By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The downing of three expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets by low-cost, Chinese-manufactured J-10C aircraft during the Pakistan–India aerial conflict on May 7 highlighted the affordability and operational capability of Chinese fighters. In light of this encounter, several countries are now reassessing their Rafale procurement plans. Uzbekistan, which had previously expressed interest in acquiring 24 Rafale jets, is currently engaged in negotiations with China to purchase JF-17 aircraft. China has increasingly focused on expanding arms exports to Central Asia, a market traditionally dominated by Russia.

BACKGROUND: On May 7, India launched missile strikes against six locations in Pakistan, attributing responsibility to its long-standing rival for the April 22 attack that claimed the lives of 26 tourists in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) deployed Chinese-manufactured J-10C fighter jets, which succeeded in downing five Indian aircraft, including three Rafale jets recently procured from France. Pakistan utilized China’s advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles to carry out the strikes on the Indian fighters. The India–Pakistan confrontation, characterized by missile exchanges, drone attacks, and artillery shelling, concluded on May 10 following a ceasefire agreement brokered by the U.S. 

In 2016, India concluded a US$ 8.8 billion agreement with France for the procurement of 36 Rafale fighter jets. Pakistan entered into a US$ 1.525 billion deal with China for the acquisition of 20 J-10C aircraft.

China ranks as the fourth-largest supplier of conventional weapons globally, following the U.S., France, and Russia. The country produces the majority of its military equipment domestically and primarily exports to developing nations. China is increasingly asserting itself as the dominant arms exporter in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, while also expanding its presence in Central Asia. Chinese aircraft have gained recognition as cost-effective alternatives to Western models, particularly among developing states. 

China has been consolidating its defense partnerships with Central Asian nations in recent years. In 2015, it supplied FD-2000 long-range air defense systems to both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, following defense equipment contracts signed by the two countries with China in 2013. The FD-2000 is capable of intercepting a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, armed helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles. In 2022, China further deepened its regional security ties by signing bilateral security cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan during a visit by former Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe. 

China has now emerged as a principal defense supplier to Central Asia. At the China–Central Asia Summit in 2023, Beijing articulated its intention to strengthen military cooperation and security engagement with the region at a time when Russia is increasingly preoccupied and resource-constrained due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

China is actively capitalizing on the current geopolitical landscape. Last year, it supplied EVOMax unmanned systems to Kazakhstan, whereas Tajikistan in 2024 procured the Chinese-manufactured HQ-17AE air defense system, which significantly enhances its capacity to defend against a range of aerial threats, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Uzbekistan also continues to enhance its military cooperation with China, procuring FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems in February. The FM-90, an upgraded version of the HQ-7, is designed for short-range defense against threats such as cruise missiles and drones. In contrast, the KS-1C serves as a medium-to-long-range air defense system. Together, these systems provide Uzbekistan with a layered and integrated air defense architecture capable of countering a broad spectrum of aerial threats.

China’s defense exports to Central Asia were minimal between 2010 and 2014, accounting for only 1.5 percent of the region’s total arms imports. However, this figure rose substantially to 18 percent during the 2015–2019 period, reflecting a marked increase in Beijing’s regional defense engagement. According to one estimate, Russia’s arms exports to Central Asia declined by 64 percent between 2020 and 2024. This downturn created a vacuum, which other suppliers—including India and China—moved to fill. During this period, China accounted for 17 percent of the replacement in arms supply, further solidifying its growing influence in the region’s defense sector.

BACKGROUND: The performance of Chinese-manufactured aircraft during the brief military confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces has not only reignited global interest in Chinese defense technology but also challenged the perceived superiority of Western military hardware.

China has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the recent India–Pakistan conflict. The market valuation of Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC)—a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the producer of the J-10C fighter jets—surged by over US$ 7.6 billion following the aerial engagement on May 7. On the same day, CAC’s share price on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange rose by more than 17 percent, coinciding with Pakistan’s Defence Minister’s confirmation that five Indian fighter jets had been downed overnight.

