious colonial agenda to accomplish in the disputed region.  

Human Rights Reform in Kazakhstan

By Oleg Salimov (05/08/2015 issue of the CACI Analyst)

A series of high-profile convictions and trials of members of the political opposition took place in Tajikistan in the second half of July. Among them are a 17-year prison term for Maksud Ibrogimov, the leader of “Youth for Revival of Tajikistan,” a 5-year prison term for Jamoliddin Makhmudov, the top political advisor to the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, and the final phases of a new trial of former Tajik Minister Zaid Saidov, who is already serving a 26 year prison term, which could result in an additional sentence of 25 years. Human rights activists and relatives of convicted opposition members report unfair trials and significant violations of human rights.

Ibrogimov disappeared in Moscow in January 2015 and later reappeared in Dushanbe (see the 04/01/2015 Issue of the CACI Analyst). He was tried behind closed doors at the Ismoili Somoni district court of the city of Dushanbe. The information about Ibrogimov’s trial and verdict was kept secret for a month. Ibrogimov was convicted on June 24 but the official release of the verdict was published only on July 23. Yet the details of Ibrogimov’s case, such as his illegal extradition from Russia to Tajikistan, the substantiation of the accusations against him, and details of the trial, were declared a state secret. The 36-year-old Ibrogimov was convicted on four criminal counts, including “organization of extremist group,” “organization of activity of extremist group,” “public calls to extremist actions,” and “organization of criminal group.” According to Radio Ozodi, Ibrogimov was deprived of his right to be defended by a Russian attorney as his Russian citizenship was revoked during his extradition to Tajikistan.

On July 20, the Hissar district court sentenced Makhmudov to five years in prison for illegal possession of weapons and ammunition. At the trial, Makhmudov admitted that he possessed a handgun due to his leadership position during the Civil War but dismissed state accusations and witness statements on his illegal turnover of weapons, calling them a farce. Makhmudov is a political advisor to the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) Mukhiddin Kabiri. As a prominent IRPT member, Makhmudov held positions in the IRPT Supreme Governing Council as well as the State Central Committee on Elections and Referendums as part of the post-Civil War reconciliation agreement between the government and opposition. Makhmudov was arrested in February 2015, right before Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections in March. IRPT was subjected to substantial persecution from the government prior to the elections, forcing its leader Kabiri to flee the country after IRPT lost the elections. Makhmudov’s case was likely intended to intimidate Kabiri and drive him out of the country.

Tajikistan’s Supreme Court finalized the review of Saidov’s new economic case on July 22 in Dushanbe. The trial took place behind closed doors at the ward of Tajikistan’s State Security Services (former KGB). Saidov was sentenced to 26 years in prison in 2013 for criminal charges, including rape and polygamy. In the new case, the state prosecutor requested another 25-year sentence for Saidov, a US$ 5.5 million fine, and the confiscation of his entire property for economic crimes involving abuse of office and illegal assets appropriation.

Earlier this year, Tajik courts in Dushanbe and the Khatlon region sustained the decision of Tajikistan’s Anticorruption agency to expropriate two enterprises owned by Ukrainian businessman Dmitry Firtash, which were privatized during Saidov’s work as a Minister of Industry of Tajikistan.
In his final statement, Saidov rejected all state accusations and insisted that his imprisonment was politically motivated. Saidov was arrested in May 2013 after announcing the formation of the political party New Tajikistan. The announcement preceded the November 2013 presidential elections in Tajikistan.

Recent events in Tajikistan demonstrate the disregard for international law, human rights, and principles of democracy on the part of Tajik authorities. Human rights activists and organizations protested against the secretive trials, lengthy and questionable prison terms, concealment of information, deprivation of defense for the accused, and other transgressions. Tajikistan’s justice system is highly politicized, and is frequently used as a tool to deal with political challengers for Rakhmon’s regime. The president’s clan exercises strong influence over the country’s courts and justice in Tajikistan is curtailed by the judges’ personal loyalty to the country’s ruler rather than their commitment to the rule of law and democracy. The long overdue reform of Tajikistan’s justice system must emphasize the actual independence of the justice system as a separate branch of power and guarantee its representatives safety from retribution from the government and president. Until then, the illegal persecution and imprisonment of political dissidents in Tajikistan will continue.

