By Eduard Abrahamyan

In recent months, Armenia and Russia have strengthened their relations. A series of high-level meetings shows not just a return to normal diplomacy but a purposeful reshaping of their alliance. Alongside President Putin’s renewed ties with Azerbaijani President Aliyev and the Kremlin’s broader adjustment of its regional strategy, the revived dialogue between Putin and Prime Minister Pashinyan forms part of a wider diplomatic renewal. This shift marks a clear easing of the tensions that strained their bilateral relations from September 2022 to mid-2024.



                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The intensified Armenia–Russia bilateral reengagement commenced on October 8, 2024, with the Moscow meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, ostensibly ending a two-year estrangement stemming from Moscow’s inaction and the CSTO’s reluctance to deter or even explicitly identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of the September 2022 incursions into Armenian territory. Equally detrimental was the perception that Moscow had tacitly approved Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation in Karabakh.

The October 2024 meeting set both sides on a path toward a “new rhythm” in strategic relations, creating the basis for a renewed partnership aimed at resolving the “misunderstandings” that had emerged, as later described by Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Sergey Lavrov. The two leaders have since maintained regular contact through phone calls and in-person meetings throughout 2025. Yerevan also hosted several high-level Russian delegations, underscoring the breadth and institutional depth of the renewed dialogue. Diplomatic sources described this reset as a key turning point that effectively ended the period of tension, with both governments instructing their institutions to pursue a full realignment across all areas of strategic cooperation.

In January and May 2025, the foreign ministers made reciprocal visits, each reaffirming the start of a “new page” in the strategic partnership through “genuine and open discussions on accumulated issues.” This diplomatic thaw reached its peak in June 2025 with the visit of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council, to Yerevan, aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation. Matviyenko’s visit not only supported Armenia’s evolving foreign policy direction but also highlighted the Kremlin’s engagement in Armenia’s domestic politics. Her meetings in Yerevan were widely seen as a sign of Moscow’s friendly neutrality, or even quiet support for the ruling Civil Contract party ahead of Armenia’s general elections planned for June 2026. After her meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan on 6 June, Matviyenko stated that “[Pashinyan] conveyed greetings to our president and emphasized that, despite insinuations, he and [Putin] have always maintained constructive, substantive relations without any issues,” sending a clear message to the “ill-wishers” that no divisions exist between the Armenian and Russian leadership.

The revival of high-level diplomacy has taken place alongside Pashinyan’s participation in international forums led or co-funded by Russia. In May 2025, he attended Moscow’s Victory Day parade, one of Putin’s most visible displays of state power and ideological authority. Pashinyan also traveled to Kazan to join the sixteenth BRICS Summit, which the Kremlin presented as proof that Western efforts to isolate Russia had failed. In July, Armenia’s Prime Minister took part in the International Conference on Nature and Environmental Protection in the Altai, supporting Putin’s broader vision of portraying Russia not as a marginal actor in the Turkic world but as the guardian of its historical and cultural origins amid the growth of the Organization of Turkic States. Later, Pashinyan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Pakistan blocked Armenia’s application for full membership. Armenia would otherwise likely have joined one of the most rapidly consolidating non-Western frameworks, arguably challenging the West.

The recent strengthening of Armenia–Russia relations is closely linked to economic interdependence and the gradual improvement of Russia’s public image in Armenia. Economically, Russia has reaffirmed its role as Armenia’s main trading partner, with trade turnover reaching a record US$ 12.4 billion in 2024, more than twice the level recorded in 2022. According to investigative reports, this increase reflects the function of both Armenia and Azerbaijan as logistical intermediaries in Moscow’s sanction-evasion networks. Armenia’s re-export channels have supported the transfer of dual-use goods to, and embargoed gold from, Russia, while Azerbaijan has discreetly facilitated the re-export of Russian hydrocarbons. Together, these practices have formed a coordinated and mutually beneficial regional mechanism that reinforces the Kremlin’s economic resilience. In September 2025, during the World Atomic Week conference in Moscow, Pashinyan and Putin agreed that Rosatom would extend the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for another decade, ensuring continued supply of over 30 percent of Armenia’s electricity. Official statements also noted that the two leaders discussed the potential construction of a new reactor by Rosatom to address Armenia’s concerns about the ageing Soviet-era facility.