The air warfare offered China an opportunity to showcase its advancements in aviation technology on the global stage, underscoring the effectiveness of China’s “low-cost, high-capacity” production model in the defense sector. The performance of Chinese J-10C against French Rafale, which is over three times more expensive, highlights the operational competitiveness of more affordable Chinese alternatives. This event is likely to accelerate the expansion of China’s military exports in the coming years. Although the Rafale retains technological advantages over Chinese platforms such as the JF-17 Thunder and J-10C, the results of this live combat scenario is expected to adversely affect the export prospects of France’s Dassault Aviation.

The J-10C fighter jet is scheduled to make its debut at the 2025 Paris Air Show—one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions, historically dominated by Western manufacturers. The inclusion of the J-10C in this prestigious event signifies a growing recognition among global industry leaders of China’s rising aerospace capabilities.

In the aftermath of the India–Pakistan aerial confrontation, China’s J-10C and JF-17 Thunder fighter jets have gained increased appeal among Central Asian countries. For instance, Uzbekistan expressed interest in purchasing 24 Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tashkent in November 2023. However, Uzbekistan has earlier this year engaged in negotiations with China to procure JF-17 jets. The recent air combat between India and Pakistan is likely to further incentivize Tashkent to finalize a deal with Beijing. China’s appeal as an arms supplier is also enhanced by its willingness to facilitate technology transfers to recipient states. Notably, China is assisting Uzbekistan in establishing its own domestic defense industry. 

China is poised to capture a significant share of Central Asia’s arms market, capitalizing on shifting regional dynamics. All five Central Asian republics have increased their defense expenditures at a time when Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms sales to the region has eroded following the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. 

CONCLUSIONS: The live air combat between India and Pakistan has significantly elevated the global market value and demand for Chinese arms and aircraft, strengthening Beijing’s defense sales narrative, particularly in Central Asia. The recent acquisition of Chinese defense systems by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signals a departure from traditional defense alignments in the region, reflecting a broader pivot among Central Asian states toward Chinese military technology. 

China views Central Asia as a strategic gateway to West Asia and the Black Sea region. Its growing security engagement and expanding arms sales serve as crucial instruments for deepening its strategic foothold in the region through sustained defense collaboration with Central Asian states. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email,  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Emil Avdaliani 

Azerbaijan, akin to nations in Central Asia and the Gulf, endeavors to balance relations among major powers in order to avoid exclusive alignment with any singular geopolitical axis. Baku’s recent diplomatic initiatives reflect this strategy, which has contributed to enhancing the nation’s regional standing: relations with Iran have improved, engagement with China has intensified, and the European Union now seeks deeper political cooperation with Baku.

BACKGROUND: Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.

Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.

This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

A significant shift occurred in Baku–Beijing relations when, in April, the two countries elevated their ties to the level of a comprehensive partnership during the Azerbaijani president’s visit to China. While the development of the Middle Corridor remains a priority, the agreement with Azerbaijan places additional emphasis on enhancing bilateral cooperation in investment and business. As the largest economy in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan serves as a key entry point for China into the region.

Similarly, in April and May, Azerbaijan conducted meetings with Ukrainian officials—an uncommon move given Baku’s cautious stance on the war. However, in the context of increasingly strained relations with Russia, Baku’s outreach to Kyiv appears intended to signal displeasure to Moscow. Russia continues to deny any involvement in the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over its territory, a claim Baku maintains. Consequently, relations have deteriorated, with President Ilham Aliyev declining to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May.

In May, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan formalized their strategic partnership, enabling Tashkent to become a party to the Shusha Declaration, originally signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2021. Azerbaijan has maintained an active diplomatic presence in Central Asia, and although the Caspian Sea functions as a geographic divider, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly interconnected.

In late May, Azerbaijan hosted a trilateral summit with the leaders of Turkey and Pakistan, marking a new chapter in their cooperative relations. The geopolitical dimension of this partnership is becoming increasingly significant, particularly in light of Pakistan–India tensions and New Delhi’s growing ties with Armenia. The three Islamic nations also advanced collaboration in the political, economic, and military spheres.

