By Armen Grigoryan
March 20, 2017, the CACI Analyst
March 5 marked the start of official campaigning for Armenia’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for April 2, after which a parliamentary system will replace the current presidential one. Yet these elections are unlikely to bring about any significant changes in either the economic and social spheres or in Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy, given the dominant position of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). The opposition running for election is fragmented and short of resources, and will compete in an election system favoring the RPA.
By Richard Weitz
January 19th 2017, the CACI Analyst
The Trump administration will soon undertake a comprehensive review of Russia-US relations and U.S. policy toward the rest of Eurasia. Although the new team will presumably consider many options, the president-elect’s statements imply that the U.S. will not soon support further NATO expansion or other actions that would strongly antagonize Moscow. Despite this limitation, the U.S. government will continue security ties with U.S. partners in Eurasia, such as Georgia. In practice, there are a number of steps the U.S. and Georgia can undertake to advance their mutual security.
By Armen Grigoryan
January 12th, 2017, The CACI Analyst
Further negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue seem to be practically postponed until Armenia completes its parliamentary elections in April 2017. At the same time, the government demonstrates an unwillingness to proceed beyond rhetoric with governance and economic reforms. The administration’s inability to deliver satisfactory economic results and ensure social development, as well as its close connections with Russia with a strong clientelism component, suggest a further growth of dependence and compliance with Moscow’s political agenda.
By Stephen Blank
November 27th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
Few people think about trends in the Caucasus with reference to or in the context of Russia’s Syrian intervention. But Moscow does not make this mistake. From the beginning, Moscow has highlighted its access to the Caucasus through overflight rights and deployment of its forces in regard to Syria, e.g. sending Kalibr cruise missiles from ships stationed in the Caspian Sea to bomb Syria. Therefore we should emulate Russia’s example and seriously assess military trends in the Caucasus in that Syrian context.
By Zaur Shiriyev
September 12th, 2016, The CACI Analyst
In the wake of the St. Petersburg meeting, it has become clear that two, distinct peace processes are in play. The OSCE Minsk Group is creating a technical conflict prevention mechanism, while Russia is leading a conflict resolution process. However, while they may appear distinct – and therefore potentially conflicting – these parallel tracks are complementary.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.