By Farkhod Tolipov

On November 14-15, 2025, the 7th Consultative Meeting of Heads of States (CMHS) of Central Asia took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The meeting constituted a milestone in the 34 years of Central Asia integration since 1991. Long-awaited signs of institutionalization of this process emerged alongside the decision to grant Azerbaijan membership in this regional format. This was the hitherto most consequential CMHS, giving rise to potentially serious implications concerning the further evolution of Central Asian regionalism and its geopolitical implications. 



                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoev initiated the format of CMHS of Central Asia in 2017; and six meetings have been held since. This new format was introduced after almost 10 years of “frozen” integration from 2006 to 2016, during which the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, maintained mostly bilateral relations.

Regional integration, which had seen some progress between 1991 and 2005, was interrupted due to the merger of the regional structure Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) after Russia joined CACO. Central Asian states could not restore their own regional structure until 2018 when the first Consultative Meeting was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Five consecutive meetings took place in Tashkent, November 2019; in Avaza, Turkmenistan, August 2021; in Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, July 2022; in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, September 2023; and in Astana, August 2024.

The CMHS has had a controversial dual effect. They consistently demonstrated seemingly resolute political will to strengthen and advance regional cooperation, while at the same time the participating presidents persistently refrained from rhetorical commitments to integration – perhaps out of concern that stronger integration could undermine their sovereignty. The regional cooperation/integration dilemma has thus constrained strategic choices and visions for the future.

In particular, this tendency was reflected during the 6th CMHS when the presidents adopted the Conception of Regional Cooperation “Central Asia-2040” which does not envisage integration at all. Yet the 7th Meeting included steps towards the establishment of institutions pertinent to a full-fledged regional organization. Although the presidents still avoid speaking in terms of real integration, they decided on four important issues: the creation of a permanent Secretariat; renaming the CMHS “Central Asian Community”; raising the status of National Coordinators of Consultative Meetings to Special Representatives of Heads of States; and adopting the Conception of Regional Security based on the Catalog of Risks.

However, the most controversial decision was the admission of Azerbaijan to the “C5” structure.

IMPLICATIONS: The first institutional forms of regional integration in Central Asia were set up in the 1990s. At that time, institutions such as the Council of Heads of States, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Councils were created, and attempts were even made to establish a Central Asian parliament. Central Asian leaders now make efforts to revitalize the initial integration process, albeit without articulating the very concept of “integration.”

The preceding six CMHS have yielded important experiences in terms of maintaining the impulse and rhetoric of regionalism as such. Moreover, the CMHS not only reintroduced the regional format of cooperation but also stipulated a geopolitical recalibration in and around Central Asia. One manifestation of this is the proliferation of so-called “C5+1” formats which reflected, among other things, the emerging regional order in Central Asia.

It was expected that Uzbekistan, as the initiator of CMHS and chair of the 7th Meeting in Tashkent, would push the pro-integration agenda forward. This intention appeared successful. Renaming the regional format the Central Asian Community (CAC) associates with the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) which functioned between 1994 and 2000. The successful operation of CAEC led the overall process of creating CACO. Hopefully, CAC can also promote stronger political unity among the states concerned. However, the new name must signify not only a positive disposition but also the real new political status of this community of five states. The “old” challenges remain in this “new” stage when it comes to their constantly repeated mantra about conducting common foreign policy concerning key international and regional issues.

A significant decision in this regard was taken regarding the Concept of regional security and stability as well as the Catalogue of security risks in Central Asia and measures to address them for 2026-2028. The idea of establishing a regional security architecture was articulated also in the previous CMHS. This is, indeed, a very crucial strategic task to be addressed urgently, requiring coordination of foreign policies. The content of the Catalogue clarifies what these risks are and how the regional security system will be created. Indeed, since Central Asian states have strategic partnership agreements and alliance relationships with each other, now is the time to test them by agreeing on the Catalogue to address regional security challenges.

Mirziyoev also proposed another, normative, idea: “based on our values and traditions of public diplomacy, we believe it would be appropriate to create a Council of Elders consisting of renowned public figures with extensive life experience. We believe this will contribute to generational continuity in our countries, as well as to strengthening regional solidarity and identity.” This message points to the importance of a common regional identity for the peoples of Central Asia. It was a call to engage citizens in regional integration and bring this process to the broader public. Indeed, broader involvement of civil society in regional integration has hitherto been lacking and this was a signal to the Central Asian public to contribute to making the region a real community.

In Tashkent, the five presidents were accompanied by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev. The summit adopted the decision to admit Azerbaijan into the Central Asian structure, which gave rise to a number of questions regarding the transformation of the five-lateral CMHS format into a six-lateral one and producing an equation with one unknown variable. Azerbaijan is a South Caucasian state, not a Central Asian one. How this seemingly bi-regional format will evolve in terms of future integration remains to be seen.

Uzbekistan’s former foreign minister Abdulaziz Komilov noted in an interview that Azerbaijan joining the CMHS as a member created a new geopolitical reality. The admission of Russia into CACO in 2004 was fatal for this organization and destroyed it. Azerbaijan, in contrast, is not an imperial state and does not have hegemonic ambitions. Azerbaijan’s membership in CMHS coincides with the transformation of this format into CAC.

Azerbaijan already has close relations to Central Asian states; together with Azerbaijan, four Central Asian states (excluding Tajikistan) are members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Azerbaijan is also a geopolitically experienced state and can in many respects pose a good example for Central Asians. At the same time, its membership in CMHS can profoundly impact the regional integration process. Whether Baku can play a special geopolitical role in Central Asia depends on its ability to contribute to what Central Asians have so far lacked in their regional and international actions – a single agency in the international system. The extent to which they will be able to achieve this together with Azerbaijan remains an open question.

The Tashkent summit also gave rise to another surge of criticism in Russian media and analytical circles. Especially Azerbaijan’s intensified participation in Central Asian regional affairs was described as a cause for concern and as concealing a pro-Western geopolitical design.

CONCLUSIONS: Previous CMHS have produced several positive statements and documents. The time has now come to address crucial practical questions regarding the new institutional structures agreed upon. Determining the actual content of the Catalog of Risks is an important issue. So is the status of the newly instituted high-ranking Special Representatives, and whether they will become more visible and engage with the broader public. Stronger visibility will undoubtedly motivate broader public engagement and thereby add more dynamism to the integration process. Another important issue is whether the Secretariat will be a transparent structure. It should avoid the risks of becoming overly bureaucratic and becoming preoccupied with the narrow interest in maintaining national sovereignty at all costs.

It also remains to be seen whether Azerbaijan’s membership is only eclectic – a mechanical expansion for the sake of showcasing regionalism; or a strategic enlargement based on a long-term and well calculated decision for the sake of confronting a new round of geopolitical challenges.

The Central Asian five-lateral format will experience a new round of geopolitical challenges related to great power rivalry in and around this region, especially in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine; the diversification of international transport and other connectivity in Central Asian states; and the rising profile of Central Asia in terms of its strategic autonomy in the international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.