Russia’s public image in Armenia has begun to recover from its low point in 2022–2023. A July 2025 poll by the International Republican Institute shows a clear improvement in public attitudes: the share of respondents viewing Russia as the “greatest threat” fell to 27 percent (down from 40 percent the previous year), while 45 percent now regard Russia as Armenia’s most important political partner, an 18-point increase since 2024. This change in perception is driven less by traditional Russian information campaigns or local pro-Russian media than by a deliberate adjustment of Armenia’s state-controlled narrative, which now tends to present Russia in a “pragmatically” neutral light. The outcome is a gradual restoration of public ambivalence, a sentiment neither strongly pro- nor anti-Russian, that mirrors Yerevan’s cautious process of re-accommodation with Moscow.

IMPLICATIONS: The ongoing renegotiation of the Russia–Armenia alliance, alongside Putin’s renewed rapprochement with Azerbaijan as shown at the CIS Dushanbe summit in October, suggests that the recurring “crises” in Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku are not genuine strategic breaks. Instead of marking major shifts, these episodes usually reflect short-term tactical frictions, temporary disagreements that each side manages or uses to achieve immediate political or diplomatic goals.

Such frictions are often exaggerated in Western discussions as signs of a major geopolitical shift, whether portrayed as Armenia’s “pro-Western pivot” or Azerbaijan’s alleged “anti-Russian turn.” In reality, the situation is more nuanced. Both Yerevan and Baku often highlight the appearance of tension with Moscow for strategic purposes, using the perceived distance from Russia to strengthen their negotiating position with Western partners.

For Armenia, this approach supports a dual narrative: expressing European ambitions to gain sympathy and investment while keeping practical ties with Russia for various reasons. Pashinyan’s shifting engagement with the CSTO reflects this duality—not an actual withdrawal, but an effort to push the bloc to act while maintaining reassurance toward Western partners. Likewise, the 2024 removal of Russian border guards from the Armenia–Iran border was largely symbolic, affecting only the Agarak–Nordooz checkpoint, while Russian software systems and personnel continued to operate.

Azerbaijan follows a similar strategy, occasionally dramatizing its disagreements with Moscow to project strategic independence while maintaining practical cooperation. As Aliyev stated during his meeting with Putin in Dushanbe, despite the December plane incident, the “relationship has successfully developed across many areas,” which Putin hoped would “continue in the spirit of our alliance.” Despite symbolic disputes, Baku and Moscow continue to collaborate in energy, transport, and security, including through the “3+3” regional platform and trilateral projects involving Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. These selective displays do not mean that all tensions are artificial or coordinated. Real disagreements remain, such as over Moscow’s security obligations to Armenia or the oil contamination scandal involving Russian exports passing through Azerbaijani infrastructure to the EU, but Pashinyan and Aliyev rarely cross Moscow’s strategic boundaries. Thus, what appears as instability often serves to renegotiate hierarchies rather than to overturn them.

For Moscow, this managed ambiguity remains advantageous. By allowing limited dissent and some visible distance, Russia maintains its regional influence while appearing less intrusive, “being present by seeming absent.” This recently adopted strategy enables Putin to exercise influence without attracting too much Western attention. From Moscow’s viewpoint, even Western-backed initiatives such as the August 8 Armenia–Azerbaijan Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) infrastructure deal are not viewed as threatening. Instead, TRIPP is seen as fitting into Russia’s wider connectivity strategy, linking Russia and Turkey through Azerbaijan, similar to how the North–South corridor connects Russia and Iran. The Kremlin’s reasoning assumes that regional realities, codified by the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement, will eventually force Washington either to cooperate with Moscow or to withdraw from the project.

