By Emil Avdaliani

On December 19–20, 2025, the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takachi in the C5+1 format. This marked the fifth such summit involving Central Asian leaders in 2025. Japan’s growing engagement with the region is driven primarily by interest in mineral extraction and processing, sectors that have attracted increasing competition from major Asian and Western powers. Tokyo’s evolving approach reflects broader global dynamics and heightened tensions over supply chains. Rather than seeking to exclude other external actors or assume a leading security role in Central Asia, Japan is pursuing a pragmatic strategy centered on economic cooperation. Through economically attractive initiatives, it aims gradually to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region.

BACKGROUND:

In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.

A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.

Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.

For Japan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out because of their geographic position, economic potential, and human resources. However, Tokyo is also deepening engagement with other regional actors. Turkmenistan, for example, concluded eight investment agreements with Japanese firms. In Tajikistan, Japan has expressed interest in developing logistics and transport infrastructure, as well as in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements.

Japan and the Central Asian states also established cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and medicine. The parties proposed the creation of a Central Asia–Japan digital hub to promote collaboration in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the Internet of Things, and digital technologies.

Following the summit, a multilateral business forum was convened at which several joint projects were announced. These included the construction of solar power plants in Uzbekistan by Sumitomo, Chubu Electric Power, and Shikoku Electric Power, supported by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI); the establishment of a medical center by Sojitz; and critical minerals mining projects involving the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).

IMPLICATIONS:

For the Central Asian states, closer ties with Japan form part of a broader strategy to pursue a more multi-aligned foreign policy, extending beyond reliance not only on Russia and China but also on the EU and the U.S. Japan is regarded as a reliable and responsible source of investment, particularly in sectors such as green energy and infrastructure. With its considerable technological expertise and development experience, Tokyo is in a strong position in the competition for influence in Central Asia.

Japan nevertheless faces structural constraints as an investor that limit its geopolitical weight in Central Asia. Geography constitutes the primary obstacle: there are no direct overland or maritime routes linking Japan to the region. Central Asia’s landlocked position, combined with its considerable distance from Japan, will continue to impose significant constraints on bilateral relations. Consequently, Japan is unlikely to emerge as a major geopolitical actor in the heart of Eurasia. It will remain structurally disadvantaged especially vis-à-vis Russia and China, but also in comparison to the EU and the U.S. 

Second, Japan interest in security and military cooperation in the region is limited. Instead, it has primarily relied on soft power as its principal instrument of influence in Central Asia. For example, Tokyo has long supported Kazakhstan in assisting victims of Soviet-era nuclear testing by providing medical and technical aid, particularly to residents of the Abay region, where the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site is located. Other Central Asian states likewise receive substantial financial assistance from Japan. Notably, Tokyo offers various forms of partnership that are not formally conditioned on requirements related to democracy or human rights reforms.

Tokyo has demonstrated particular openness to cooperation in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). This focus reflects the heightened global attention Central Asia has received in recent years due to its resource base, which is critical for global supply chains. Japan seeks to diversify its mineral and REE imports away from China. This is not the first indication of Japanese interest in the region’s rare earth sector. In the 2010s, Tokyo participated, albeit briefly, in the Stepnogorsk project in Kazakhstan before withdrawing from the initiative. The December summit, however, signaled a renewed commitment to the mineral sector, underscored by a pledge to invest approximately US$ 19 billion over the next five years in developing supply chains in the region.

In this context, Kazakhstan introduced the Next-Generation SmartMining Plus initiative, aimed at digitalizing the mining industry. Discussions also addressed the first-ever shipment of gallium, a rare metal used in electronics and semiconductors, from Kazakhstan, a development of particular significance given China’s dominant position in global gallium production.

The intensifying competition for Central Asia’s REEs and other critical minerals forms part of a broader contest over the region’s resource base. The EU, Russia, China, the U.S., and other actors all perceive substantial untapped potential in Central Asia.

Although Japan is a relatively late entrant into this competition, its pledge to invest US$ 19 billion is notable, as no other external power has committed a comparable sum. The closest parallel is the EU’s plan to mobilize €12 billion under its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to enhance connectivity across Eurasia and strengthen the Union’s competitiveness vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Tokyo is capitalizing on Central Asia’s preference for engaging a wide range of external partners. It has also identified sectors in which the region remains particularly vulnerable and receptive to external support. One such domain is the rapidly evolving landscape of Eurasian connectivity.

