BACKGROUND: The State Department’s annual human rights report continues to rank Uzbekistan as being among the worst offenders in this regard. Increasingly frustrated with Uzbekistan, Congress has legislated language in the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal year (FY) 2004 stating that the funds appropriated by this act will only be made available to the Uzbek government if the Secretary of State determines and reports that it is making progress on the human rights commitments it made to Washington in the Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation of 2002. Failure to obtain such certification means that the State Department will terminate all the aid programs it administers, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training Act funds etc. Unless Uzbekistan can show demonstrable progress, those funds will be cut off on July 1. Indeed, this date was slipped back to give Tashkent time to comply. Obviously any such cutoff will place America’s continued presence at Karshi-Khanabad under a cloud. Uzbekistan’s human rights and democracy record has been the repeated target of external criticism for its violation of accepted canons of behavior in treaties and agreements to which it is a party. Ironically, it was Uzbekistan that pushed for the language on improving human rights policies to secure continued U.S. assistance and strategic cooperation. That language included calls for multiparty elections, a free press, and an independent judiciary. None of this has been forthcoming, however. Indeed, widespread repression has continued with no letup, while worries exist regarding the Uzbek economy. Moreover, Western reports and Congressional testimony have shown that torture is routinely practiced in Uzbek prisons where prisoners have no civil or human rights, and Uzbekistan scores particularly badly on the government’s failure to address the trafficking of people, particularly women, illegally across borders for purposes of sexual exploitation. In response to the lack of progress, Congress has essentially declared that it has had enough and will punish Uzbekistan through suspension of those aid programs that the State Department supervises. Yet strategically speaking, Uzbekistan is a vital outpost in the War on Terrorism and potentially in any future Asian strategy scenario for the U.S. military, whose main responsibility is, quite properly, defense of America’s strategic interests. While the aid and assistance programs that the Pentagon supervises are not included in this legislation and are therefore immune to such Congressional mandates for now, it is likely that further Uzbek noncompliance with the 2002 agreement’s terms could affect those programs in the future.

IMPLICATIONS: Thus the different responsibilities and priorities accruing to the State Department and the Pentagon has led to differences between them with regard to Uzbekistan. But as yet there is no overt sign of inter-departmental friction, even though the two departments obviously have different priorities and hence different approaches to Uzbekistan. In the final analysis, the law has to be obeyed no matter how much time Uzbekistan may be given to comply with it. However, it is highly likely that the Pentagon fully grasps the gravity of the Uzbek dilemma. In Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s recent trip to Uzbekistan, human rights were publicly listed as being on the agenda. Hence the United States is bringing pressure to bear on Uzbekistan to make tangible and genuinely good faith efforts to democratize its politics. There can be no doubt that the State Department in particular feels this Congressional pressure and is strongly urging reforms and not only in Uzbekistan. After all, at every Congressional hearing on Central Asia its representatives are regularly subjected to questioning on these issues and cannot evade answering or responding to Congressional and external pressure. However, it also seems clear that Karimov and his associates do not take this diplomatic pressure seriously as long as they think Washington needs them for strategic purposes as much if not more than they need Washington. In the worst case, cutting off funds, even if it is an act of pique and outrage at Tashkent’s failure to actualize its promises more than a well-conceived strategic move, could be seen by some as the only way to get Karimov’s and his government’s attention. Flowing from this quandary, Uzbekistan might actually make tangible gestures to improve its record and attempt to persuade external audiences that it might be turning over a new leaf. Alternatively, it might try to stonewall or bluff Washington as it has since the human rights question became an issue in the 1990s. In that case, the aid is likely to be cut off, whereas signs of genuine reform would probably bring about the State Department’s certification of improvement. A third way between these two more or less polar opposites may be devised to keep the aid flowing for a time and to get some sort of action that can be credibly represented as progress along the required lines.

CONCLUSIONS: Beyond these immediate prospects, the issues at hand reveal a much deeper strategic dilemma facing both governments. Uzbekistan’s utter failure to reform jeopardizes not only its strategic partnership with Washington and its subsequent ability to defend itself against any military threat, but also its own internal stability. As noted above, it was Uzbekistan that argued for language on Human Rights to be included in the 2002 Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation. This stemmed from an insistence to that effect by the liberal and reform-minded elites of the Foreign and Defense ministries, most likely to be able to involve U.S. leverage in their struggle to move reforms onward in the face of opposition mainly from the interior ministry and others. Uzbekistan’s authoritarian morass and failure to implement reforms it had itself urged raises questions regarding the struggle for influence among various forces in Tashkent. Karimov may not control the country nearly as tightly as usually thought, and most importantly, the strength of the hawks in the ministry of interior may be underestimated. In any case, this raises doubts on Uzbekistan’s future stability and risks exacerbating the country’s vulnerability. If Uzbekistan is isolated due to its own misguided policies, not only the Karimov regime, but the interests of many other governments could be at serious risk.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013.