By: Yunis Gurbanov

The Eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State (CMHS) of Central Asia was held on October 8, 2026, in Awaza, Turkmenistan. It was the first meeting at which Azerbaijan was represented as a full-fledged member of the format. More significantly, the Awaza meeting can be regarded as an effort to provide content to the expanded format since the parties adopted a Joint Statement and decided on the regulatory documents of the Consultative Meeting, designating the format Chair in 2027 to Azerbaijan. The inclusion of Azerbaijan will not transform the Consultative Meeting into a supra-state structure or an integration association. The forum remains built on the principle of consensus and consciously maintains its flexibility. The inclusion of Azerbaijan has nevertheless shifted the geographical focus and agenda of the meeting. The Caspian Sea will connect the countries, not separate them, placing Trans-Caspian transportation and energy cooperation as well as other issues of cooperation and ecology on the agenda.

BACKGROUND:

CMHS is the outcome of developments in intra-regional relations due to the changing political environment in Uzbekistan from 2016 onwards. Instead of forming one more intergovernmental organization on the basis of a binding treaty, the five Central Asian countries created a leadership-oriented consultation and coordination mechanism. During the Awaza summit, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev explicitly stated his opposition to “cumbersome structures” and advocated for a flexible format of cooperation of sovereign states based on respect and pragmatism.

The importance of Azerbaijan’s involvement increased gradually. Baku was asked to participate in previous gatherings as a guest since its cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan was developing politically, economically and in transport. Azerbaijan was acknowledged by all Central Asian presidents as one of the full-fledged members of the group in November 2025. The informal consultative meeting in Cholpon-Ata in July 2026 and the adoption of the Cholpon-Ata Declaration helped establish the first CMHS involving the six presidents in Awaza.
The CMHS on October 8 did more than just confirm the format’s enlargement. According to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, the trade volume between Azerbaijan and Central Asia increased by 50 percent in the past year, and more than 400 enterprises with capital from Central Asian countries operate in Azerbaijan. Baku also established joint investment funds with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and cooperation in transport, energy transit, information technologies and renewable energy is growing.

Azerbaijan’s involvement in the C6 format is most significant in the transport area. The Middle Corridor passes through Azerbaijan and connects Central Asia with Georgia, Türkiye, and Europe. It has become increasingly relevant for the Central Asian states seeking access to Western markets through the Caspian Sea. According to Aliyev, the volume of cargo transported via the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10 percent in 2025 and by nearly 20 percent in the first eight months of 2026.

IMPLICATIONS:

The inclusion of Azerbaijan expands the CMHS format while avoiding any attempts to change its geographic identity and creating a new regional concept in which connectivity becomes the main element.

Another implication is the shift from trade to production. The most significant idea put forward at the Awaza summit was Mirziyoyev’s proposed new economic objective of “six economies – one product,” implying that companies in different countries that partake in the cooperation will be involved in the same value chain instead of trading. Uzbekistan also proposed to organize the “Central Asia-Azerbaijan” business forum in Khiva during 2027.

This will perfectly suit Azerbaijan’s appeal to the participating states to “invest together, produce together, and enter foreign markets together,” providing for more industrial zones, factories, logistics centers and investment projects along the corridor.

The meeting also addressed institutional development. The leaders adopted regulatory documents for the CMHS, while Uzbekistan proposed developing a dedicated legal framework. However, Mirziyoyev emphasized that implementation mattered more than the number of documents adopted. Greater institutionalization could improve coordination, but excessive formalization risks undermining the mechanism’s flexibility.

Transport coordination is likely to remain the most practical area of cooperation. Uzbekistan proposed establishing a Council for Infrastructure Development to coordinate transport projects and integrate national infrastructure into a broader regional framework. This initiative aligns with the development of the Baku International Sea Trade Port.

Cooperation also extends to energy resources. Oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is transported through Azerbaijan’s transport network, while the three countries are developing a green energy corridor to supply Western markets. These initiatives highlight the Middle Corridor’s potential for energy cooperation and digital connectivity, including the installation of fibre-optic cables beneath the Caspian Sea.

Environmental challenges are equally significant. Azerbaijan has raised concerns about declining water levels in the Caspian Sea, which could influence coastal infrastructure and increase the costs and reduce the efficiency of maritime transport.