For Yerevan, adopting a “region-first” policy means engaging with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, even while maintaining pro-Western rhetoric. The March 2025 parliamentary resolution to start EU membership talks serves mostly performative and domestic aims rather than indicating a real policy shift. The Pashinyan government continues to emphasize the advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union and has applied to join the SCO, showing how Western-oriented language coexists with lasting non-Western partnerships.

Moscow’s acceptance of this balancing comes from its belief that Pashinyan’s EU-focused gestures do not present a real threat. This explains the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to events such as the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who has fallen out of favor in Putin’s circles. Putin does not oppose either Pashinyan or Aliyev; rather, he views both as cooperative actors within Russia’s changing regional strategy. This approach is reflected in the Kremlin’s “warm neutrality,” expressed by Matviyenko toward Pashinyan before Armenia’s elections, and in Putin’s calculated revelation at the Dushanbe summit about Ramiz Mehtiyev’s planned coup against Aliyev. 

CONCLUSIONS: At this stage, Armenia–Russia relations highlight the growing gap between outward perception and internal reality in the region. To Western observers, Armenia’s pursuit of European integration and broader multilateral ties may seem like a gradual move away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. Yet beneath this surface lies a more complex and regionally rooted dynamic. It suggests that the Kremlin is rethinking its approach in the South Caucasus, developing a coordinated and flexible form of engagement with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that hides the full extent of Russian influence while strengthening the illusion that Russia is withdrawing. This adjustment gives all three actors subtle room to maneuver, allowing for a shared strategy of cooperative dominance and geopolitical maskirovka.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Eduard Abrahamyan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Analysis and author of Small States, Russia and the West: Polarity, Constellations and Heterogeneity in the Geopolitics of the Caucasus (Routledge, 2025).

By Emil Avdaliani

On October 9, the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan met in Dushanbe. Relations appear to be improving and despite the persisting distrust, Baku seeks to maintain a functional relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Baku has taken significant steps to strengthen ties with Washington, with U.S. companies pledging investments in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector. Close relations with both Russia and the U.S. align with Baku’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy aimed at avoiding dependence on any single major power. Through this approach, Baku seeks to demonstrate that it enjoys increasing flexibility in its international maneuvering.



                                                                   Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.

On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.

Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Amid the tensions and eventual reconciliation with Russia, Baku has also improved its relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated during the Biden administration. That period coincided with the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the mass displacement of Armenians, developments that created friction between Washington and Baku. However, with Trump’s return to the presidency, momentum began to build toward reversing this trend. The ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan drew renewed U.S. attention, with Washington showing a clear willingness to act as the main mediator in the process.

This development led to the peace summit in Washington, D.C., on August 8, where Yerevan and Baku reached a landmark agreement granting the U.S. a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a transit corridor through Armenian territory. Named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), the corridor will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea, bypassing the traditional route through Georgia. In addition, Azerbaijan secured U.S. President Donald Trump’s approval of an order lifting Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. During the summit, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil, and following the event, Washington and Baku agreed to hold regular meetings on military and economic cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: For Azerbaijan, Putin’s remarks were seen as an apology, and Baku now appears ready to normalize relations with Moscow. Yet beneath this adjustment lies a deeper motive: Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is shaped by calculations of power balance. Although weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia remains strong enough to exert pressure on Azerbaijan, and Baku has been cautious not to provoke Moscow’s anger. Positioned geographically between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan remains vulnerable to possible Russian military or economic pressure, as well as to instability from the Middle East driven by Israeli and U.S. actions against the Islamic Republic.

