By Kodirjon Eshonkulov

On July 2–3, 2026, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev paid Uzbekistan's first presidential state visit to Georgia in 23 years, elevating bilateral ties to a strategic partnership. Coming weeks after a similar upgrade with Kazakhstan and a wave of Georgian ministerial visits across Central Asia, the trip is not a bilateral curiosity but a marker of a structural shift: Central Asian states are actively re-anchoring their westward connectivity strategy in the South Caucasus, and doing so on terms decoupled from the European Union's political relationship with Tbilisi. For the future of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and Middle Corridor connectivity, the durability of this Caucasus terminus may matter as much as the eastern infrastructure itself.

BACKGROUND:

Uzbekistan and Georgia established diplomatic relations in 1994, formalized a year later through a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and have since maintained a modest but steadily expanding relationship built on trade, direct Tashkent–Tbilisi and Tashkent–Batumi flights, and cultural exchange through Tbilisi's Georgian Cultural Center Megobroba, active since the same year. Bilateral trade reached roughly US$ 270 million by the end of 2025, a meaningful but still marginal figure relative to Uzbekistan’s overall trade portfolio. Momentum built gradually: Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze visited Tashkent in March 2025, and Days of Georgian Culture were held in Tashkent this past March. 

What distinguishes the July 2026 visit is both its symbolism and its timing. Mirziyoyev’s trip was the first at head-of-state level in over two decades, and it produced a Joint Declaration establishing a strategic partnership, alongside sectoral memoranda spanning economy, healthcare, agriculture, finance, customs, education, ICT, and culture. Crucially, it did not occur in isolation. It followed Georgian Dream ministers’ consecutive June visits to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and preceded Kazakhstan’s own strategic partnership agreement with Georgia (signed June 30 in Astana) by only days. A visit by Turkmenistan’s president to Tbilisi is reportedly also being prepared. Taken together, this is not a single bilateral gesture but a coordinated Georgian campaign to institutionalize relations across the entire Central Asian core, and a reciprocal Central Asian interest in securing a reliable Caucasus foothold. Beyond official protocol, the visit registers concretely at the level of Uzbekistan’s exporting businesses. Investment and Trade Minister Laziz Qudratov described how domestic manufacturers in textiles, food processing, and household appliances plan to complete final production stages inside Georgia’s Poti free economic zone before re-exporting to third-country markets — a practical illustration of how exporters, not only diplomats, are recalibrating around the Caucasus route. Local reporting on the visit also cited a nearly US$ 400 million prospective portfolio of hotel and residential projects tied to the deepening exchange. Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili, for his part, publicly framed the partnership as reinforcing Middle Corridor connectivity between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, suggesting the recalibration is felt on both sides of the route rather than driven solely from Tashkent.

IMPLICATIONS:

The logic behind this convergence is best understood through the lens of the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Caspian trade route linking Central Asia and China to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Black Sea, explicitly designed to bypass Russian territory. Since 2022, the corridor has moved from a secondary alternative to a strategic necessity for Eurasian trade planners, precisely because the northern route through Russia carries mounting sanctions risk and reputational cost. For Uzbekistan, this matters concretely: the CKU railway, once operational, will generate westward-bound freight that needs a credible onward path to European markets. Georgia's Black Sea ports, Poti and Batumi, are the corridor’s terminal gateway. A CKU line that ends without a secure, upgraded, and diplomatically stable corridor beyond the Caspian is a truncated asset. Mirziyoyev’s visit, and the accompanying attention to industrial, logistics, and tourism cooperation, should be read as an attempt to secure that missing western half of the chain.

This is where the visit’s timing against Georgia’s own geopolitical trajectory becomes analytically significant. Georgia’s EU accession process has been effectively frozen since 2024, following the Georgian Dream government’s foreign-agents legislation and its own decision to suspend accession talks until 2028. The European Council has described the process as being at a “standstill,” and the EU has cut assistance and partially suspended visa facilitation. Yet, notably, working-level cooperation between Georgian officials and their EU, NATO, and U.S. counterparts has reportedly continued largely undisturbed, and Brussels has kept investing in interconnection projects that run through Georgian territory, including Black Sea undersea cable plans advanced via a Romania-Georgia memorandum earlier this year.

This produces what might be called a decoupling of infrastructural and normative logics. Political-value alignment between Tbilisi and Brussels has deteriorated, but the geographic and commercial rationale for treating Georgia as an indispensable transit state has not, incentivizing Central Asian capitals to deepen engagement with Georgia on infrastructure, trade, and logistics. This gives Tashkent room to pursue a transactional, interest-based diplomacy toward the Caucasus, a pattern consistent with Uzbekistan’s broader post-2016 foreign policy style, which has generally prioritized connectivity and economic diversification over alignment with any single bloc’s political conditionality.