Azerbaijan has also recently emerged as a venue for negotiations between opposing parties. For example, in April, Turkish and Israeli delegations convened in Baku to discuss the establishment of a potential “deconfliction mechanism” aimed at preventing direct clashes between the two states in Syria. In May, Baku also hosted Russian and German political representatives for talks on reviving the “Petersburg Dialogue,” which had been suspended since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This dimension of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy is particularly noteworthy, underscoring the country’s growing reputation as a credible and impartial facilitator of dialogue between the conflicting sides.

IMPLICATIONS: This diplomatic activism underscores Azerbaijan’s rising regional significance and its strategic efforts to position itself as a capable middle power—one that can exert influence within its immediate neighborhood while simultaneously acting as a crucial partner to rival great powers.

Evolving patterns of connectivity across Eurasia have been a key factor in enhancing Azerbaijan’s regional role. The Middle Corridor, which extends from the Black Sea to Central Asia and effectively links the EU with China, traverses Azerbaijan (alongside Georgia). This route enables both the EU and China to circumvent Russian territory, while Azerbaijan’s significance is further elevated by the EU’s demand for Caspian gas. Additionally, Brussels has intensified outreach to Central Asia, with which European leaders are increasingly engaging in trade and investment. The recent EU–Central Asia summit, where the Union pledged €12 billion in investments, exemplifies the rising importance of the Middle Corridor. A portion of this investment is earmarked for infrastructure upgrades along the route, particularly in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has also assumed a more critical role for China than in previous years. From Beijing’s perspective, Azerbaijan functions as a gateway to the Black Sea region. Moreover, China views Azerbaijan as a promising market for its rapidly expanding electric vehicle (EV) industry. Data from the past year indicate that Chinese brands are gaining increasing popularity in Azerbaijan, with discussions underway regarding potential joint production ventures. The country may also serve as a strategic hub for the distribution of Chinese EV models throughout the South Caucasus and beyond.

Azerbaijan’s increasing regional significance has prompted Iran to pursue full normalization of relations with its northern neighbor. During the Iranian president’s visit to Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared, “Our goal, our primary goal is to raise Azerbaijani–Iranian interstate relations to a higher level.” This aspiration was accompanied by tangible measures. On May 21, Iran announced the execution of the sole assailant responsible for the 2023 attack on the Azerbaijani embassy. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises—Araz-2025. Diplomatic relations have now been fully restored, and cooperation on the International North–South Transport Corridor has been expanded. Consequently, Tehran and Baku have reduced tensions to levels seen prior to 2020, before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Iran’s strategic calculations also reflect concerns about preventing Azerbaijan from decisively aligning with Israel or the U.S. Azerbaijan has recently been identified as a prospective candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords, a U.S.-led initiative aimed at improving Israel’s relations with the Islamic world. The U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, indicated that Azerbaijan could join the Accords in the near future. While he mentioned other potential members—including Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon—Azerbaijan stands out due to its geographic location north of Iran. Although Baku and Tel Aviv have historically maintained close ties, formal accession to the Accords would significantly elevate Azerbaijan’s stature in the Middle East and strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Given the persistent challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the Islamic Republic will remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s position north of Iran will only enhance its strategic relevance for both the U.S. and Israel. This development will, in turn, improve Baku’s bargaining leverage, thereby motivating Iran to pursue increasingly cordial relations with its northern neighbor.

