By Alexander Scrivener

Georgia’s political crisis rumbles on as the government of the increasingly anti-Western Georgian Dream party faces widespread protests from the country’s overwhelmingly pro-EU populace. But as the number of demonstrators dwindle due to a combination of oppression, fatigue, and demoralisation, the question of how Georgian Dream will manage the situation going forward becomes crucial.

Will Georgian Dream choose to “muddle through” and ignore the dissenters, or will it seek to cement a more fully-fledged authoritarian regime through brute force? It is too early to make definitive predictions, but the current status quo may evolve into a longer-term state of permanent low-level political crisis in which neither government nor opposition possesses the resources to gain a decisive victory over the other.

BACKGROUND: Georgia’s street protest movement has now entered its third month. The protests began on November 28 in response to the announcement by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze that the country would be suspending its bid to join the EU until 2028.

The announcement came soon after a disputed parliamentary election on October 26, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party claimed victory with almost 54 percent of the vote. None of the four opposition forces recognised the result, which they allege was falsified. This position was also supported by President Salome Zourabichvili who claims to remain in office despite her term ending on 29 December. International and domestic observer missions gave at best mixed verdicts about the conduct of the election, casting further doubt on the result’s legitimacy. For example, the OSCE mission found that in 24 percent of observations, voter secrecy was “potentially compromised.”

But the election itself only prompted small-scale, relatively subdued protests. It was not until PM Kobakhidze’s suspension of membership talks with the EU that hundreds of thousands of Georgians came out onto the streets spontaneously. Polls have indicated that at least 80 percent of Georgians support EU membership, and the abrupt announcement caused a significant eruption of public anger.

Unlike previous protests, which had been mostly centred on the capital Tbilisi, the protests this time included sizable demonstrations in the regions, including the cities of Kutaisi, Batumi, Ozurgeti, and even the normally politically quiescent small town of Khashuri.

The protests were at first accompanied by a steady stream of resignations, including Georgia’s ambassadors to the US, France, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Footage of widespread police brutality against protesters in the initial weeks fuelled further anger. This violence was also perpetrated by unofficial regime enforcers, the so-called titushky, who targeted opposition leaders and activists for unprovoked beatings, in some cases with police looking on and refusing to intervene.

Meanwhile Georgian Dream-aligned media attempted to paint the protesters as violent, pointing at demonstrators’ use of fireworks against police.

As domestic and foreign pressure on Georgian Dream increased, the government changed tack. The use of indiscriminate violence fell, replaced instead by more targeted actions. Fines for breaking the rules around protest rose tenfold, and the blocking of “strategic” roads of international importance was made a criminal offense.

The combination of fatigue, holidays, and government crackdowns have meant that numbers at the street protests are not currently as high as at their peak in early December. But a determined core of activists continue to protest and shut roads.

Georgia is now at a crossroads. It is unclear whether the protests will slowly peter out, or whether they will gain new strength as spring approaches. It also remains to be seen whether Georgian Dream continues to follow a policy of balancing crackdowns with a policy of ignoring the demonstrators.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s domestic politics is at an impasse, with supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and opposition-minded Georgians increasingly inhabiting parallel realities.

The reality Georgian Dream is attempting to project is one of business-as-usual. It is assisted in this by the fact that, since the end of President Zourabichvili’s term on December 29, Georgian Dream now has monopoly control of all major state institutions. Georgian Dream MPs sit alone in Parliament, and officials shuttle between Tbilisi and its remaining foreign partners such as Hungary and the UAE.

The other reality is one in which none of these institutions are now recognised as legitimate by the opposition. Many Western countries maintain strategic ambiguity, neither recognising the government’s legitimacy, nor formally cutting ties. Despite Georgian Dream’s hopes that the Trump Administration would agree to a reset in frayed U.S.-Georgia relations, it was pro-opposition Salome Zourabichvili, and not her Georgian Dream-appointed successor as president, Mikheil Qavelashvili, who was invited to attend President Trump’s inauguration.

What happens next is difficult to predict.

Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which both domestic society and foreign partners remain split between those who recognise the Georgian government as legitimate and those who do not. This stalemate between a government that maintains sufficient resources to cling to power, and a pro-EU protest movement that is both too weak to topple Georgian Dream but too strong to be comprehensively defeated could endure for an extended period.

In this scenario, Georgian Dream may continue to oscillate between broad crackdowns on protesters and more passive and targeted methods of dealing with dissent, including merely ignoring demonstrations until they peter out by themselves. It is possible that, especially in a world in which Georgia is far from the top of international agendas, Georgian Dream manages to “muddle through” and serve out its term until the 2028 parliamentary election, despite large sections of the population refusing to recognise its legitimacy. A similar situation ensued between 2008 and 2012 when large parts of the then opposition to the United National Movement government of President Mikheil Saakashvili boycotted Parliament.

However, a more troubling scenario is also possible. Georgian Dream’s recent rhetoric has often suggested a lurch towards fully fledged authoritarianism. Senior officials including PM Irakli Kobakhidze have vowed that “co-habitation” with the opposition would soon come to an end and that many parties would be banned. Threats against the country’s largest liberal-leaning university, Ilia State University, machinations around the ownership of the main pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari, and systematic beatings and arrests of opposition leaders all point to a rapid deterioration in democratic freedoms.

At worst, Georgia could end up more closely resembling Azerbaijan or Belarus than it ever has before. Authoritarian consolidation in Georgia is unlikely to look exactly like it does in those countries – but the emergence of a syncretic “Khachapuri Putinism” that borrows from both the Hungarian and Russian models of governance cannot be ruled out.

Finally, many Georgians hope that somehow the government can be forced to leave office or make major concessions. Some hope that the Trump Administration will continue to pile pressure on Georgian Dream through sanctions. Others talk of the falling value of the Georgian lari as evidence that prolonged political crisis could impact investor confidence, forcing Georgian Dream to the negotiating table in order to save the economy.

These hopes may be exaggerated. Trump’s initial actions in office have only emboldened Georgian Dream as its civil society critics are stripped of USAID funding and support. And while a major economic shock cannot be ruled out, the double-digit growth Georgia has enjoyed as a result of the influx of Russian money has so far more than cancelled out the impact of any jitters amongst the relatively small number of Western investors in the country. A recently announced US$ 6 billion in investment from the UAE demonstrates that investors that do not prioritise democratic values are more than happy to fill economic gaps vacated by more scrupulous investors.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the pro-EU protest movement in Georgia is to have any chance of success, it must cease waiting for external deliverance and focus on mobilising its supporters more strategically.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s pro-EU protest movement is far from dead. But the prospect of it succeeding in replacing the ruling Georgian Dream party look slimmer by the day. A combination of fatigue, weak leadership, and foreign allies distracted by the upheaval being wrought by the Trump Administration, do not amount to favourable conditions for Georgia’s opposition.

Georgian Dream, on the other hand, are not in an ideal position either. Increasingly isolated on the international stage, they alternate between going through the motions of day-to-day ordinary governance and lurches into outright authoritarianism that leave the impression of a government under siege.

It is difficult to predict how this stalemate ends. But a broad range of outcomes between full authoritarian consolidation and a fracturing of the regime is possible. However, despite the opposition’s apparent fixation on securing foreign support to bolster its position, it seems increasingly likely that the fate of Georgia will be largely decided by the balance of domestic forces, rather than in some grand bargain between global powers whose main priorities lie elsewhere.

AUTHOR BIO: Alexander Scrivener works at the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) in Tbilisi, where he leads policy research on advancing democratic security across Eurasia. His work spans policy advocacy and media analysis, with past roles at the BBC, International Criminal Court, and Transnational Institute.

Johan Engvall

January 22, 2025

In a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the South Caucasus and Central Asia have become more interconnected, forming a new Trans-Caspian area. As trade along the Middle Corridor is gaining in importance, the Caspian Sea is becoming a unifier rather than divider of the regions. All countries on the eastern and western side of the Caspian pursue multi-vector foreign policies to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. As the EU is seeking to assert itself geopolitically, it is in its strategic interest to support the evolving Trans-Caspian cooperation. To elevate its engagement with the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the EU should replace the outdated Eastern Partnership with a new Trans-Caspian Partnership. Such partnership would enhance regional connectivity and cooperation and give regional states greater collective weight in their dealings with different powers.