Finally, Azerbaijan’s participation brings about a convergence of interests with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), an important instrument of Baku’s foreign policy. Four of the six C6 countries are OTS members, while Turkmenistan holds observer status. Tajikistan, with its distinct linguistic and cultural identity, participates in other regional cooperation frameworks. The OTS has also gained importance in Azerbaijan’s security policy. At the October 2025 Gabala summit, President Ilham Aliyev proposed joint military exercises and subsequently emphasized defense and security cooperation in September 2026. Rather than competing with the OTS, however, the C6 format offers a broader platform for regional cooperation.

However, the expanded format faces geopolitical constraints, reflecting the six states’ differing relations with Russia, China, Türkiye, the EU, and the U.S. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan remain members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Turkmenistan maintains its policy of permanent neutrality, while Tajikistan pursues distinct foreign policy and security priorities.

CONCLUSIONS:

Azerbaijan’s full inclusion in the Consultative Meeting represents not merely a symbolic expansion but a structural extension of Central Asian regional cooperation. The Awaza meeting on October 8 demonstrated that the expanded format could facilitate more practical cooperation on production chains, infrastructure, investment, energy corridors, digitalization, and environmental challenges.

However, the significance of the C6 format should not be overstated. It is neither a formal organization nor an alliance, and its participants retain their sovereignty and distinct foreign policy orientations. Its potential instead lies in providing a platform for political coordination among six states connected by the Caspian Sea and increasingly integrated through transport, energy, and investment corridors, enabling them to align their interests.

Azerbaijan’s first chairmanship in 2027 will provide an important test of the format’s potential. If Baku succeeds in translating the initiatives proposed at the Awaza meeting into concrete projects, the transition from C5 to C6 could mark a significant step towards broader regional cooperation across the Trans-Caspian region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Yunis Gurbanov is a Senior Adviser at the AIR Center in Baku and Lecturer at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of Azerbaijan. His research focuses on Eurasian geopolitics, regional security, connectivity, and political and economic cooperation across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the broader post-Soviet region.

By Emil Avdaliani

The EU’s deepening engagement with Tajikistan through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (ECPA) aligns with Brussels’ broader economic and political outreach toward Central Asia. This strategy represents another phase in the Union’s increasingly active policy toward the region. The EU’s interest is driven by the Central Asia’s significance amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China over control of supply chains critical for battery and electric vehicle production. A further factor strengthening EU–Central Asia relations is the regional states’ pursuit of multi-alignment. Wary of dependence on either Russia or China, the Central Asian governments seek partnerships with other major powers.

                                                                     Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.

Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

IMPLICATIONS: The EPCA was concluded after several years of bilateral negotiations, a timeframe regarded as relatively brief for agreements of this nature. The EU remains committed to serving as a partner in Tajikistan’s future development and seeks to broaden cooperation across a range of key sectors, from education to investments in critical infrastructure.

Tajikistan is particularly interested in attracting additional European investments and technologies for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station and the modernization of the Nurek facility. Moreover, Dushanbe seeks to advance the implementation of a “green” economy, a topic addressed in discussions between President Emomali Rahmon and the President of the Council of the European Union, António Costa. Tajikistan has articulated ambitious plans to transform the country into a significant producer of green energy. In June, the leadership announced that by 2037 the country would generate electricity exclusively from renewable sources. Although perhaps unrealistic, these plans underscore Dushanbe’s rising aspirations.

The EU’s intensified engagement with Tajikistan corresponds to Brussels’ broader involvement in Central Asia. The summit convened by the EU with the five Central Asian states in Samarkand earlier this year represented a significant development in bilateral relations. Under the Global Gateway program, the EU announced a €12 billion investment package for Central Asian countries, including €3 billion for transport, €2.5 billion for critical minerals, and allocations for other sectors. Initiated in 2023, the EU–Central Asia summits have become central to bilateral ties, reflecting the region’s increasing significance for Brussels following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion altered Eurasian connectivity, elevating the importance of Central Asian routes for both China and the EU. As part of the Middle Corridor, Central Asia is integrated into the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, designed to advance sustainable and interconnected infrastructure projects worldwide.