This explains why, after a relatively extended period of tension with Moscow, Baku ultimately chose reconciliation. Moreover, this approach aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader pattern of behavior toward other powers. Since 2020, when Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, its relations with Iran have worsened. Tehran grew concerned about the shifting balance of power in the South Caucasus, marked by Azerbaijan’s rising confidence and Turkey’s expanding influence. Until late 2024, ties between Baku and Tehran went through several cycles of tension, yet both sides were careful to prevent any major military escalation. This period concluded with a clear rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran, marked by bilateral visits and the reopening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.

The reconciliation with Moscow also reflects Baku’s ongoing focus on maintaining balanced relations with its neighbors, particularly major powers. Ties with Russia remain important, as shown by the expansion of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia’s interior through Iran to the Indian Ocean. A key branch of this corridor passes through Azerbaijan, making it a vital route for Russia’s access to the Middle East. In addition, strong bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and Russia provides another incentive for both countries to avoid any serious deterioration in their relationship.

However, this reconciliation is neither complete nor entirely sincere. Azerbaijan will continue to follow its multi-vector foreign policy, which increasingly limits its dependence on Russia. The broader geopolitical context favors Baku. Engaged in a prolonged conflict that demands vast economic and military resources, Russia has been unable to maintain the dominant position in the South Caucasus that it held before 2022. The regional states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, quickly moved to take advantage of this new flexibility. Azerbaijan regained territories long controlled by Armenia, while Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh largely stood by. Since the fall of the Armenian enclave in September 2023, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have steadily worsened. In Baku, the need to rely on Moscow’s goodwill has greatly diminished, giving the country greater confidence in its foreign policy. As a result, Azerbaijan has expanded ties with Israel and Pakistan, improved relations with Iran, strengthened strategic cooperation with Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and, most notably, established a strategic partnership agreement with China.

To balance Russia, Azerbaijan needs not only Turkey, its traditional ally, and stable relations with Iran, but also strong ties with the U.S. Although Washington has at times encouraged dialogue with Moscow over the war in Ukraine, it has also demonstrated its ability to pursue an independent agenda in the South Caucasus, often at odds with Russia’s core interests. The TRIPP agreement is one example of this approach. It angered Moscow because the deal reduced Russian influence and encouraged both Azerbaijan and Armenia to follow Washington’s lead. For Baku, therefore, greater U.S. involvement in the region translates into reduced dependence on Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS: The current level of tension with Russia has eased, following a familiar pattern in Azerbaijan’s dealings with Moscow and other neighboring states. It also shows that Russia cannot afford to abandon Azerbaijan or enter a cycle of escalation with Baku. Moscow is unable to handle another major crisis along its borders and remains dependent on Azerbaijan for transit within the INSTC project. Looking ahead, a continued period of stable but cautious bilateral relations is likely, without major escalation, yet unlikely to develop into deeper cooperation. The relationship will remain based on pragmatic, transactional engagement, while over time the geopolitical gap between the two countries can be expected to grow increasingly evident.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

By Umair Jamal

On July 3, 2025, Russia became the first major state to formally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. This decision, framed as a strategic partnership aimed at countering the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), seeks to employ Taliban authority to stabilize Afghanistan and curb regional terrorism. Yet, the move entails legitimizing a regime with longstanding and ongoing associations with jihadist networks, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist actors. These linkages, encompassing ideological affinities, logistical cooperation, and territorial safe havens, generate concern regarding the exacerbation of extremism, the destabilization of neighboring states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, and the complication of global counterterrorism strategies.

                                                                 City of Kabul (Image Courtesy of Pexel)

BACKGROUND: Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government on 3 July 2025 represents a significant reorientation in its Afghan policy. This decision is underpinned by Moscow’s security imperatives and broader geopolitical calculations.

After the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly reasserted control over Afghanistan, creating a power vacuum that has permitted diverse extremist organizations to expand within ungoverned spaces. Russia’s engagement is shaped by the Taliban’s asserted opposition to the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a shared adversary responsible for the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, which claimed more than 140 lives. This incident highlighted ISIS-K’s transnational capabilities, leading Russia to regard the Taliban as a prospective partner in constraining its influence.