In the context of the war in Ukraine and the increasing efforts by the EU, India, China, and other actors to develop alternative overland trade routes, the so-called Middle Corridor, linking the Black Sea to China’s western region of Xinjiang, has gained strategic prominence. Japan’s support for strengthening east–west connectivity in Central Asia reflects an effort to reduce Russia’s historically entrenched influence over the region’s infrastructure and economic networks. This strategic logic underpins Tokyo’s commitment to further development of the Middle Corridor.

CONCLUSIONS:

Japan’s expanding engagement with Central Asia reflects both its own foreign policy recalibrations and the intensifying competition among Asian and Western powers for access to the region’s strategic resources. Rivalry among Asian actors in particular has grown more pronounced, with China, South Korea, India, and several ASEAN member states all seeking to deepen their ties with Central Asia.

Compared to Russia and China, however, Japan’s ambitions remain more cautious. Rather than pursuing dominance, Tokyo aims to position itself as a facilitator of existing regional dynamics. Support for the expansion of the Middle Corridor and for the extraction and processing of REEs and other critical minerals aligns with Japan’s objective of mitigating Moscow’s and Beijing’s potential monopolistic influence in these sectors.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Lindsey Cliff

The Organization of Turkic States has expanded beyond its cultural foundations to address regional challenges through green finance, digital innovation, and artificial intelligence initiatives. Led by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the OTS established the Turkic Green Finance Council and proposed collaborative AI networks, responding to economic pressures from sanctions and oil price fluctuations. Key initiatives include the Turkic Green Vision promoting renewable energy development and the Green Middle Corridor for sustainable transport, alongside digitalization programs for customs procedures and cybersecurity cooperation. The establishment of institutional mechanisms—councils with rotating leadership, working groups of technical experts, and concrete investment vehicles—suggests organizational maturation. Whether these programs deliver tangible results will determine if the OTS evolves from primarily aspirational declarations into substantive economic and technological cooperation.

BACKGROUND:

The Organization of Turkic States has recognized the interconnected nature of climate, technology, and economy-related challenges. As such, the OTS has recently pushed, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leading the charge, for greater collaboration and integration in response to these threats. The fields of green energy, digital transformation, and smart innovation have become areas of pragmatic cooperation.

At the 2025 Gabala Summit, OTS leaders stressed "the importance of cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence and promote the integration of AI, green and digital technologies, and smart manufacturing systems into industrial strategies of the Member States, with a view to enhancing productivity, sustainability, and regional competitiveness through coordinated innovation and capacity-building efforts." This declaration marks a significant evolution for an organization that began with primarily cultural ambitions.

These initiatives respond to practical challenges facing landlocked Central Asian states. The growing global confrontation between the West and a loose anti-Western axis has added economic challenges for countries in the region. Mutual sanctions imposed by Russia and the West from 2014 onward hit the region hard, in combination with dramatic fluctuations in oil prices. Large-scale devaluations took place in the years following 2014, lowering purchasing power. While some entrepreneurs benefited from helping Russia circumvent sanctions, this hardly benefited the economy as a whole or reduced unemployment.

IMPLICATIONS:

In the domain of green finance and sustainability, the OTS has taken several concrete action steps. In Bishkek in November 2024, the Turkic Green Finance Council was established, with the Kazakh Astana International Finance Centre taking the lead. The Council will "provide OTS member states with an additional boost for developing green finance and attracting sustainable investments into regional projects."

The Council's inaugural meeting in September 2025 was attended by "heads and representatives of financial regulators, ministries of economy and finance, as well as stock exchanges from OTS Member States and Observers," supporting the possibility of tangible integration among all levels of the region's public and private sectors. Unlike summit-level photo opportunities, this meeting brought together the officials responsible for day-to-day implementation and strategy. The meeting resulted in the adoption of a joint communique expressing commitment to progress in sustainable development and environmental protection, "guided by the principles of Turkic Green Vision, as well as the Turkic World Vision 2040, and the OTS Strategy for 2022-2026."