Read The Convergence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (PDF)

By Laura Linderman

On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze declared the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, rejecting talks until 2028 and refusing EU budget support. Kobakhidze asserted that Georgia would enter the EU in 2030, "with dignity" - a claim rejected by the vast majority of Georgians who view this as a betrayal of the country's pro-European aspirations.

This decision sparked nationwide protests that reflect the broad public consensus in support of European integration. Demonstrators have gathered in Tbilisi, Batumi, and cities across Georgia, condemning GD's decision and the subsequent police brutality against mostly peaceful protesters. Demonstrations have continued since the announcement, with protesters blocking streets, clashing with riot police, and facing dispersal attempts using water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray. President Salome Zourabichvili has pledged to stay on as Georgian President, emphasizing that the illegitimate Parliament cannot elect a legitimate President.

BACKGROUND:  Prior to the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgia's economy was experiencing double-digit economic growth, despite the fact that most ordinary Georgians live near poverty. This growth was fueled, in part, by financial flows from Russia, including tourism, trade, and potentially sanctions-evading investment. Russia is a significant market for Georgian products like wine, and the influx of Russian money had created a wealthy elite dependent on these financial flows. The economic growth figures helped the Georgian Dream (GD) secure support and acquiescence from some segments of the population.

This dependence on Russian money creates a conflict between Georgia's political aspirations of joining Europe and its economic realities. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia did not produce much that Europe wanted to buy, while Russia was a major consumer of Georgian products. This economic reality, coupled with GD's close ties to Russia, likely contributed to the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, further consolidating its grip on power and jeopardizing Georgia's European future.

The protests that followed Georgian Dream's decision to suspend EU accession negotiations were fueled by a strong desire for EU integration among a distinct majority of the Georgian population. While the GD government maintained its rhetoric about commitment to eventual EU membership, its decision to postpone accession talks until 2028 provoked immediate public anger and confirmed long-standing suspicions that the government lacked genuine commitment to EU integration. The government's ratification of a Russian-style "foreign agents" law over the summer, coupled with its strategic courting of older, rural conservative constituencies more vulnerable to fears of cultural upheaval and potential conflict with Russia, further reinforced the perception that GD was prioritizing appeasement and political expediency over meaningful European alignment.

The timing of the announcement coincided with a European Parliament resolution documenting electoral irregularities. This resolution echoed widespread criticism of the elections, which were marred by concerns about the secrecy of the vote, vote-rigging, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, as reported by international observers. GD's decision, perceived by many as a rejection of the popular will in favor of closer ties with Russia, led to a significant portion of the population demanding immediate progress toward EU membership.

IMPLICATIONS:  Since the November 28^th announcement, numerous civil servants have resigned in protest, including Georgia's ambassadors to the United States, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Italy, Czechia, and the Netherlands. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia imposed sanctions on GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and several high-ranking Interior Ministry officials, barring them from entering their countries. The Baltic states also condemned the suppression of protests and reaffirmed their support for the Georgian people's European aspirations. In addition to these resignations and sanctions, various sectors of Georgian society mobilized in opposition to the GD's decision. Students from universities organized marches and protests, demanding a reversal of the decision and calling on their universities to suspend classes so students could participate in demonstrations. The Georgian Trade Unions Confederation criticized GD's lack of transparency and condemned police violence against protesters. The International Chamber of Commerce in Georgia warned that halting the EU accession process would negatively impact the country's economy and investor confidence. Both major banks, Bank of Georgia and TBC Bank, and leading internet providers Magti and Silknet condemned the government's actions and reaffirmed their commitment to European integration.

The implications of GD’s decision and the subsequent protests are multifaceted and far-reaching:

• Erosion of Democracy: GD’s actions, including the alleged election rigging and violent suppression of protests, have significantly damaged Georgia’s democratic credentials. International observers have expressed concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the shrinking space for civil society in Georgia, especially the ratification of the Russian-style foreign agents law. The use of excessive force against protesters, including journalists, further highlighted the government's disregard for fundamental freedoms.

