BACKGROUND: In late May 2000, Russian officials announced the possibility that the bombing of training camps in Afghanistan would commence over the summer. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov asserted "Acts of terror and other actions which could damage the interests of Russia and its partners in Central Asia are being prepared on the territory of Afghanistan." Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembskii pointed to an agreement reached in Mazar-i-Sharif between representatives of the Taliban and of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, Saudi-born terrorist Usama bin Laden, and Uzbek Islamist leader Djuma Namangani. It is clear that Russia seeks to be the guarantor of stability in Central Asia and rework existing alliances in Central and South Asia.

In order to justify a Russian attack on Afghan soil, Yastrzhembskii advised critics of Moscow's campaign against the Taliban to familiarize themselves with Russia's new military doctrine that provides the possibility of delivering preventive strikes - not only conventional, but nuclear. Such comments came shortly after Putin's visit to Uzbekistan where several dozens of security agreements were signed. While in Uzbekistan, Putin stated, "We are ready to take preventive measures, if necessary." On 23 May, Federal General Governor of the Northern Caucasus, Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev, stated that he supported Yazsrzhembskii's statements against Afghanistan.

By the end of May, news spread of Uzbek warplanes violating Afghan airspace and of forced expulsions of Afghans from Kazakhstan. In late May, both Kazakh President Nazarbayev and Uzbek President Karimov stated that they supported the concept of bombing Afghanistan but only in response to an Islamic militant attack, not a preemptive strike, a distancing from Russia's position but still not an outright rejection of the concept. Russia's close ally, Tajikistan President Rakhmonov, has asked both Russia and the United States to solve the crisis while Kyrgyzstan President Akayev favors preemptive bombing and the establishment of sixty-four checkpoints along the Tajik border to repel "thousands of militants."

IMPLICATIONS: China harbors a similar security threat from the Taliban as Russia. In mid-April 2000, the police and security chiefs of the Shanghai Five (Russia, the PRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) agreed that the Afghan Taliban were a significant threat to regional stability. They decided to consolidate "military ties for joint strikes against nationalist separatism and religious extremism, international terrorism and the protection of regional security and stability. On 4 June 2000, PRC sources stated that Uyghur separatists had been receiving training from militant Chechens in Taliban camps in Afghanistan in order to attack targets in China, including Hong Kong. Four days later, a sub-meeting of the Shanghai Five announced that they intended to exchange information and carry out joint large-scale anti-terrorist operations.

Preventing the return of Islamic militants to Central Asia after last year's insurgency of 1,000 rebels into the Batken region of the Ferghana Valley is clearly at the forefront of Russian and Central Asian diplomacy. Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense are establishing an air defense network in Central Asia that seeks to duplicate Western uses of air power for punitive measures. To bomb bases in Afghanistan, Russia could use long-range TU-22MZ and front-line Su-24 bombers, escorted by MiG-29s and Su-27s from Central Asian members of the Shanghai Five. In mid-May 2000, Russian Air Force Chief Anatolii Kornukov visited Kazakhstan and negotiated the ability for Russian fighters to use Kazakh air space as a transit corridor in order to move assets closer to potential area of operations.

Russia has been pressuring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to participate in military action particularly during the meeting of the CIS Collective Security Council in Minsk, Belarus. Under the new Minsk agreement, Russia would be obliged to intervene in Central Asia in the event of Afghan retaliation from aerial bombing. President Karimov's Uzbekistan, which, though not a member of the Shanghai Five, signed a comprehensive bilateral security agreement with Russia on the eve of the Minsk summit. Uzbekistan has also been quite active diplomatically in requesting additional military aid and security guarantees from Germany to fight the extremists. Military cooperation is growing quickly with a minimum of complaints.

CONCLUSION: Russia remembers what President Clinton and US Secretary of Defense Cohen said about Washington's 20 August 1998 tomahawk cruise missile attack on Afghanistan that destroyed six sites including the Zhawar Kili al-Badr training facility. Clinton stated: "Our target was terror. Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical grounds affiliated with funded by Usama bin Ladin." The Russians imply the Kremlin would have as much justification as the United States did in hitting Afghanistan with long-range cruise missiles. Moscow points out that Afghanistan and Pakistan have trained thousands of Islamic militants in rhetoric similar to US target objectives announced in 1998.

Russia and the West are agreeing to fight terrorism and narco-militants. On 9 June 2000, the Russian and U.S. presidents agreed to establish a bilateral working group to draft specific proposals on measures of political, economic and other counteractions to the terrorist threat from the Afghanistan territory. What is at issue is the greater geopolitical game that is being played out in Central Asia. The implications of a Russian strike against the Taliban would be enormous. It would consolidate anti-Russian bases in Afghanistan and throughout the region, invite China to intervene, make the Central Asian states more authoritarian, bring India and Pakistan into the Central Asian equation, and challenge the West to fight terrorism on Russia and China's behalf.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Theodore Karasik is a Resident Consultant with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. He is Editor of Russia and Eurasia Armed Forces Review Annual from Academic International Press. Dr. Karasik received his Ph.D. in History from the University of California Los Angeles.

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