The practical objectives of the Council, along with attendance by multiple levels of government and business leaders, suggest the OTS is moving from broad declarations toward institutional mechanisms for sustainable finance. The Turkic Green Vision proposes creation of several working groups: the Turkic Renewable Energy Alliance would promote renewable energy development; the Green Middle Corridor would create a sustainable transport route; the Turkic Biodiversity and Ecosystem initiative would promote collaboration in environmental protection and restoration; the Climate Change and Educational Awareness Program would promote study of climate issues and community disaster resilience.

Artificial intelligence and digitalization have also become main focuses of OTS integration. At the 2024 Bishkek Summit, Secretary General Kubanychbek Omuraliev highlighted collaborative projects across "e-commerce, technoparks, digital infrastructure development and cybersecurity" and suggested creation of a Turkic AI network and further investment in AI innovation and education. The organization also aims to streamline trade through digitized customs procedures, enabling more efficient transportation of goods.

Uzbekistan has been at the center of much of the AI and digitization agenda. Domestic investment in the digital sector has led to rapid modernization, increasing domestic internet access and speed, expanding IT service exports from $170 million to $1 billion, and attracting foreign investment. In AI, Uzbekistan has been investing within the framework of its "Strategy for the Development of AI Technologies through 2030." The goal is to "create a national AI model and train 1 million specialists." Already, the country has spent $50 million toward this goal, with 86 projects started and free online training programs launched. Through OTS AI Forums, the organization hopes to follow Uzbekistan's lead toward a more digital future with international investment in local IT and AI.

Kazakhstan is also attempting to lead in areas of AI and digital innovation, suggesting an intra-OTS Digital Monitoring Center. Kazakhstan's President Tokayev recently proposed dedicating an upcoming informal OTS summit to the theme of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development, and he made digitalization and AI the centerpiece of Kazakhstan's national strategy in a September 2025 public address. The aim is to set up Kazakhstan as a "fully digital country" within three years, establishing a dedicated ministry for digitalization and AI, developing legal codes for AI governance, and developing digital currencies.

In these areas, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are taking leading roles. Kazakhstan not only hosted the inaugural Green Finance Council but also suggested its creation. Of course, Uzbekistan now leads the region in AI readiness and is making significant domestic progress on its digitization and AI agendas. Future OTS summits will likely maintain continued focus on AI, digital innovation, and sustainable development.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Kazakh-proposed Digital Monitoring Center represents potential cybersecurity and defensive integration—a real avenue for pragmatic cooperation. The transnational nature of climate threats and the internet necessitate a collective regional response. While the Turkic Green Vision adds language about supporting "cultural and natural values of the region," and third-party observers recognize IT as a way to "preserve cultural heritage," the primary drivers are practical: economic development, energy security, and regional competitiveness.

These initiatives respond to genuine needs. The rapid development of initiatives in finance, digitalization, and green energy demonstrates that the OTS is expanding beyond its cultural foundations. However, questions remain about implementation. As with many OTS initiatives, movement from declarations to concrete results will determine whether these programs represent genuine integration or remain primarily aspirational.

The establishment of institutional mechanisms—councils with rotating leadership, working groups of technical experts, and concrete investment vehicles like the Turkic Investment Fund—suggests a maturing organization. If these initiatives deliver tangible results in coming years, they will mark the OTS's evolution from a primarily cultural organization into a platform for substantive economic and technological cooperation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Lindsey Cliff is a junior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, who is also pursuing a Master’s degree at Georgetown University in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies.

By Sergey Sukhankin

In Kazakhstan’s recent referendum, over 71 percent of voters endorsed building the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), marking a significant step toward advancing this major infrastructure project. Strongly supported by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the national political elite, the NPP is expected to address Kazakhstan’s current and projected electricity needs. Additionally, as the world’s leading uranium producer, Kazakhstan stands to benefit from self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment, reducing its reliance on external suppliers. A key issue now centers on which entity will secure the NPP construction contract, with geopolitical considerations expected to weigh heavily alongside technological and economic factors.