• Strained EU Relations: The decision to halt EU accession has severely strained Georgia’s relationship with the EU. European officials have condemned GD's move as a betrayal of the Georgian people’s aspirations and a rejection of the country's European future. The suspension of EU budget support and the potential for sanctions against GD leaders further isolate Georgia from its European partners.

• Strained US Relations: The US decision to suspend its Strategic Partnership with Georgia, in response to GD's halt of EU accession negotiations, signals a deterioration in US-Georgia relations and underscores US concerns about GD government's commitment to democratic values and the rule of law. By suspending the partnership, the US aims to pressure the Georgian government to reconsider its actions and to demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles. The suspension also raises questions about the future of US assistance to Georgia, which has been instrumental in supporting the country's democratic and economic development. This move could weaken Georgia's security and stability, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions with Russia. Additionally, it may embolden anti-Western forces within Georgia and undermine the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people

• Geopolitical Realignment and Russian Influence: The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin's praise for GD's decision, just minutes after the announcement, has raised suspicions about potential Russian influence behind the move. The sources also highlight GD's adoption of policies, such as the "foreign agent" law, that mirror Russian legislation and have been criticized by the EU and the US.

• Implications for Regional Stability: The potential geopolitical realignment of Georgia has significant implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus. A shift towards Russia could embolden the Kremlin to exert more influence in the region and potentially threaten the sovereignty of other neighboring countries, particularly Armenia.

• Economic Fallout: The halting of EU accession has created significant economic uncertainty for Georgia. The potential for reduced foreign investment and trade disruptions could severely impact the country's economic growth. While Georgia's recent economic growth has been partly fueled by Russian money, this raises concerns about economic sustainability and potential dependence on Russia. The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rejection of EU budget support will limit financial assistance and hinder development. GD's actions have damaged Georgia's international reputation and risk international isolation. Widespread protests, including strikes by schools and universities, are disrupting economic activity and further undermining investor confidence. The ongoing political instability threatens to derail Georgia's economic progress and international standing.

CONCLUSION:  GD's decision to halt EU accession has triggered a nationwide crisis, revealing a stark disconnect between the ruling party and the overwhelming pro-European sentiments of Georgian citizens. While GD claims to be pursuing a "European path with dignity," its actions suggest a shift towards Russia's sphere of influence, raising concerns about the country's sovereignty and democratic future. This shift is motivated, in part, by a strategic calculation that aligns with the interests of certain political and economic elites within Georgia, who have benefitted from closer ties with Russia and favor an appeasement strategy with the North. GD has employed a range of tactics to consolidate its power, including manipulating elections, intimidating voters, and suppressing dissent, drawing parallels to the authoritarian playbook seen in countries like Hungary. The opposition's struggle to counter GD's narrative and mobilize sustained public resistance highlights the challenges facing pro-democracy forces in Georgia.

AUTHOR BIO: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow and Director of Programs at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council.

By Svante E. Cornell

December 8, 2023

Kazakhstan has been deeply affected by the geopolitical turmoil across the region in the past several years, which threatened to undermine the viability of the country’s multi-vector, balanced foreign policy. But Kazakhstan’s leaders have stayed the course, which has for twenty years sought to balance relations with Russia through the expansion of ties with powers ranging from China to the U.S. and Europe. In recent years, Kazakhstan has also embraced regional cooperation in Central Asia, while strengthening ties with Turkey as well. The continued success of this approach remains crucial to the continued independence and stability of Central Asia as a whole.

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By Kornely Kakachia

September 5, 2022

Georgia has struggled to achieve its foreign policy goals of restoring its territorial integrity and achieving Euro-Atlantic integration. In recent years, Georgia’s relations with the West have cooled somewhat as a result of Georgia’s internal problems, while the Georgian Dream government’s normalization policy with Russia has led to an increase in Russian influence in the country. In effect, a pro-Western foreign policy was replaced by a balancing approach between Russia and the West. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the limits of this having the-cake-and-eating-it approach, which has led to the question whether the GD government lost its foreign policy compass, at a time when its domestic objective to stay in power clashes with the reforms needed to push for EU membership.

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