by Georgiy Voloshin (05/01/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)
On April 23, Kazakhstani media reported that a Russian-built Mig-31 military aircraft owned by Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense had crashed during a training flight near a small village in Karaganda province in the country’s center. Although both pilots took urgent measures to be catapulted out of the cockpit, the aircraft’s captain did not survive his wounds after an unsuccessful landing. While the prosecutor’s office opened an official investigation, the preliminary assessments of the incident showed that the onboard navigation system had malfunctioned. The Ministry of Defense quickly reacted to the news stating that the aircraft had undergone capital repairs in December 2012 at a Russian assembly plant in Rzhevsk and was under maintenance warranty at the moment of its crash. Two days later, Askar Buldeshev, the Deputy Commander in Chief of Kazakhstan’s Air Defense Forces, was arrested by the country’s law enforcement agents on charges of corruption related to the purchase of military equipment from third parties.
by Richard Weitz (05/01/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)
Kazakhstan’s government is atypical among Central Asian countries for its prominent efforts to reduce tensions in Eurasia as well as to increase understanding, trust, and cooperation between different regions, cultures, and religions. The Kazakhstani government’s motives in seeking such a prominent role are straightforward. It aims to reduce security threats and advance economic interests. It also wants to elevate the country’s profile in world affairs by hosting prominent international gatherings and by making visible contributions to international peace and prosperity. Kazakhstan’s main problem is that Astana’s limited diplomatic and other resources limit its ability to pursue its ambitious foreign-policy agenda.
by Georgiy Voloshin (04/03/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)
While Kazakhstan prepares to launch a series of costly infrastructure projects, including the modernization of its three oil refineries and the much-awaited start of production at the Kashagan oil field, the economic data recently unveiled by the country’s Statistics Agency and major energy companies are far from reassuring. In early 2013, Kazakhstan’s statistics body stated in its annual report that the Kazakhstani economy had grown by a meager 0.5 percent in 2012 as compared to 3.5 percent one year before, let alone the spectacular figures reported in earlier periods both before and even during the world financial crisis. According to most expert opinions, the structure of Kazakhstan’s economy, which is still heavily dependent on the lucrative oil and gas sector as well as mining activities, has largely remained unchanged, despite a broad range of initiatives aimed at greater diversification. At the same time, the major energy companies whose cumulative revenue permitted the country to prosper in better times now face multiple challenges and can further undermine Kazakhstan’s growth prospects.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.