Tajikistan places particular value on connectivity opportunities arising from the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. Historically, the country has remained peripheral to major transit routes, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assuming more central roles in linking China with global markets. Recently, however, Dushanbe has sought to capitalize on evolving Eurasian connectivity. Central Asia’s interaction with Afghanistan constitutes one potential avenue, but given Tajikistan’s cautious stance toward Afghanistan, the country is instead considering transit routes through Iran. Relations between Tehran and Dushanbe have improved in recent months, and Tajikistan is now actively pursuing the use of Iranian ports to gain access to India and the Gulf region.

Another transregional project pursued by Tajikistan is the Middle Corridor. In June, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that Dushanbe is actively cooperating with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other partners on agreements providing mutual discounts on rail transportation to facilitate trade flows. This activism is not confined to Tajikistan but reflects a broader trend observable in the conduct of other regional states, including even the most closed one, Turkmenistan.

For the EU, Tajikistan holds particular importance in light of Brussels’ growing focus on securing rare earth resources, which are vital for multiple industries where competition with China has intensified. Estimates suggest that the country possesses approximately 800 mineral deposits containing critical materials demanded in global technological production. In late 2024, Tajikistan announced the discovery of 15 new major deposits of rare earths. In July of this year, authorities further reported the identification of rare earth metals—niobium and tantalum—in the Rasht Valley. Tajikistan also possesses considerable hydropower potential, with its 13,000 glaciers accounting for 68 percent of Central Asia’s water resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The EU’s engagement with Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, demonstrates that the Union has adopted an increasingly geopolitical orientation toward the region. To compete effectively with China, Russia, the U.S., and other powers, Brussels must shift its focus from rhetorical emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion to more tangible measures, including investment in critical sectors of cooperation with Central Asian states. The EU is regarded as a reliable partner owing to its adherence to high environmental standards in investment and the long-term benefits derived from them. While Central Asian states anticipate deeper EU involvement, they also acknowledge the constraints of bilateral cooperation. Geographic remoteness and underdeveloped infrastructure remain significant obstacles. Furthermore, the EU allocates fewer financial resources to the region than Russia, and particularly China, while its bureaucracy, unlike China’s, is less adaptable to the needs of individual Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Johan Engvall

January 22, 2025

In a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the South Caucasus and Central Asia have become more interconnected, forming a new Trans-Caspian area. As trade along the Middle Corridor is gaining in importance, the Caspian Sea is becoming a unifier rather than divider of the regions. All countries on the eastern and western side of the Caspian pursue multi-vector foreign policies to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. As the EU is seeking to assert itself geopolitically, it is in its strategic interest to support the evolving Trans-Caspian cooperation. To elevate its engagement with the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the EU should replace the outdated Eastern Partnership with a new Trans-Caspian Partnership. Such partnership would enhance regional connectivity and cooperation and give regional states greater collective weight in their dealings with different powers.

Read The Convergence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (PDF)

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

On September 17, 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz participated in the second Germany-Central Asia Summit held in Kazakhstan. His three-day visit to the region commenced in Uzbekistan, followed by engagements in Kazakhstan, where he also held meetings with the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At present, Germany is confronted with the necessity of refining its regional policy to effectively respond to the evolving challenges in Central Asia. While it seeks to deepen its relations with the region, the specific approach it will adopt to address these challenges remains uncertain.