In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court annulled the Taliban’s terrorist designation, maintained since 2003, thereby facilitating formal recognition and reflecting a pragmatic effort to stabilize Afghanistan and safeguard Russian interests in Central Asia. The Taliban’s governance, however, remains highly contested owing to their strict enforcement of Islamic law and enduring connections with extremist organizations. The movement appears to have openly violated the 2020 Doha Agreement commitment undertaken with the international community to prevent Afghan territory from serving as a base for terrorism.

During their 1996–2001 rule, the Taliban provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda, a relationship that endures through both operational and ideological linkages, as documented in recent UN assessments. The Haqqani Network, a semi-autonomous Taliban faction under Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, remains pivotal in orchestrating attacks and sheltering terrorists. In addition to al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban sustain ties with organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which targets China’s Xinjiang region. Since 2021, at least 21 extremist groups have exploited Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training, recruitment, and logistical operations, according to the UN’s 15th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report.

ISIS-K, which emerged in 2015 with an estimated 4,000–6,000 combatants, persists in conducting attacks across Iran, Pakistan, and Europe, reinforcing Russia’s calculated yet precarious reliance on the Taliban to confront this threat while potentially disregarding their wider patronage of jihadist networks.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban carries substantial implications for regional stability and global counterterrorism. On the one hand, it may enhance collaboration against militant organizations such as ISIS-K, which pose threats to both Russia and Central Asian states. The Taliban have undertaken operations that reduce ISIS-K’s local activity, though the group’s international reach endures, as demonstrated by the 2024 Moscow attack. On the other hand, such engagement entails risks, as legitimizing the Taliban may strengthen a regime that continues to shelter, protect, and support multiple extremist factions.

A recent United Nations assessment warns that al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups now control facilities in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and are increasingly assisting anti-Pakistani militants, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in conducting cross-border attacks. Another UN report indicates that the TTP has established new training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal) Provinces and is expanding recruitment within its ranks, including from the Afghan Taliban. The UN further notes that the Taliban continues to provide the TTP with logistical, operational, and financial support, with leader Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly receiving a “monthly payment” of approximately 43,000 USD. Evidence also suggests that TTP cadres sustain tactical-level ties with ISIL-K in Afghanistan while offering training and assistance to militant networks in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Moreover, the de facto authorities in Kabul have deployed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) combatants within law enforcement and military units to provide domestic security, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

In recent months, foreign terrorist combatants of Central Asian origin with affiliations to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have relocated from the Syrian Arab Republic to northern Afghanistan. These fighters have been characterized as “scouts,” serving as a vanguard to establish conditions for the subsequent arrival of their families and additional militants into Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), continues to operate within Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, ETIM enjoys “unprecedented levels of freedom” under Taliban governance. In some instances, the Taliban have relocated ETIM militants from Badakhshan, near China’s border, to other regions under pressure from Beijing. This relocation appears to constitute partial restraint rather than elimination, enabling the group and its ideology to persist in Afghanistan. The Taliban have further refused to extradite senior figures such as TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who remains in Kabul directing the group’s global activities, including those of its Syrian contingents. Turkistani reportedly mediates internal Taliban disputes and represents al-Qaeda in the Taliban’s Shura Majlis, particularly on military affairs. This situation directly contradicts Taliban denials of hosting foreign fighters and demonstrates high-level endorsement and protection.