Another factor driving normalization is the Islamic Republic’s growing interest in maintaining peaceful relations with Azerbaijan, particularly as it faces mounting challenges. These include sustained Israeli strikes against its Axis of Resistance, the continued impact of the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, and tensions with Turkey arising from the evolving balance of power in Syria. In this context, Tehran appears increasingly inclined to avoid additional regional friction. Indeed, it may ultimately be compelled to tolerate Azerbaijan’s potential accession to the Abraham Accords, provided such a development does not constitute a direct security threat to the Islamic Republic.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Azerbaijan underscores the country’s rising significance in regional affairs. Transit, trade, and investment constitute the central pillars of Baku’s engagement with regional and global powers. This approach aligns with what is commonly termed a multi-vector foreign policy—a strategic orientation wherein no single major power is prioritized. Instead, multi-alignment is pursued as a means to enhance a country’s international standing. In a global context marked by great power rivalry, the erosion of international norms, and the ascendance of middle powers, Azerbaijan—like many states in Central Asia and the Middle East—seeks to balance among dominant actors to avoid exclusive alignment with any one geopolitical center. Thus far, this strategy has served Baku well, and it is likely to persist amid the continuing emergence of an increasingly multipolar international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On March 31, 2025, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation submitted a proposal to the Supreme Court to allow the Taliban to operate in the country. On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court officially removed the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations. A year earlier, there had been no legal mechanism to delist terrorist groups. That mechanism was introduced through amendments to the Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice in May 2024, with the endorsement of President Vladimir Putin. The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list is the product of a steady normalization of Russia’s relations with the Taliban.

BACKGROUND: Russia’s complex relationship with the Taliban dates back to the movement’s rise to power in the 1990s. After the Taliban took Kabul in September 1996, Russia made several attempts to restore relations, despite having supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Russian diplomats traveled to Pakistan and met with both Pakistani and Taliban officials to explore the possibility of recognizing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moscow’s key concern at the time was the Taliban’s recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which Russia viewed as a serious threat to its territorial integrity. However, the Taliban, still wary of Moscow’s role in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, rebuffed Russian overtures.

In August 1998, the Taliban embassy in the United Arab Emirates informed Kabul that a Russian delegation, led by Alexander Oblov, intended to visit Afghanistan to discuss reopening the Russian embassy and possibly recognize the Taliban regime. Yet, the Taliban Foreign Ministry instructed officials not to issue visas to any Russian representative, citing Moscow's role in the destruction of Afghanistan and stating that “all the troubles of our nation are due to Russian interference.”

The rise of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and growing security threats in Central Asia pushed Moscow toward a pragmatic re-engagement with the Taliban. Russia’s concerns over ISIS-K have grown significantly since 2014, especially in light of the group's ability to operate in northern Afghanistan, close to the borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These concerns have helped shift Russia’s strategic calculus.

Uzbekistan’s involvement in the peace process with the Taliban—including its invitation to a high-level Taliban delegation to visit Tashkent—prompted Russia to deepen its own engagement. Moscow responded by inviting the Taliban for separate discussions, as well as joint talks alongside the Afghan government delegation, to address the peace process and the post-withdrawal landscape following the exit of U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played an instrumental role in reshaping Moscow's perception of the Taliban. Karzai has argued that ISIS-K has no Afghan roots, and its fighters were introduced from abroad to destabilize the region. According to Karzai, only the Taliban are capable of effectively fighting ISIS-K. This narrative found a receptive audience in Moscow, which has long feared the potential spillover of instability into the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and a former ambassador to Kabul, has been central to the evolution of Russia’s Taliban policy. Known for his deep knowledge of Afghan affairs, Kabulov has publicly advocated for recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate political force. Under his guidance, Moscow hosted several rounds of intra-Afghan talks, including Taliban representatives, even before the group's return to power in 2021. In November 2016, reports emerged that Russian representatives had allegedly met with Taliban commanders at a Russian military base in Tajikistan, and that unidentified helicopters delivered weapons to Taliban fighters in Badakhshan province, claims that Moscow, Tajikistan, and the former Afghan government denied. Still, the optics suggested a growing convergence of interests between Russia and the Taliban, particularly in countering ISIS-K and limiting Western military influence in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to power, Russia was among the few countries that kept its embassy in Kabul operational. While Moscow has not formally recognized the Taliban government, it has significantly expanded its diplomatic engagement. Taliban delegations have visited Moscow multiple times, and Russia has reciprocated by including Taliban officials in regional security dialogues such as the Moscow Format.