BACKGROUND: Germany's interest in Central Asia has significantly increased in recent years, as evidenced by a series of high-level visits and diplomatic initiatives. In 2023, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by the inaugural Germany-Central Asia Summit. These engagements have consistently emphasized the importance of strengthening ties with the region, with particular focus on Kazakhstan. With a trade volume of $4 billion, Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Germany and is viewed as a strategic country within the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan has recently begun to draw attention as well. Germany has also demonstrated its capacity for swift action in responding to the challenges Europe has faced since 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The increasing perception of Russia as a security threat has forced Germany, along with other European nations, to make critical decisions. Recognizing the necessity of adopting a more proactive stance, particularly in terms of military and energy policies, Germany has taken measures to address its concerns with Russia indirectly, while positioning itself as a key actor in the broader regional context. The decision to deepen relations with the Central Asian republics represents a significant development during this period. The growing consensus that Germany must adopt a more active role in the region than it has in the past is shaping the current government’s strategic approach. Alongside issues such as migration, security, energy, and the Middle Corridor, the broader challenge of regional competition has also emerged as a priority on the government’s agenda. In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that China's influence in Central Asia is as significant as Russia's. Germany has emphasized that its efforts to reduce the influence of both Russia and China in the region are undertaken on behalf of all European countries, reflecting a coordinated response to these geopolitical dynamics. During her 2022 visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock expressed this sentiment, stating: “It is important to me that the future holds more for them than merely the choice between being straitjacketed in Russia’s front yard or being dependent on China. And so my main aim in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is to listen to the hopes and expectations that people there are pinning on Europe in the current circumstances.” The German-Central Asian Summit and the recent strengthening of ties with the region have emerged as key developments in recent years. The second summit took place at a time when Chancellor Scholz indicated a more proactive approach toward Central Asia. This shift raises important questions about how Germany will manage its relations with the region, whether it will pursue a selective policy approach, and how closely its actions will align with the expectations of the international community. These factors will be critical in shaping Germany's long-term strategy and influence in Central Asia amidst a complex geopolitical environment.

IMPLICATIONS: In September 2024, Chancellor Scholz began his meetings in Uzbekistan as part of a strategy to provide regional balance. The German government described his visit as an effort "to breathe life into this regional partnership," reflecting Germany's growing interest in Uzbekistan’s increasing economic strength. During his meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Scholz emphasized Germany’s firm commitment to deepening bilateral relations. The two parties signed several agreements, including those relating to the Green Central Asia Initiative and critical minerals. However, the migration agreement attracted the most attention. This deal aims to address the legal challenges faced by Uzbek citizens by facilitating the movement of skilled workers to Germany, enabling them to work in various sectors. For Uzbekistan, which had long awaited this development, the agreement marked a significant achievement in its relations with Germany. On the other hand, the German media has reported that another significant aspect of the agreement pertains to the deportation of Afghan nationals who have committed crimes in Germany. In June 2024, it was revealed that Germany would work with Uzbekistan to facilitate this process without directly engaging with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has expressed its willingness to cooperate and is expected to play a crucial role in the deportation of Afghan individuals from Germany. During the talks, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted the historical depth of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Germany, dating back to the 18th century, and stressed the importance of strengthening these ties in the current era. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation in various sectors, particularly in politics, security, defense, and culture. The trade volume, which was approximately $1.3 billion in 2023, is expected to increase significantly in the near future. As a result, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, has emerged as one of the key countries receiving special attention from Germany. After Uzbekistan, Scholz visited Kazakhstan, where the summit was to take place, signaling Germany’s new Central Asia policy. Scholz gave a statement highlighting Central Asia’s importance: “We want to continue and further intensify this... Especially in times of global uncertainty, we need close, trusting international partners.” Chancellor Scholz's remarks indirectly referenced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting instability. Since early 2022, the war has brought significant disruption to Europe, leading to negative consequences that have directly and indirectly affected Germany. Issues ranging from energy security to the defense of the European Union's borders have highlighted Russia's continuing presence as a multifaceted threat, contributing to what Scholz has referred to as "global uncertainty." Central Asia, once regarded by Russia as its "near abroad," has now been redefined by Germany as a region of "trustworthy partners." Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who hosted the summit, outlined six key areas of cooperation with Germany. He emphasized the importance of increasing trade volume and called for collaboration in energy, industry, transport, water resource management, and efforts toward global peace. Central Asian countries view their relations with Germany as a strategic opportunity to attract technical and technological investments while leveraging Germany as a gateway to strengthen ties with the broader European Union. Consequently, the recent meeting underscored a strong interest in Germany's technical expertise. Proposals were put forward to further develop the Middle Corridor and to involve Germany in the Green Energy Line project connecting Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, both sides expressed interest in expanding cooperation on hydrogen energy to encompass the entire European Union. In the broader context of regional affairs, the European Union's Global Gateway strategy remains crucial. This initiative, which has received praise from President Tokayev, is valued for its role in enhancing transport connectivity between Central Asia and the EU. However, Germany’s Central Asia policy is now facing growing pressure and heightened expectations from multiple stakeholders. Many media outlets and academics interpret the Global Gateway as a competitive response to China's influence in the region, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which has been active since 2013. China's role has faced criticism from various perspectives, leading to increasing calls for Western-centered initiatives. As a key player, Germany is expected to promote policies that advance European strategies across different regions. Nevertheless, the long-term advantages of a regional strategy focused on competing with China remain uncertain for Germany, raising questions about the sustainability and impact of such an approach. International organizations have increasingly urged Germany to adopt a more proactive stance on human rights issues in Central Asia. Human Rights Watch, for example, has called on Germany to address persistent challenges in the region. However, the long-term impact of Germany’s involvement in sensitive matters such as human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and non-transparent elections remains uncertain. Scholz has expressed doubt about Germany’s ability to take a leading role on these issues at this time. How Germany navigates these concerns will significantly influence its position within Europe and its reputation as a reliable partner in Central Asia. Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to pose a major challenge for Germany. Scholz has condemned the Taliban’s rise to power as “illegitimate” and described the situation in Afghanistan as "depressing." However, his stance has been interpreted in varying ways by countries in the region. While Germany can adopt a more selective approach to its relations with Afghanistan, Central Asian states do not have the same flexibility due to their geographical and political proximity. As a result, Germany's attempts to influence the policies of regional countries concerning Afghanistan could lead to unintended negative consequences. Germany's involvement in the regional strategies of Afghanistan's neighbors—such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—could potentially create tensions and adverse repercussions, complicating its broader Central Asian policy.