Another pressing concern is that the Taliban are deploying and mobilizing foreign militant organizations such as Jamaat Ansarullah, which undermines Tajikistan’s stability, and the IMU, to combat ISIS-K in Afghanistan. This operational integration is troubling, as it demonstrates the incorporation of such groups into military roles. A recent UN assessment highlights “closer ETIM/TIP collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” encompassing alliances with TIP’s Syrian affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The report further noted that “Regional Member States reported that, in December 2024, a three-person delegation, including one representative from ETIM/TIP, traveled from Damascus to Kabul and engaged the de facto authorities on the eastward movement of foreign terrorist fighters.” Such partnerships and dialogues indicate that the Taliban regard groups like ETIM and IMU as allies rather than adversaries, despite their destabilizing implications for Central Asia and Russian interests.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government constitutes a high-risk gamble that may ultimately backfire by strengthening a regime deeply enmeshed with jihadist networks. United Nations reports substantiate the Taliban’s continued support for organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, TTP, and ETIM, which exploit Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training and cross-border operations, thereby undermining stability across Central and South Asia.

By legitimizing the Taliban, Russia may unintentionally reinforce a wider terrorist ecosystem, thereby weakening international counterterrorism norms and complicating collaboration with Western and regional partners. The Taliban’s accommodation of at least 21 extremist organizations, documented since 2021, heightens the risk of Afghanistan reemerging as a central hub of global terrorism.

To balance its security interests while mitigating associated risks, Russia should pursue a cautious and multifaceted strategy. First, it should employ platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to coordinate with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on intelligence exchange and border security to limit extremist spillover. Second, Moscow should make its support for the Taliban conditional upon verifiable commitments to sever links with groups such as TTP and ETIM, reinforced through targeted sanctions to ensure compliance. Third, Russia ought to engage both Pakistan and India in addressing cross-border threats posed by TTP and Kashmir-oriented organizations like LeT and JeM, fostering regional dialogue to avert escalation. Finally, it should strengthen its domestic counterterrorism capacity by investing in real-time surveillance of Afghan-based groups and reducing reliance on Taliban assurances.

By combining pragmatic engagement with rigorous oversight, Russia can advance its objective of constraining ISIS-K while avoiding the amplification of a broader jihadist threat and ensuring that Afghanistan does not further destabilize the region.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Charlotte Krausz

President Trump's recent imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil signals a potential expansion of secondary sanctions to other Russian energy customers. The policy shift threatens to extend punitive measures to post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that remain heavily dependent on Russian energy infrastructure. While aimed at curtailing Russia's war revenues, such measures could paradoxically drive these strategically important regions closer to Moscow's orbit, undermining years of U.S. and EU engagement in the region.

Gazprom headquarters in St. Petersburg, Russia (Image Courtesy of Flickr)

BACKGROUND: In his statements, Trump has criticized countries that import oil and accused them of funding the “Russian war machine.” By stopping Russia’s revenues from its largely petrostate-based war economy, the U.S. seeks to thwart Russian advances in Ukraine and punish Putin. Yet imposing high tariffs on countries dependent on Russia for their energy supply, especially on post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, could have far worse ramifications for U.S. and EU aspirations in the region and drive former Soviet republics closer to Russia once more

A key example of this policy shift occurred in the first days of August 2025, when President Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff (later raised to 50 percent) on India for being a major buyer of Russian oil. Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of India, said that “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable.” Given that India buys one-third of its crude oil from Russia, India is unlikely to change course, and the tariffs have badly damaged relations with India. The move is especially surprising given Trump’s past cordial relationship with Modi and the Biden administration's geopolitical courting of India. Biden even hosted Modi for a state dinner in June 2023.

In a recent opinion piece in The Washington Post, Andriy Yermak, Ukraine’s chief of the presidential office, praised the high tariffs on India. Yermak declared that it was a “great first step” but called for more pressure and for a “full economic blockade” of Russia. While Ukraine understandably wants everything possible to be done to end the war and bring peace, not all avenues will lead to the desired outcome. The decision for Europe to get off Russian oil following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was apparent and necessary. And though it led to an increase in energy costs and inflation, alternative energy sources were found, and Russia lost a vital stream of revenue. The expansion of these sanctions, this reasoning goes, will help the war effort and thwart Russia’s imperial ambitions.

