By Suren Sargsyan
Donald Trump’s return to the White House marked significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy. His second presidential term not only departs from the foreign policy approach of the Biden administration but also diverges considerably from his own first term. The rapidly evolving trajectory of U.S. foreign policy has profound implications—not only for U.S. allies but also for countries and regions that are directly or indirectly affected by changes in Washington's global posture. The status of the South Caucasus, which has seen varying degrees of U.S. engagement and interest over the years, has become increasingly unclear in the Trump administration’s foreign policy, despite pivotal geopolitical developments that increase the region’s significance.
BACKGROUND: Scholarly literature reflects a range of views regarding Western, and particularly U.S. interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. One prevailing argument suggests that the West has historically exhibited limited engagement in these regions, largely because they have been traditionally considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Some analysts even contend that, with the exception of the Baltic states, most former Soviet republics have been implicitly regarded as falling within Russia’s zone of control by Western powers themselves.
Conversely, a competing viewpoint asserts that the U.S. has maintained clear, albeit non-vital, strategic interests in the region. While not central to U.S. foreign policy, these interests are nonetheless significant. Accordingly, Washington has sought to exert influence when opportunities have presented themselves most notably in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.
At various times and for varied reasons, U.S. policy toward the countries of Central Asia has gained increased attention, often surpassing the level of engagement shown toward the South Caucasus. This heightened focus has been driven by several key factors. Notably, following the events of September 11, 2001, Central Asia became strategically important for the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. In addition, the region has been viewed as a critical arena for geopolitical competition with Russia and China. The presence of significant energy resources has further elevated the strategic value of Central Asia in U.S. foreign policy calculations.
It is also important to recognize that the U.S. has rarely articulated official, standalone strategies for individual regions such as the South Caucasus. Exceptions exist—for instance, the Trump administration’s publication of a formal strategy for Afghanistan in 2017 or Central Asia Strategy of 2019 but they are rare. Often, regions like the South Caucasus are subsumed under broader strategic frameworks, such as the Caspian Basin, Eurasia, or the Greater Middle East. Within this context, U.S. policy toward Iran also influenced engagement with the South Caucasus. Even in the absence of a declared strategy, U.S. efforts to isolate Iran often relied on close cooperation with neighboring states, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, the U.S. viewed Georgia—and, to a lesser extent, Armenia—as potential counterweights to expanding Russian influence in the region. Moreover, Washington saw the normalization of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the opening of their shared border as strategically important. Only under such circumstances could the closure or limiting the capabilities of the Armenia-Iran border be considered a feasible long-term policy goal. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has sought to play an active role in addressing regional conflicts and unresolved issues, recognizing that the persistence of such disputes could create opportunities for the resurgence of Russian influence in the region. This understanding also underpinned Washington's active involvement in the OSCE Minsk Group and its support for the negotiation process regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
IMPLICATIONS: During Donald Trump’s first presidency, U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus was relatively passive. Throughout those four years, there were very few direct and active engagements with the leaders of South Caucasus countries, reflecting a lack of a robust or comprehensive bilateral agenda. While cooperation has taken place in specific areas, the U.S. did not maintain an active, coordinated, or consistent presence in the region. This changed significantly under President Joe Biden, particularly after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and even more so following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022. Biden moved quickly to become involved in the South Caucasus, positioning the U.S. as a mediator in both Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish relations. Under leadership of President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken, Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish negotiations gained momentum. There was a concerted effort to reach a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan during Biden’s presidency, especially since the bulk of the negotiations had taken place under the mediation of his administration. However, the Democratic Party’s electoral defeat created a complicated situation. The new Trump administration appears to place little priority on the fact that the peace agreement is essentially ready, with only a few unresolved points remaining before it can be signed. As for the Armenian-Turkish negotiations, they too seem to have stalled under the current administration, suggesting a broader slowdown in U.S. engagement in the region's peace processes.
Moreover, several pressing questions remain unanswered. It is unclear how the U.S. envisions its mediating role within the framework of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement. Equally ambiguous is the meaning behind Trump advisor Steve Witkoff’s recent comment suggesting that Armenia and Azerbaijan could join the Abraham Accords. There is also uncertainty about the future of U.S. policy toward Georgia—once considered a strategic partner but now appearing to have lost that status—as well as toward Armenia, which was granted a similar strategic designation just days before President Biden's departure. More broadly, it remains unclear whether the U.S. views the South Caucasus as a cohesive regional unit or continues to approach it as a collection of separate, unrelated states.
CONCLUSIONS: Maintaining a presence in the South Caucasus requires effective engagement with each state individually. However, a regional approach remains essential. Within Trump’s team, there appears to be a growing understanding of the significance of the South Caucasus for Russia, Iran, and Turkey not only geopolitically but in broader historical context. As a result, extending U.S. influence in the region would require both a clearly defined regional strategy and tailored bilateral tools, including the application of soft power. Yet the Trump administration’s limited interest in soft power (cutting all foreign assistance programs), its lack of enthusiasm for deepening bilateral partnerships, and its relatively passive role in regional conflict resolution, all point towards the absence of a strategic approach toward the South Caucasus. The Trump administration still lacks a concrete policy toward the South Caucasus as a region, as well as clear strategies for conflict resolution in the region and distinct approaches to Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan individually.
This will complicate the efforts of future U.S. administrations to establish meaningful involvement in the region and could create an environment conducive to the emergence of regional formats like the 3+3 platform (involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran). The establishment of such a framework would effectively push not only the U.S. but also the EU out of the region—at a time when the EU is struggling to maintain relevance in global geopolitics, especially as long as Washington acts unilaterally. A withdrawal of U.S. influence from the South Caucasus would make reengagement either impossible or extremely difficult. Therefore, if the U.S. aims to maintain influence in a region bordered by its historical rival Iran, strategic competitor Russia, and a problematic ally in Turkey, Washington must, at the very least, preserve its current level of influence. This includes deepening strategic relationships, applying soft powr, and fostering new economic and business ties. Within this context, it would be logical for the administration to intensify its efforts to support the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as enhance its engagement with Georgia. Unresolved issues in the region will prevent the U.S. from achieving a robust strategic presence—not only across the South Caucasus as a region but also within the individual countries that comprise it.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate in U.S. foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.