(Image courtesy: RFE/RL)

By Arslan Sabyrbekov (06/24/2015 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On June 10, Kyrgyzstan marked the fifth anniversary of the tragic inter-ethnic violence that claimed more than 400 lives, displaced tens of thousands of people and destroyed thousands of households. In the aftermath of the bloody events, the President of neighboring Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, issued a statement that third forces provoked the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and the Kyrgyz leadership agreed. However, recent developments indicate that Karimov’s position vis-à-vis the authorities in Bishkek and the conflict has changed into a more confrontational stance.

Karimov’s changing mood became apparent after his remarks to his Kyrgyz counterpart at the informal summit of the CIS states held in Moscow on May 8, in connection with the celebration of the 70^th anniversary of the victory against Nazi Germany. At the summit, Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev stated that, “It is of course sad that not everybody could make it to this summit because, to some extent, it is a tribute and respect for fathers and grandfathers, mothers and grandmothers who were in the war. I think that this day should remain in the memory of all countries because the future will punish those who forget the past.”

In response to this statement, the Uzbek President said that every democratically elected leader is in a position to decide what to celebrate and where, and no one has the right to force his opinion on others. Karimov continued by referring to his Kyrgyz colleague as simply “Almaz” and described his statements as incorrect and tactless. Atambayev interfered, stating that he was simply expressing his opinion, but Karimov ironically interrupted him by saying, “We all know your opinion already.”

Nevertheless, during his bilateral talks with the United Nations’ Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Karimov described the June 2010 events in southern Kyrgyzstan as a full-scale war. “Power holders in Kyrgyzstan did not draw any conclusions. The causes of the conflict need to be investigated at an international level,” Karimov noted, despite the fact that the inter-ethnic clashes were investigated by a national as well as an international commission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This is in stark contrast to the Andijan massacre of 2005, which were never evaluated either by national or international commissions.

Yet Karimov touched on a weak spot by pointing to Kyrgyzstan’s failure to bring the perpetrators to justice. Well-respected international human rights organizations have also called on the Kyrgyz authorities to retry all those convicted following the June 2010 inter-ethnic clashes, a trial that according to them saw ethnic Uzbeks sentenced at a higher proportion that then their Kyrgyz counterparts. Such a retrial would involve the case of the human rights defender and ethnic Uzbek Azimjan Askarov, sentenced to life for organizing mass disturbances and instigating inter-ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. According to Rachel Denber of Human Rights Watch, “In the case of Azimjan Askarov, the Kyrgyz justice system has utterly failed to deliver justice. The case was riddled with blatant flaws from start to finish, and it is astounding that the court did not order a thorough investigation into the way it was conducted.”

In general, Bishkek-Tashkent relations have always been uneasy. The two countries have been divided not only over the ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan, but also on numerous border conflicts and the constant struggle for water resources. According to local political analysts, Karimov’s increasingly critical statements addressed to Bishkek might be guided by geopolitical interests. In a number of interviews, Uzbekistan’s president has stated that Tashkent will not enter the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union or any other alliance that is reminiscent of the Soviet Union, unlike Bishkek, which is pursuing the opposite foreign policy.

Also, earlier this year Kyrgyzstan approved the sale of its gas network to Russia’s Gazprom for the symbolic price of US$ 1 and is now receiving its energy supplies without any delay. This has removed Tashkent’s leverage, which it has previously deployed to bully Bishkek by cutting off supplies during winter. Such developments, along with Bishkek re-equipping its military with the Kremlin’s assistance might are indeed irritants to power holders in Tashkent.