BACKGROUND: While visiting Jordan during October of last year, Alu Alkhanov went on record, complaining that his then-first deputy prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov, was undermining his rule as president. This was the first overt indication of tension between the two men since Alkhanov – equipped with the Kadyrovsty’s requisite blessing – acceded to the presidency in August 2004. Back then, Kadyrov heralded him as “a steadfast general, a firm politician and a principal opponent of separatism”. In truth, however, this rather curt endorsement was almost certainly duplicitous, for Kadyrov evidently regarded the former interior ministry general as weak and malleable – certainly no threat to his own role as power-broker within the structures of the pro-Moscow regime. Indeed, the true extent of Alkhanov’s authority was soon called into question when allegations surfaced that he was ‘kicking up’ money to his de facto superior, Kadyrov. In fact, even while still a mere first deputy prime minister, Kadyrov’s power and influence went far beyond that commonly associated with such a post. His writ is extensive, mainly because of the considerable paramilitary structures he controls. As a result of this, as well as the political patronage he receives from certain key personages in Moscow, he clearly believes that his political star is on the rise. In recent months, Kadyrov has frequently made sweeping, seemingly off-the-cuff remarks on series of controversial topics, ranging from the redrawing of long-standing territorial boundaries to polygamy. Upon becoming acting premier, his pronouncements became ever more bold and ad hoc, a trend which – for the time being, at least – has seemingly reached an apogee following his rash (and possibly unconstitutional) decision to suspend the activities of the Danish Refugee Council in Chechnya. This brash decision, taken on foot of the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper, drew condemnation from several prominent Russian politicians who accused the new premier of overstepping his authority. But the fact that Kadyrov feels able to skirt constitutionality so brazenly tells us much about the political dynamics within the pro-Moscow regime in Chechnya, and perhaps even more about the nature of relations between Moscow and Grozny. The successive government posts held by Kadyrov (as first deputy premier and then prime minister) are, by their very inception, to do mainly with economic matters concerning the republic. Traditionally, matters of a high political nature, or those pertaining to foreign relations, are the preserve of the president of the republic – in this case, Alu Alkhanov. Kadyrov’s nonchalant circumvention of these conventions shows firstly, how little respect he holds for the integrity of the existing power structures; and secondly, how confident he is that the federal centre will not object unduly to this kind of behavior.

IMPLICATIONS: Since his father’s death, Kadyrov has cultivated a healthy working relationship with president Putin and his quietly influential deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov. However, relations with other colleagues - particularly some of those closer to home – are rather less buoyant. Tensions between Russia’s military brass and the Kadyrovsty have existed since the time of Kadyrov senior. Echoing sentiments routinely expressed by his late father, Ramzan insists that there are no more “bandit formations” in Chechnya, and can therefore see no reason why federal troops should remain in the republic. When asked about the possible withdrawal of troops during a recent interview with Kommersant, Kadyrov simultaneously revealed both his contempt for the Russian generals, and the underlying tensions caused by this issue, remarking: “As for the generals…I’m not going to say that I care about their opinion.” For some in Russia’s military hierarchy, however, the prospect of a withdrawal is an anathema. Quite a few harbor vested professional and economic interests in this conflict; interests which can only be upheld through maintaining a federal military presence in Chechnya. Statements from Kadyrov expressing bewilderment at their continued presence are, therefore, decidedly unwelcome and have made him powerful enemies in this constituency. Indeed, it is possible to perceive the recent decision to place Kadyrov’s militia under the aegis of the Russian army as the latest overt manifestation of this longstanding, mutual antagonism. As mentioned previously, Kadyrov’s relations with president Alkhanov are deteriorating sharply. The latter clearly feels undermined by the sheer rhetorical impunity of the young prime minister, and indeed numerous observers covering last year’s parliamentary elections remarked on the almost tangible tension that exists between the two men. Importantly, Kadyrov has also irked some important personages further up along the federal chain. Dimitri Kozak, the Russian president’s representative in the North Caucasus, is one such person. The Kadyrovsty are representative of the intra-governmental, clan-based “corporate groups”, which Kozak believes are at the root of a systemic crisis of government which afflicts the entire region. Indeed, in addition to rebuking Kadyrov over the banning of the Danish Refugee Council, Kozak has also launched an investigation into reports that the study of Islamic literature has become compulsory in Chechen schools. Furthermore, he has recently cast doubt on the prospect of Kadyrov acceding to the presidency at any time in the near future. Clearly, therefore, Kozak and the Russian military (for different reasons) place far less stock in Kadyrov’s utility than their immediate superior, president Putin. In fact, Russia’s policy toward its client regime in Chechnya – and more particularly toward Kadyrov – has assumed the pantomimic proportions of a ‘good cop, bad cop’ stage routine, with Putin and Surkov playing the benevolent role of the former, while Kozak, the Russian military, and certain high-placed siloviki assume the more confrontational role of the latter. These siloviki, it should be noted, view Kadyrov with abject suspicion, and many believe that he is a ‘creeping separatist’. This incoherence has contributed mightily to Kadyrov’s recent injudiciousness: assured of Putin’s political goodwill, he feels entirely unencumbered by extra-presidential, federal structures.

CONCLUSIONS: In light of his recent behavior on the political stage, it seems clear that Ramzan Kadyrov is entirely indifferent about the appropriate decorum befitting a regional head of government. Although to a certain extent Kadyrov’s personal arrogance accounts for his insouciance, blame must also be apportioned to the federal authorities. There is a clear dichotomy of approach when it comes to dealing with Kadyrov. Seemingly, the higher up the federal chain one goes, the more indifference one discerns regarding his political uncouthness. Putin and his immediate circle rarely comment on (let alone condemn) his increasingly frequent extravagances. Commonly, it is left to lower ranking federal representatives to elicit glib, often qualified retractions from him in the wake of such incidents. As long as he receives the unquestioning, entirely uncritical patronage of the president and his immediate circle, Kadyrov will continue to test his political boundaries. Should the powers that be decide to put a stop to his march, then they would likely begin by shedding this reticence to proffer criticism when deserved. Should they decide not to, then Kadyrov will continue to thumb his nose at Kozak, the Russian military, and political convention in general, while simultaneously escalating intra-governmental tensions between himself and Alkhanov. Finally, Kadyrov’s brazenness will invariably give rise to speculation about the true extent of his loyalty to Putin and his clique. However, to speculate along these lines is to misunderstand the relationship itself, which is ultimately based on mutual self-interest, not loyalty. Putin presently perceives Kadyrov as a capable counterweight to the rebel movement, while Kadyrov increasingly regards his relationship with Putin as a means of staving off his burgeoning array of domestic opponents. Hence, Kadyrov is unlikely to wantonly provoke his benefactors in the Kremlin, as quarrelling with Putin would leave him precariously isolated astride an increasingly fractious domestic political landscape.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from University College Cork, Ireland.