The decision to remove the Taliban from the terrorist list reflects the culmination of this slow but steady normalization. According to Russian officials, this step is primarily aimed at fostering dialogue and enhancing regional security cooperation. While some critics in Russia have questioned the wisdom of legitimizing a group with a violent past, proponents argue that engagement with the de facto authorities in Kabul is a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, economic considerations have also played a role. Since 2022, Afghanistan has expressed interest in purchasing Russian oil and wheat. The Taliban have also invited Russian companies to invest in mining, infrastructure, and energy projects. Removing the terrorist designation facilitates such cooperation, especially given Western sanctions that have pushed Moscow to diversify its foreign partnerships.

The removal of the Taliban from Russia’s terrorist list is likely to have a ripple effect across Central Asia and beyond. For Central Asian countries, Russia’s policy shift may serve as a green light to expand their own engagement with the Taliban. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have already established pragmatic relations with the Taliban, primarily driven by security and economic interests. Uzbekistan’s active involvement with the Taliban on trade and transit connectivity to South Asia has influenced Russian policymakers to adjust their strategy in favor of smoother economic and diplomatic ties with the Taliban. Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Russia viewed Uzbekistan as a regional competitor. The recent Termez Dialogue, hosted by Uzbekistan with the participation of Central Asian countries and the Taliban, heightened Moscow’s concerns over Uzbekistan’s growing role as a regional player and the potential challenge it poses to Russia’s influence in Central Asia.

Tajikistan has also begun expanding trade and transit relations with Kabul, opening joint border markets in the Badakhshan provinces of both countries, as well as utilizing Sher Khan Port in Kunduz province. The extension of electricity exports to Afghanistan and the recent CASA-1000 meeting in Dushanbe—attended by a Taliban delegation—signal a growing interest in fostering mutual economic ties between Kabul and Central Asia. However, this normalization also comes with risks. The Taliban's refusal to form an inclusive government or ensure basic human rights—particularly for women and minorities—has prevented broader international recognition. By legitimizing the Taliban without demanding reforms, Moscow risks enabling continued repression and governance failures that could fuel further instability.

In terms of security, closer cooperation between Russia and the Taliban might strengthen the fight against ISIS-K, particularly in northern Afghanistan. However, it may also deepen regional rivalries, especially if Iran, China, and Russia begin to compete for influence in post-U.S. Afghanistan. The recent participation of Taliban officials in multilateral forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) dialogue formats and The Termez Dialogue in Uzbekistan signals a growing desire among regional powers to integrate Afghanistan into new security architectures that exclude the West. Economic and political relations between the Central Asian countries and the Taliban are growing fast.

Finally, the implications extend to the global geopolitical sphere. Russia’s embrace of the Taliban may signal a broader strategy of contesting Western norms by engaging with non-Western, often pariah, regimes. Moscow’s willingness to engage with the Taliban mirrors its outreach to other sanctioned or controversial governments, from Syria to North Korea. This aligns with the Kremlin’s effort to promote a multipolar world order, one that challenges U.S.-led international structures.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations marks a pivotal moment in its Afghanistan policy. While it reflects pragmatic calculations tied to regional security concerns and economic interests—particularly in light of Central Asia’s growing engagement with the Taliban—it also signals a broader shift in Moscow’s diplomatic approach amid sanctions and geopolitical isolation. The long-term success of this engagement will depend not only on the Taliban’s capacity to deliver security, uphold governance, and respect international laws and human rights, but also on Russia’s ability to balance its strategic ambitions with regional stability and global legitimacy.

AUTHORS’ BIOS: Aigerim Turgunbaeva, journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. Aigerim writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan Studies. Ghiasi writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.

By Chimguundari Navaan-Yunden and Tuvshinzaya Gantulga

Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus marks a pivotal evolution of its "third neighbor" strategy, aimed at strengthening partnerships beyond its traditional ties with Russia and China. This strategic shift has gained urgency in light of changing regional dynamics within Greater Central Asia. Since 2020, Mongolia has intensified its diplomatic activities, exemplified by presidential visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024. Economic interactions, while still modest, show promising growth, notably in trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, where exports have notably increased. These developments align with broader regional trends towards greater independence from Russia and China, as Central Asian countries seek to establish cooperative mechanisms. Ultimately, Mongolia's westward pivot not only enhances its sovereignty but positions it as a crucial player in promoting regional stability and cooperation in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.