BACKGROUND:  Discussions about constructing a new, modern NPP in Kazakhstan date back to the early 2000s. From 1973 to 1999, the country operated an NPP in Shevchenko (now Aktau), which was closed as part of Kazakhstan’s de-nuclearization policy. However, tangible steps toward this goal only began in 2021, following a severe electricity shortage linked to a spike in cryptocurrency mining and pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the European Union’s push for sustainable trade relations led Kazakhstani political leaders to prioritize renewable energy expansion in the national economy. In promoting a public vote for constructing an NPP, the government highlighted four main priorities: averting a potential energy crisis amid rising electricity demand; mitigating environmental risks linked to unsustainable energy sources; reducing Kazakhstan's reliance on electricity imports from Russia; and preserving the competitiveness of Kazakh exports to the EU. Despite compelling arguments supporting the nuclear power plant project, significant concerns have emerged from local experts, civil society, and the public. A primary worry centers on the risk of nuclear accidents, with Chernobyl and Fukushima serving as stark reminders of possible environmental catastrophes. Specific fears include potential harm to the fragile ecosystem of Lake Balkhash, which is already experiencing drying and may face further degradation from plant operations. Moreover, experts emphasize Kazakhstan's current lack of expertise and infrastructure for safely managing nuclear waste, leaving the issue of radioactive waste disposal unresolved. The economic viability of Kazakhstan's nuclear project is also a subject of concern. Critics point to the high construction costs and question the plant’s long-term financial sustainability, especially given the uncertain outlook for future electricity demand. Some experts suggest that the expected surge in demand may not occur as projected. They argue that even if demand does rise, Kazakhstan has alternative options, such as expanding renewable energy sources and improving the efficiency of the current electricity grid, which could address energy needs without relying on nuclear power. Geopolitical concerns further drive opposition to Kazakhstan’s nuclear project. Recent incidents at nuclear facilities, such as Zaporizhzhia and Kursk, illustrate the vulnerability of such infrastructure during conflicts, highlighting risks if similar instability arises in Central Asia. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s limited technical expertise and financial resources mean it would likely depend heavily on foreign partners to build and operate the plant. Critics argue that this reliance could compromise Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, with potential implications for the country’s long-term energy autonomy and geopolitical independence.