But this strategy could be disastrous if poorly applied, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where countries are still dependent on Russia for energy needs. The energy landscape in Central Asia reflects decades of Soviet-era infrastructure and integration. Central Asian countries, except oil-rich Turkmenistan, remain highly reliant on Russian energy infrastructure and benefit from shared Soviet-era energy grids and the Eurasian Economic Union.

The South Caucasus presents a similar case. Georgia and Armenia, even more so, are largely dependent on Russian oil and have limited energy supply options. Georgia lacks domestic oil refineries and imports primarily from Russia and Azerbaijan, with Russian imports recently surpassing Azerbaijani supplies for the first time in eighteen years despite troubled bilateral relations. Armenia faces even greater constraints, with Gazprom maintaining a monopoly over natural gas imports and distribution. Natural gas made up 80 percent of Armenia’s energy imports in 2020. The rest comes from Iran in an electricity-for-natural trade deal. Armenia’s natural gas imports are delivered through the North-South Gas Pipeline via Georgia. Other regional pipelines bypass Armenia due to geopolitical conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the closure of European markets to Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian energy companies redirected their focus towards Central Asia, leading to an increase in Russian energy imports into the region. Russia and Central Asian countries rely on the same Soviet-era-built energy grid and EAEU membership. Russian investment in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure has expanded since 2022, including nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and hydroelectric facilities elsewhere. Even Kyrgyzstan, despite being a renewable energy leader, plans to double its Russian oil imports by 2040.

Despite their energy dependence on Russia, both Armenia and Georgia have sought EU membership in the past. Both countries have undergone democratic revolutions, although their current political situations are tenuous. After Russia failed to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive, public opinion of Russia dramatically decreased, with two-thirds expressing a negative view and 40 percent viewing Russia as a threat. When the Georgian government withdrew from EU accession in November 2024, protests lasted for months demanding a reversal. Armenia and Georgia also share ties to Europe and the U.S. in terms of tourism, culture, and ethnic diasporas.

The U.S. imposing sanctions or high tariffs on countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus has the potential to undo decades of U.S. outreach to these regions. These could not separate their energy supplies from Russia without great harm to their own economies, nor would such a tradeoff be worth it to them. Antagonist trade policies would increase anti-American sentiment, inhibit future American investment, and thrust these post-Soviet states back into Moscow’s orbit.

Secondary sanctions on Russian oil importers are not assured to change the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which has been at a territorial standstill for months. Russia has proved more than capable of keeping its war machine growing and expanding under international sanctions. These approaches are less effective than simply supplying Ukraine directly with the weapons it needs to liberate territory and defend its skies.

Should the U.S. see strategic importance in weaning post-Soviet republics off Russian oil, it could encourage alternative energy routes and the use of renewable energy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are already at the forefront in renewables like wind and hydroelectric power. A key alternative route could source energy from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world. As Michael Doran from the Hudson Institute explains, “We just need a few kilometers of pipeline to be built in order to connect up Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan, which can then flow comfortably to Europe across Georgia … Turkmen Gas could end the dependence of Europe on Russian gas.” In addition, the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan presents new energy options for Armenia. If Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey were to be opened, it could diversify its energy imports rather than remaining reliant on Russia.

CONCLUSIONS: Post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus are caught between a revanchist Russia and growing ties with the West. Central Asia and the South Caucasus have much to offer the West, from energy deposits to critical minerals, emerging democracies, and tourism. A “full economic blockade” would not only be impossible to enforce but also detrimental to long-term U.S. interests.

The countries of the Central Asia and Caucasus regions are aware of the great power rivalries surrounding them. They understand their precarious situations and the importance of not antagonizing Russia. If the U.S. wants to have a presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the decades to come, it must respect the inherent multilateralism of these regions. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Washington must decide to what extent it sees importance in stopping the flow of Russian oil. It must weigh the value of cutting Russian oil revenues against future relations with post-Soviet countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Charlotte Krausz is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington-based think tank. She is an undergraduate at the University of St. Andrews studying International Relations and Persian.