Armenia constitutes another important part of the equation. Georgia is currently viewed, including by Armenian officials, as the most EU-oriented state in the South Caucasus and as a de facto gateway for Armenia’s own European aspirations. Should Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization progress, particularly regarding transit arrangements sometimes referenced as the Zangezur corridor, a second Caucasus route could eventually supplement the existing Azerbaijan–Georgia axis, further reducing Central Asia’s dependence on any single transit state and adding redundancy to the Middle Corridor architecture. For now, however, the corridor’s practical backbone remains the Azerbaijan–Georgia pairing, with Uzbekistan’s new strategic partnership effectively buying insurance on the Georgian half of that pairing.

CONCLUSIONS:

Mirziyoyev’s Tbilisi visit should not be filed away as routine diplomatic housekeeping. It is best understood as one node in a broader, near-simultaneous Central Asian recalibration toward the South Caucasus, running parallel to, and largely independent of, the EU’s own frozen political relationship with Georgia. The distinction matters: it suggests that the Middle Corridor’s institutional foundations are being built on transactional infrastructure diplomacy rather than shared democratic conditionality, a divergence that may serve Central Asian connectivity interests in the near term but could complicate future efforts to fold these corridors into EU-backed connectivity frameworks such as Global Gateway. For the CKU railway’s long-term commercial viability, the durability of Uzbekistan’s new Georgian partnership, and the corridor’s insulation from further South Caucasus political volatility, will matter as much as the completion of the tracks themselves.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Kodirjon Eshonkulov is an independent researcher specializing in Central Asian geopolitics, transboundary infrastructure politics, international relations with Europe and a recent graduate of Ajou University’s Graduate School of International Studies in South Korea. He was worked as a political correspondent on Uzbekistan’s social and political reforms after 2017. He has published several articles in The Times of Central Asia about Uzbekistan’s water scarcity problem and its relations with Afghan Taliban government on the Koshtepa canal. 

By Umair Jamal

The Afghan Taliban’s growing investment in drone technology is seemingly a response to their conventional military limitations. Rather than a surprising development, it reflects a broader global trend where actors with limited resources use affordable drone systems to challenge better-equipped opponents like Pakistan. This capability not only strengthens the Taliban’s asymmetric warfare options but also raises serious concerns about technology proliferation to other militant groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and its impact on regional stability.

BACKGROUND:

Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban have faced severe constraints, including the lack of a functional air force and heavy international sanctions. It seems they have turned to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a feasible and cost-effective solution for surveillance and limited strike missions.

According to ACLED data, the Taliban first began using drones in a military capacity in February this year, with at least 12 recorded instances of strikes into Pakistan. These have included cross-border attacks targeting Pakistani security posts, with some attempts reaching deeper into Pakistani territory. Initially employed for propaganda, the platforms have evolved into weaponized systems.

The Taliban are actively working to build domestic drone production capabilities. Reports point to front companies such as Dinit Technology offering lucrative contracts to engineers and robotics experts in Afghanistan to join the program. Moreover, recruitment efforts have also targeted universities, with Taliban officials showing interest in student drone projects. 

The Daily Mail recently reported that the Taliban are using a former Special Air Service (SAS) base in Logar Province as the primary test site for the new drones. According to one report, the Taliban are now sourcing electronic and mechanical parts – GPS modules, electric motors, flight control systems, and sensors – from black markets and smuggling networks for these purposes as the group lacks any formal agreement with any country. Although designed for civilian use, these items are reportedly being repurposed to produce increasingly sophisticated drones capable of medium-altitude flight, reconnaissance, and precision strikes.

Local production and maintenance facilities are seemingly being established at a rapid pace. For many Afghans, these developments may be viewed with a mix of nationalist sentiment and concern about prolonged conflict as advancing drone capabilities could draw increased foreign attention and potentially intensify conflict in the region. Communities near the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan are already experiencing the direct effects of heightened tensions and increased militarization. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Taliban’s drone program is a clear example of how emerging technologies enable resource-limited actors to challenge conventionally superior opponents. 

This logic has become increasingly evident during Russia’s war in Ukraine, where drones have proved highly effective against better-resourced forces. Arguably, the same advantage applies to both state and non-state actors, explaining why both the Taliban and groups like the TTP are heavily investing in drone capabilities.

For Pakistan, which has traditionally relied on conventional military superiority, this development poses a direct challenge. For instance, cross-border drone activity has already increased pressure on border defenses and air surveillance systems. 

Pakistan, like many countries heavily invested in traditional military hardware, has lagged in developing effective counter-drone technologies. Its defense doctrine and procurement have historically prioritized conventional assets such as fighter jets, tanks, and artillery systems, leaving gaps in addressing low-cost and asymmetric threats like modified commercial drones. 

This technological lag has become particularly evident in recent border incidents, where Pakistani forces have struggled to consistently detect and neutralize small and low-flying UAVs used by the Taliban and TTP. As a result, Islamabad has had to rely on ad-hoc measures and international partnerships to bolster its counter-drone capabilities, highlighting the urgent need for greater investment in specialized electronic warfare, radar systems, and drone-jamming technologies tailored to the evolving regional threat landscape.