IMPLICATIONS:  Four main contenders have emerged to construct Kazakhstan’s NPP: Russia’s Rosatom, China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KEPCO), and France's Électricité de France (EDF). While Kazakhstan has pledged to base its choice on factors such as economic feasibility, technological reliability, and environmental safety, Russia and China realistically lead the race. Although France and South Korea bring significant expertise, high construction costs (potentially exceeding US$ 12 billion) and geopolitical dynamics may limit their competitiveness. Thus, Kazakhstan appears to face three pragmatic options moving forward. One option is for China to assume the role of sole contractor for the project, a scenario with several competitive advantages. China offers relatively lower construction costs compared to French and South Korean alternatives and maintains a robust trade and investment relationship with Kazakhstan, enhancing its influence as an economic partner. However, the feasibility of China proceeding alone is uncertain. Moscow might perceive China’s unilateral role as a diplomatic slight, as Russia has become a key strategic partner and potential Arctic access point for China. Moreover, it remains unclear if China is willing or prepared to undertake this project independently, given its geopolitical sensitivities. A second option is to appoint Russia as the sole contractor, a role Moscow has long pursued. Between 2010 and 2019, President Vladimir Putin personally lobbied Kazakhstan to select Rosatom as its nuclear plant builder. Given Russia’s current geopolitical isolation and diminishing network of allies, Moscow might view any exclusion of Rosatom as a serious diplomatic offense. The recent “grain war” between Russia and Kazakhstan—allegedly sparked by Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS—demonstrates how swiftly Moscow might respond with retaliatory measures if it perceives a breach in loyalty or alignment. An analysis of Russian sources indicates several strategies Russia might use to “encourage” Kazakhstan to prioritize Rosatom’s bid. A primary leverage point is Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian territory for transporting export-bound oil. Approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russia, and oil revenue constitutes about two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s national budget. Any disruption in this transit route could precipitate a fiscal crisis for Kazakhstan, with severe implications for the stability of its national budget. A second leverage point is Russia’s role in alleviating Kazakhstan’s energy deficit through electricity exports. Russian experts warn that any abrupt cessation of this supply could lead to severe energy shortages in Kazakhstan, potentially triggering economic and political instability. These pressure points are further highlighted by recent incidents, such as the explosion at Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev discussed with EU officials increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supplies. These events suggest that- Should Kazakhstan consider alternatives to Russia for its NPP construction, it might face similar pressures or retaliatory actions from Moscow. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia for both oil export infrastructure and electricity supply exposes the country to significant vulnerabilities. Nearly 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, and oil revenues account for approximately two-thirds of the national budget. Any disruption to this transport network could result in severe economic consequences, potentially destabilizing Kazakhstan’s fiscal position. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s electricity deficit is largely covered by imports from Russia. Russian experts caution that if Russia were to cut off this supply, Kazakhstan would face a precarious situation, where both political stability and economic restructuring could become unfeasible. These dependencies highlight Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Russian influence, as demonstrated by the 2022 explosion at the Tengiz oil field, the country’s largest, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev’s discussions with EU officials about increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supply due to the invasion of Ukraine. This incident underscores Russia’s capacity—and potential willingness—to retaliate against Kazakhstan should the country act in ways that conflict with Russian interests. A third option is to form an international consortium to oversee the construction of the NPP. This approach could provide a balanced compromise, allowing Russia to participate without being the sole contractor, thus reducing the risk of secondary economic sanctions. Such an arrangement might appeal to Moscow, as it would obscure Rosatom’s central role while still involving Russian expertise. Notably, President Tokayev has rhetorically supported the idea of an “international consortium,” suggesting that this could be the most feasible solution. However, several uncertainties surround the international consortium option. A significant challenge is that the construction of the nuclear reactor, the core component of the NPP, cannot be easily divided among multiple parties. This raises the critical issue of who would be responsible for sourcing and manufacturing the reactor, as the origin of this essential component remains unclear. Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities within the consortium could lead to complications. Some members would likely take leadership roles, while others would play secondary, supportive functions. The precise allocation of these roles, and how they align with the interests of the participating companies, remains uncertain, potentially creating tensions within the consortium and complicating cooperation and decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS:  The construction of Kazakhstan’s NPP will provide crucial insight into Russia’s influence in Central Asia, a region where assertions of Russia’s diminishing role may underestimate its true significance. The outcome of this project could offer a clearer picture of Russia’s geopolitical and economic standing in the region. If Kazakhstan ultimately selects Rosatom as the sole bidder—an outcome that seems less probable—or if Russia’s state corporation participates within an international consortium, it will symbolize Russia’s continued strategic presence in Central Asia. Such a scenario would highlight Russia’s ability to retain substantial leverage in the region, despite competing global interests. Whether as the lead contractor or a key consortium member, Rosatom’s involvement would likely reinforce its central role in the region’s energy infrastructure and broader geopolitical affairs.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Natalia Konarzewska 

June 16, 2020, the CACI Analyst

The collapse of oil prices and oil demand along with the economic shutdown imposed to fight the coronavirus pandemic are putting a strain on Azerbaijan’s economy. The upheaval on the global oil market has exposed fragilities in Azerbaijan’s banking system as four of its banks were recently put under temporary administration of the central bank and others had their capital requirements relaxed. The government has introduced economic and social packages to mitigate the consequences of the crisis; however, growth forecasts in 2020 remain pessimistic.

By Bakhrom Radjabov 

June 4, 2020, the CACI Analyst

Since January, COVID-19 (coronavirus) has reached the level of a global pandemic. At first, some Central Asian republics seemed to be virus-free islands with zero confirmed infection cases. Afghanistan confirmed its first COVID-19 case on February 24, followed by a closure of the borders with other Central Asian republics. Kazakhstan discovered its first cases of COVID-19 on March 13, and Uzbekistan on March 15. Kyrgyzstan confirmed its first case on March 18 whereas Tajikistan did not report any cases until April 30. Before this date, the country allowed mass gatherings, including the celebration of Navruz, which was cancelled by other Central Asian governments. Turkmen authorities have so far not officially reported any cases of COVID-19 in the country.