BACKGROUND: Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus represents the latest evolution of its third neighbor strategy—a long-standing policy aimed at cultivating partnerships beyond Russia and China to enhance Mongolia’s sovereignty. This westward pivot has emerged as a strategic necessity for Mongolia, particularly as regional dynamics across Greater Central Asia undergo significant transformation.

Mongolia's diplomatic activity with Central Asia has accelerated markedly since 2020. High-level visits, previously sporadic, have become increasingly frequent and substantive. President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh's recent state visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024 resulted in numerous bilateral agreements, bolstering cooperation in trade, transport, and cultural exchange. The visit to Uzbekistan yielded 14 bilateral agreements and the inauguration of Mongolia's Embassy in Tashkent. Similarly, the Kazakhstan visit established a formal strategic partnership. Mongolia's diplomatic outreach extended to Turkmenistan, marking the first bilateral presidential visits since diplomatic relations began in 1992, and to Kyrgyzstan, where bilateral relations have steadily improved following President Sadyr Japarov's 2023 visit to Mongolia and the opening of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Ulaanbaatar.

Economic engagement, while still modest, demonstrates upward momentum. Trade with Kazakhstan has reached approximately $150 million annually, with Mongolian exports of horse meat growing from $2.9 million in 2017 to $8.3 million in 2022. Kazakhstan's exports to Mongolia, primarily industrial and consumer goods, increased from approximately $72.9 million to $93 million during the same period. Mongolia's trade with Kyrgyzstan doubled from about $2 million in 2017 to over $5 million by 2022, driven by re-exported used cars and consumer goods. Trade with Uzbekistan grew dramatically from under $1 million in 2017 to nearly $10 million by 2022, focused on meat exports and Uzbek fertilizers. Meanwhile, trade with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan remains negligible. For Mongolia, with $20 billion GDP and over 90% of export goes to China, this is a significant development.

Mongolia's engagement with the Caucasus remains nascent but shows promising signs. High-level diplomatic exchanges include former President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj's official visits to Armenia in 2015 and Georgia in 2016, enhancing trade and cultural ties. Azerbaijan received a working visit from former President Khaltmaagiin Battulga in 2018, exploring collaborations in energy and investment. While trade volumes remain limited, recent growth is evident, particularly with Azerbaijan, where exports surged to approximately $1.6 million in 2024, primarily in livestock products.

These developments have occurred against the backdrop of emerging region-wide structures in Greater Central Asia, as countries seek to develop collective mechanisms for cooperation outside the frameworks dominated by Russia and China. Mongolia's engagement with these structures aligns with the broader regional trend toward developing greater agency and connectivity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.

IMPLICATIONS: Mongolia's deepening engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus presents crucial economic and strategic diversification opportunities. Enhanced diplomatic and economic ties provide Mongolia with a hedge against over-reliance on China, currently its dominant trading partner, and alternative options given restrictive Western sanctions against Russia. The geographic and economic profiles of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with their combined population of approximately 56 million, offer ample market opportunities for Mongolia.

Politically, Mongolia's democratic governance, a distinctive feature in the region, offers a stable and transparent framework for engagement. This reliability in governance and commitment to international norms facilitates more predictable and trustworthy partnerships in areas crucial for regional development, such as trade facilitation, infrastructure investment, and the establishment of robust legal frameworks for transport corridors. This unique identity enhances Mongolia's value to Western partners and provides a practical model for how democratic principles can support economic and strategic cooperation in a challenging geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, Mongolia's active participation in cultural events like the World Nomad Games reinforces shared heritage with Central Asian states, promoting a regional identity that bridges East and West.

The integration into regional mechanisms offers Mongolia access to emerging transport corridors, particularly the "Middle Corridor" that connects Asia to Europe without crossing Russian territory. This connectivity could mitigate Mongolia's landlocked status and provide more direct routes to global markets. The successful development of these corridors would significantly reduce Mongolia's vulnerability to geopolitical pressures from its immediate neighbors.

Central Asian and Caucasus countries benefit from Mongolia's outreach through expanded diplomatic networks and opportunities for collaborative initiatives in transport, energy, agriculture, environment and mining. Mongolia's strategic neutrality and pragmatic foreign policy approach are viewed positively in the region, enabling enhanced collaboration without triggering sensitive geopolitical responses from Russia and China.

The burgeoning regional integration subtly shifts dynamics for Russia and China. Although both powers are likely to tolerate Mongolia's increased engagement due to its non-military, primarily economic and diplomatic nature, deeper regional cooperation could eventually dilute their influence. Increased regional activity that transcends Russian and Chinese dominance, along with coordinated economic policies, could reduce regional dependency on Moscow and Beijing, leading to cautious observation from both capitals.

China's Belt and Road Initiative has significantly shaped regional infrastructure development, but Mongolia's growing ties with Central Asia introduce an alternative approach to connectivity that might circumvent Beijing's leverage. Similarly, Russia's attempts to maintain regional influence through the Eurasian Economic Union face challenges as Mongolia and Central Asian states pursue more diverse partnerships. This diversification of regional relationships represents a gradual but significant shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Mongolia's third neighbors (the U.S., EU, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkiye) view this westward pivot positively. Strengthening Mongolia's regional ties aligns with broader Western strategic goals, including promoting stability and sovereignty in Central Asia. High-profile European visits to Mongolia, followed by tours to Central Asia (e.g., French President Emmanuel Macron’s and former UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s multi-leg visits), illustrate growing interest in Mongolia's bridging role. These engagements allow Western countries to enhance their regional presence without being perceived as exclusively engaging with authoritarian regimes.

The U.S., which has traditionally engaged Central Asia through the C5+1 format, could consider integrating Mongolia into this dialogue, potentially transforming it into a C6+1 arrangement. As outlined in the American Foreign Policy Council's (AFPC) April 2025 report, such integration would better reflect Mongolia's shared strategic and economic challenges with the region, particularly in critical minerals essential to global supply chains. Similarly, Japan and South Korea recognize Mongolia's potential as a gateway to continental Asia, leveraging soft power and economic investments to enhance regional integration.

CONCLUSIONS: Mongolia's pivot toward Central Asia and the Caucasus is driven by strategic necessity and presents significant opportunities for regional integration. The past years' diplomatic and economic initiatives signal genuine, albeit incremental, progress. Although concrete outcomes remain limited, the diplomatic momentum could lead to substantive cooperation in trade, transport, and infrastructure.

For Mongolia, regional integration serves as a diplomatic insurance policy, enhancing strategic autonomy amid geopolitical uncertainty. The pragmatic approach toward bilateral and multilateral cooperation mitigates potential pressure from Russia and China while strengthening ties with Western democracies. The development of region-wide structures that exclude external powers could create space for greater collective agency among the states of Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia.

Mongolia's westward orientation strategically positions it as a significant actor capable of bridging regional divides, promoting economic cooperation, and advocating democratic governance. As suggested in the AFPC’s strategy document, the emergence of a more integrated Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia, could serve as a stabilizing force across the region. Whether this evolves into more tangible regional integration or remains predominantly at the diplomatic level will significantly impact Mongolia's role in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.

The increasing American strategic interest in Greater Central Asia, with its emphasis on developing exclusive region-wide structures and enhancing connectivity, aligns with Mongolia's objectives. This convergence of interests offers Mongolia an opportunity to reinforce its sovereignty through regional integration while contributing to a more balanced regional order less dominated by Russia and China. In this evolving framework, Mongolia's distinctive political identity and strategic positioning could turn the country into an indispensable player.

AUTHORS’ BIOS: Chimguundari Navaan-Yunden is an Ambassador-at-Large and a former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia. Tuvshinzaya Gantulga is a Nonresident Fellow at the Mongolian National Institute for Security Studies and a former foreign policy aide to the President of Mongolia. Both are alumni of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Rumsfeld Fellowship Program and members of the CAMCA Network.