By Fuad Shahbazov
October 18, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On August 16, the Azerbaijani MP and head of the Azerbaijan-Russia interparliamentary group Ali Huseynli told local media that “It would be advisable to consider Azerbaijan’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO). The sensational statement triggered a public discussion on Azerbaijan’s possible membership in the Russia-led CSTO and its consequences for the region. While some state officials described this prospect as a logical extension of Baku’s cooperation with Moscow, others strictly opposed the idea, stating that it would pose dangerous challenges to the country.
By Ilgar Gurbanov
October 25, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On August 12, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan signed the Convention on the Caspian Sea’s Legal Status in Astana. The Convention’s provision endorsing the construction of a subsea pipeline raised optimism regarding the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project, which has been stalled due to the Caspian’s uncertain status. Discussions on the TCGP have been ongoing since the 1990s, envisaging the export of 30 billion cubic meters/year (bcm/y) of Turkmen gas to Europe across the Caspian by integrating with the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).
By Natalia Konarzewska
September 25, 2018, the CACI Analyst
August 17 marked the first hundred days in office for Nikol Pashinyan’s government in Armenia, which assumed office after the mass social protests erupting in April and May this year. The leaders of the protest movement underlined that they campaigned for domestic reform, yet the ensuing transition of power followed by a crackdown on corruption and a legal purge among the Armenian political elite has already reverberated in Armenia-Russia relations. Moreover, the new government’s stiff approach towards resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has brought renewed tension in its relations with Azerbaijan.
By Eduard Abrahamyan
August 22, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On June 11, 2018, Azerbaijani state media reported the conclusion of a Belarus-Azerbaijan arms deal, displaying the procured battery-size Polonez Multiple Rocket-Launch systems (MRLS) produced by a Belarus-Chinese military industry company. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev inspected the equipment at the new brigade site near Perekeshkul, north-west of Baku. At least five launch vehicles were showcased, each equipped with eight 301mm A200-type high-precision rockets, with a firing range of about 200 kilometers. The new artillery brigade is also equipped with LORA (Long-Range Artillery System) all-weather capability precision ballistic missile systems, with a maximum firing range of 300 kilometers, manufactured by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI). The systems were subsequently showcased during a military parade in Baku on June 26.
By Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
July 5, 2018, the CACI Analyst
In late May, Nakhichevan-based Azerbaijani forces entered no-man’s land to the northwest of the exclave, formally part of Armenia, as deep as 10-15 kilometers. The territory was occupied without a single shot, and represents a physically larger portion of land than that acquired by Azerbaijan as a result of the April 2016 clashes. As the Armenian public was preoccupied with the toppling of the regime of Serzh Sargsyan and the Pashinyan government’s subsequent anti-corruption initiatives, the “silent occupation” of land in Armenia’s Vayotz Dzor province went virtually unnoticed. Since further advances into Armenian territory are likely to force Russia’s response, both sides remain cautious to avoid further confrontations.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.