There are concrete examples that illustrate the growing threat. For instance, the TTP has repeatedly used commercial, suicide, and quadcopter drones against Pakistani security forces in multiple operations along the border regions, demonstrating their increasing tactical sophistication. 

The conflict took a stark turn in December 2025 when the TTP formally announced the creation of its own dedicated Air Force unit. This development reflected a heavily altered operational reality on the ground. Data from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) acknowledged that security forces faced over 400 quadcopter and drone-related militant incidents in late 2025 alone. This sudden surge has opened critical gaps in Pakistan’s conventional military defense. While the state’s defense apparatus can effectively neutralize high-value projectiles using localized electronic jamming, it struggles against the stark asymmetry of commercial off-the-shelf drones costing a mere US$ 200 to US$ 1,000 per unit. By deploying these cheap systems at volume, the TTP usually employs saturation strategies that threaten to overwhelm the military’s conventional electronic jammers and physical defense systems.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the TTP’s growing use of drones has become a serious operational challenge for law enforcement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Senior KP police officials have acknowledged that commercial and quadcopter drones are increasingly used for surveillance of security convoys and to guide suicide attacks, making traditional policing methods inadequate. At times, the TTP follow a saturation strategy, employing drones and militants armed with sophisticated infantry weapons, stretching the presence of security forces, and then attacking through heavy blasts, e.g. car bombs. 

This evolving threat has forced provincial police in Pakistan’s KP province to accelerate modernization efforts, including procurement of anti-drone systems, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized training for rapid response units. Moreover, police forces in KP province that face attacks from TTP have undertaken modernization efforts, with provincial police setting up a dedicated drone training school in Nowshera. Recently, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police received 76 AI-powered drones with advanced surveillance and thermal imaging technology.

The pressure from TTP drone-enabled operations has compelled law enforcement agencies to shift from conventional ground-focused tactics toward integrated counter-drone strategies, highlighting the urgent need to bridge critical capability gaps along the border regions. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police claimed in July that it foiled 341 drone attacks by TTP militants with the help of modern technology in the last six months.

The Afghan Taliban, for their part, have actively employed modified commercial drones not only for reconnaissance but also as counter-attack tools in response to Pakistani conventional strikes. They have publicly framed these operations as their de facto Air Force missions. For instance, the Taliban have allegedly used drones to hit ISIS-K elements in Baluchistan, reportedly in retaliation to Pakistani cross-border actions.

These drone strikes seemingly serve a dual purpose. They provide the Taliban with a much-needed ability to project strength and respond to external pressure, while also offering valuable propaganda material. For a regime facing domestic criticism for its inability to counter Pakistani incursions, drone operations have become a political lifeline as they help the Taliban portray themselves as capable defenders and boosting regime legitimacy. Repeated operations also allow the Taliban to improve target location accuracy and operational effectiveness

One of the most critical implications of this development is the extreme difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of controlling proliferation. Arguably, cheap and dual-use drone technology is far easier to acquire and modify than advanced weapons systems. Components are widely available on global black markets, with reports suggesting the Taliban acquire parts through smuggling networks, possibly involving suppliers from the broader region and beyond. International efforts to restrict access are likely to have limited impact given the commercial nature of the technology.

This proliferation risk extends beyond the Taliban. If the group continues advancing its program, expertise and components could spread to other militant factions operating from Afghan soil. This can further intensify cross-border militancy and complicate counter-terrorism efforts for Pakistan and Central Asian states.

More broadly, the program highlights the global challenge of dual-use technology proliferation. Even isolated regimes like the Taliban can develop disruptive tools through commercial channels. This adds to existing instability in South and Central Asia and tests the effectiveness of current international export control regimes.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Taliban’s pursuit of a domestic drone program represents a logical and predictable adaptation to their strategic constraints. While still evolving, these capabilities demonstrate how asymmetric tools are reshaping modern conflict. 

The spread of this technology to groups like the TTP, combined with the lag in counter-drone defenses among regional powers, creates a more dangerous security environment.

As these capabilities mature, they risk heightening border tensions, increasing militarization, and generating new challenges for stability across South and Central Asia. 

In this regard, greater international attention to monitoring dual-use technologies and fostering regional cooperation on counter-drone measures will be essential to mitigating these risks. Ultimately, the trajectory of the Taliban’s drone program may significantly influence the future security landscape of the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Armen Grigoryan

April 15th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Tensions along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh between April 2 and 5 resulted in the heaviest exchanges of fire since 1994. Even though the use of some types of weapons was quite unexpected, the general logic of developments in the conflict in recent years has made the recent fighting rather predictable. Concerning further hostilities, the question is not if, but when they will happen. While this danger needs to be addressed by means of international mediation, so far only Russia demonstrates substantial activity in this regard. Russia’s unilateral involvement will pursue its own particular regional interests rather than producing a lasting solution to the conflict.