CONCLUSIONS: Germany now stands at a critical juncture, facing important decisions regarding its role in Central Asia. The country has the opportunity to establish a solid presence in the region by adopting a win-win strategy, leveraging its technical expertise, and fostering collaborative relationships with Central Asian countries. Conversely, Germany could also choose to act as an indirect pressure mechanism by criticizing, commenting on, or interfering in the internal affairs of these nations, potentially limiting its influence and creating friction within the region. The way Central Asian republics perceive the notion of "trustworthy partners" will become clearer over time as these dynamics unfold. Although the ambitious rhetoric of leaders like Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chancellor Scholz may initially seem promising for Germany and Europe, any negative consequences arising from the region’s complex realities could be viewed as a political failure for the German government. In this context, it would be more prudent for Germany to align its policies with the expectations of the Central Asian republics. Rather than taking a top-down approach, policies should be crafted on an equal footing, emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests to ensure a sustainable and constructive partnership.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.

COMPETITION VS PARTNERSHIP: UZBEKISTAN-KAZAKHSTAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT

By Nargiza Umarova

Recent geopolitical crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have created favorable conditions for the development of intercontinental land trade routes, significantly enhancing the role of Central Asia as a transit region linking major Eurasian markets. This shift was anticipated to improve intraregional transport connectivity and facilitate the integration of Central Asian republics into global supply chains – both essential for the region’s economic growth. However, unity among the five Central Asian states on these initiatives remains elusive. Currently, these countries prioritize the creation of international transit corridors over local connectivity. Low coordination between them leads to duplication of projects, and the focus on their own interests becomes a source of unhealthy competition. Rivalry is particularly evident in the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, each seeking alternative access to Turkish and European markets via the Caspian Sea.

BACKGROUND:  In 2018, the Central Asian states initiated a mechanism for regular Consultative Meetings aimed at enhancing multilateral cooperation in transport communications. A key priority identified was the alignment of national transport systems, a crucial prerequisite for boosting mutual trade and expanding the transit potential of the region’s countries. To facilitate this alignment, plans were proposed to establish a Regional Center for the Development of Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations, to develop a Strategy for Regional Transport Corridor Development in Central Asia, and to adopt a Regional Program for Transport Communication Development. However, years later, these initiatives remain unimplemented, although some positive developments have occurred. In 2018, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resumed railway service along the critical Galaba-Amuzang-Khoshadi route, resulting in nearly a twofold increase in mutual trade. A similar outcome was observed between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan following the launch of the multimodal corridor Tashkent-Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam-Kashgar in the same year.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated considerable activity in advancing local transport projects. As the largest economies in Central Asia, these nations account for nearly the entire volume of intraregional trade, motivating them to develop new mutually beneficial freight routes. In 2021, the two countries agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda road and railway, which will connect Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region with Uzbekistan's industrial Navoi region, effectively reducing the distance between them by more than three times. Additional plans include the construction of the Darbaza-Maktaaral railway line and the Beineu-Shalkar road. Despite successful cooperation within the region, Astana and Tashkent occasionally find themselves in competition in the external transport and logistics arena, which can be characterized as a conflict of interests. A prominent example of this rivalry is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. Following the onset of the war in Ukraine, demand for the Middle Corridor among global cargo-generating centers in both the East and West has surged significantly. This land trade route from China to Europe traverses Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and Turkey. The TITR serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor, whose operations are hindered by anti-Russian sanctions. The route is experiencing robust development, with transportation volumes reaching 2.7 million tons in 2023 and projected to increase to 4.2 million tons in 2024. Since the start of this year, container transit from China through the Middle Corridor has increased by a factor of 14. Within a few years, the route’s capacity could expand to accommodate 10 million tons of cargo annually. With appropriate infrastructure improvements and enhanced terminal capacities, the Trans-Caspian route is projected to become 35 percent faster and 40 percent more cost-effective than the Northern Corridor in the near future.

IMPLICATIONS:  It is important to emphasize that nearly all Central Asian countries are involved in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), not solely Kazakhstan. According to experts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), there are three primary transit routes within the Middle Corridor: the northern route, which passes through northern Kazakhstan; the central route, which traverses southern Kazakhstan; and the southern route, which runs through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan occupies a uniquely advantageous position within the Central Asian segment of the China–European Union–China supply chain. This strategic edge stems from its shared borders with both China and Russia. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is also striving to establish a significant role in transit transportation between China and Europe. Uzbekistan’s involvement in multimodal transport routes such as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Caspian Sea–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Black Sea region, or Georgia–Turkey–European Union (part of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, TRACECA), as well as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey–European Union, supports its ambitions in this area. It is relevant to highlight the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, which allows cargo from China to reach Uzbekistan in two days, compared to the ten days required via Kazakhstan. Plans are underway to construct a railway along a similar route, which would considerably enhance the positions of Tashkent and Bishkek in railway freight transportation from China to the Middle East, thereby bypassing Kazakhstan’s current monopoly. At present, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with railway checkpoints on its border with China. In the development of trans-Caspian transport routes toward the West, Central Asian states operate as both partners and competitors. Partnership is evident in their collaborative efforts to develop connecting routes that enable the nations of the region to link up with various transit branches of the Middle Corridor. For instance, as noted earlier, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda railway, which will be integrated into the Kazakh section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). In 2019, Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, launched an alternative trade route to Europe via the Caspian Sea, known as the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia+) corridor. Recently, the participating countries agreed to establish a consortium—a specialized body to coordinate the activities of this route. This development marks the project’s advancement to an institutional level, which provides a solid foundation for enhancing its competitive potential and boosting the transit capabilities of both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is also worth noting that, as early as 2014, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia institutionalized the Middle Corridor by first forming a Coordination Committee, which later evolved into the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.” These instances highlight the ongoing fragmentation among Central Asian states in the development of extra-regional transport routes. This fragmentation carries the risk of fostering unhealthy competition, which could generate discord among the countries in the region.

CONCLUSIONS:  Given the growing trend of deepening intra-regional ties in Central Asia, driven by the current geopolitical realities, it is increasingly crucial for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to integrate their transport project potential and establish joint coordination mechanisms. A coordinated approach to managing transit transportation through the Caspian Sea along the China-Europe-China axis is necessary, grounded in principles of equality and mutual benefit. Ensuring that the interests of one party do not overshadow those of the other is key to fostering balanced cooperation. Moreover, harmonizing the activities of the CASCA+ corridor consortium with the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” appears essential, with the goal of ultimately merging both structures into a unified coordinating body with legal status. Developing common approaches to international transport corridors and accelerating the adoption of the “Strategy for the Development of Transport Corridors in Central Asia,” which was first proposed in 2018, is equally important. Additionally, the proposal to establish a Regional Centre for Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations remains a pertinent issue.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan” (Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Her research activities are focused on studying the developments of Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors.