by Svante E. Cornell

In August 2024, the leaders of Central Asian states met in Astana, Kazakhstan, for their sixth summit since 2018. This summit – at which regional leaders further committed to deepen regional cooperation – was an important development, indicating that Central Asian states are determined not to be pawns in rising great power competition.

BACKGROUND: Since the states of Central Asia gained independence three decades ago, a key question has been whether the region’s future will be determined by the countries of the region itself, or by outside powers. The decline of international norms in recent years is a decidedly unwelcome one for Central Asian states, which find themselves at the fulcrum of great power competition on the Eurasian continent. Dividing lines became stronger around them, and the region confronts the risk of coming under the domination of an emerging axis of revisionist powers consisting of Russia, China and Iran.

In recent years, the relationship among these three revisionist powers has become stronger. The growing coordination between Russia and China has been visible for the world to see, even though their relationship in Central Asia is more complex than it seems. Similarly, there has been a steadily expanding alignment between Russia and Iran. Iran’s active support for Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought the two powers closer, and led to heightened risks that coordination between them can expand to matters relating to Central Asia and the Caucasus. China and Iran have also increased their coordination, not least in circumventing U.S. sanctions. Beyond this, there has been increasing coordination between the three revisionist powers, including joint maritime drills in the Gulf of Oman, the latest in April 2024.

The extent of the trilateral axis between Russia, China and Iran has been subject to considerable debate. Some have correctly pointed out that it remains largely rhetorical and relies mainly on three bilateral relations. Still, the axis has the potential to strengthen, particularly if the U.S.-China relationship further deteriorates and a crisis in the Taiwan straits causes Beijing to turn with renewed interest to Russia and Iran.

It is to the good fortune of Greater Central Asia that it has so far been largely spared from the direct and military intervention of these revisionist powers. Still, the emergence of this new axis changes the parameters for the region, creating new elements of vulnerability and threatening to confront it with a fait accompli of being subsumed under this new axis.

In the face of these challenges, however, Central Asian states have maintained their independent approach to the world. They have shown that they are no longer “pawns” in a “Great Game,” or at the mercy of great powers. Quite to the contrary, states in the region are developing an ability to impact the region surrounding them, gaining sufficient power to assert their own priorities – not least strengthening cooperation among each other.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the most defining developments that has made this possible is the rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia. The first state to emerge as a Middle Power is Kazakhstan, which did so through a combination of its economic strength, foreign policy strategy, and multilateral initiatives; more recently, Uzbekistan is also emerging as a Middle Power.

The concept of Middle Powers is particularly relevant to Central Asia because the region lacks a functioning collective security mechanism. This is all the more concerning because of the size differential between regional states and surrounding powers – and the fluctuating relations among those surrounding powers further contributes to instability.

This instability makes the role of Middle Powers crucial in order to anchor Central Asian security. A Middle Power has the ability to impact, to some extent, the policy of great powers and stabilize the interaction among them in its region. It can raise the situation in the region to the attention of multilateral organizations and external powers. More importantly, a Middle Power can help organize neighboring states so that otherwise smaller and weaker states can band together and pool resources.

Kazakhstan began to emerge as the first Middle Power in greater Central Asia a decade or so ago. It did so for several reasons, which include both objective attributes as well as choices its leadership made. First, Kazakhstan’s economy is by far the most developed of the region. Second, it has taken a proactive approach to developing a foreign policy to handle the competition among great powers. Third, it is taking a leading role in promoting regional cooperation. Fourth, it plays a crucial role in the connectivity of the region. Fifth, Kazakhstan has gone beyond the region with international initiatives that cemented its role. Finally, its internal reforms make its status as a Middle Power increasingly sustainable.

The August 8 summit of Central Asian leaders is an example of how Kazakhstan exercises this role as a Middle Power. Ahead of the Summit, Kazakhstani leaders had indicated their efforts to “strengthen the region’s international subjectivity,” as leaders now term their effort to build regional institutions. At the Summit, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev commented that these meetings have “given regional cooperation a systematic, comprehensive and, above all, reliable character.”

Key to this success is also the increasingly tight cooperation between Kazakhstan and Central Asia’s most populous state, Uzbekistan. With the two larger states taking the lead, Central Asia has begun to resemble the Franco-German cooperation in post-war Europe that led to the process of European Integration.

CONCLUSIONS: The rise of Middle Powers in Central Asia has considerable implications. It should lead to a fundamental rethink in many quarters about how the Greater Central Asian region should be understood. Too often, the region is still viewed in terms of a “Great Game,” where large power compete for influence, while local states are seen as helpless and possibly hopeless satrapies that lack agency of their own. 

That description of the region is now not just inaccurate but misleading. Furthermore, for external forces – be it powers such as the EU, US or Japan, or international organizations – the emergence of Middle Powers in Greater Central Asia present an important opportunity. The strategies adopted by foreign states toward the region have yet to explicitly acknowledge the emergence of Middle Powers that can serve as key partners with which foreign powers can safeguard their interests in the region.

The United States and EU both developed strategy documents toward Central Asia in the late 2010s. These strategies took a step toward acknowledging the regional states as subjects rather than objects of international relations. Events since then have largely made these strategies obsolete. As these strategies are revised, it is imperative that they reflect the new reality in the region – the emergence of Middle Powers that have considerable agency in helping shape their region for the future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Center.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

On September 17, 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz participated in the second Germany-Central Asia Summit held in Kazakhstan. His three-day visit to the region commenced in Uzbekistan, followed by engagements in Kazakhstan, where he also held meetings with the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. At present, Germany is confronted with the necessity of refining its regional policy to effectively respond to the evolving challenges in Central Asia. While it seeks to deepen its relations with the region, the specific approach it will adopt to address these challenges remains uncertain.

BACKGROUND: Germany's interest in Central Asia has significantly increased in recent years, as evidenced by a series of high-level visits and diplomatic initiatives. In 2023, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, followed by the inaugural Germany-Central Asia Summit. These engagements have consistently emphasized the importance of strengthening ties with the region, with particular focus on Kazakhstan. With a trade volume of $4 billion, Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Germany and is viewed as a strategic country within the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan has recently begun to draw attention as well. Germany has also demonstrated its capacity for swift action in responding to the challenges Europe has faced since 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The increasing perception of Russia as a security threat has forced Germany, along with other European nations, to make critical decisions. Recognizing the necessity of adopting a more proactive stance, particularly in terms of military and energy policies, Germany has taken measures to address its concerns with Russia indirectly, while positioning itself as a key actor in the broader regional context. The decision to deepen relations with the Central Asian republics represents a significant development during this period. The growing consensus that Germany must adopt a more active role in the region than it has in the past is shaping the current government’s strategic approach. Alongside issues such as migration, security, energy, and the Middle Corridor, the broader challenge of regional competition has also emerged as a priority on the government’s agenda. In this context, it is essential to acknowledge that China's influence in Central Asia is as significant as Russia's. Germany has emphasized that its efforts to reduce the influence of both Russia and China in the region are undertaken on behalf of all European countries, reflecting a coordinated response to these geopolitical dynamics. During her 2022 visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock expressed this sentiment, stating: “It is important to me that the future holds more for them than merely the choice between being straitjacketed in Russia’s front yard or being dependent on China. And so my main aim in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is to listen to the hopes and expectations that people there are pinning on Europe in the current circumstances.” The German-Central Asian Summit and the recent strengthening of ties with the region have emerged as key developments in recent years. The second summit took place at a time when Chancellor Scholz indicated a more proactive approach toward Central Asia. This shift raises important questions about how Germany will manage its relations with the region, whether it will pursue a selective policy approach, and how closely its actions will align with the expectations of the international community. These factors will be critical in shaping Germany's long-term strategy and influence in Central Asia amidst a complex geopolitical environment.

IMPLICATIONS: In September 2024, Chancellor Scholz began his meetings in Uzbekistan as part of a strategy to provide regional balance. The German government described his visit as an effort "to breathe life into this regional partnership," reflecting Germany's growing interest in Uzbekistan’s increasing economic strength. During his meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Scholz emphasized Germany’s firm commitment to deepening bilateral relations. The two parties signed several agreements, including those relating to the Green Central Asia Initiative and critical minerals. However, the migration agreement attracted the most attention. This deal aims to address the legal challenges faced by Uzbek citizens by facilitating the movement of skilled workers to Germany, enabling them to work in various sectors. For Uzbekistan, which had long awaited this development, the agreement marked a significant achievement in its relations with Germany. On the other hand, the German media has reported that another significant aspect of the agreement pertains to the deportation of Afghan nationals who have committed crimes in Germany. In June 2024, it was revealed that Germany would work with Uzbekistan to facilitate this process without directly engaging with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has expressed its willingness to cooperate and is expected to play a crucial role in the deportation of Afghan individuals from Germany. During the talks, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev highlighted the historical depth of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Germany, dating back to the 18th century, and stressed the importance of strengthening these ties in the current era. Both parties agreed to enhance cooperation in various sectors, particularly in politics, security, defense, and culture. The trade volume, which was approximately $1.3 billion in 2023, is expected to increase significantly in the near future. As a result, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, has emerged as one of the key countries receiving special attention from Germany. After Uzbekistan, Scholz visited Kazakhstan, where the summit was to take place, signaling Germany’s new Central Asia policy. Scholz gave a statement highlighting Central Asia’s importance: “We want to continue and further intensify this... Especially in times of global uncertainty, we need close, trusting international partners.” Chancellor Scholz's remarks indirectly referenced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting instability. Since early 2022, the war has brought significant disruption to Europe, leading to negative consequences that have directly and indirectly affected Germany. Issues ranging from energy security to the defense of the European Union's borders have highlighted Russia's continuing presence as a multifaceted threat, contributing to what Scholz has referred to as "global uncertainty." Central Asia, once regarded by Russia as its "near abroad," has now been redefined by Germany as a region of "trustworthy partners." Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who hosted the summit, outlined six key areas of cooperation with Germany. He emphasized the importance of increasing trade volume and called for collaboration in energy, industry, transport, water resource management, and efforts toward global peace. Central Asian countries view their relations with Germany as a strategic opportunity to attract technical and technological investments while leveraging Germany as a gateway to strengthen ties with the broader European Union. Consequently, the recent meeting underscored a strong interest in Germany's technical expertise. Proposals were put forward to further develop the Middle Corridor and to involve Germany in the Green Energy Line project connecting Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, both sides expressed interest in expanding cooperation on hydrogen energy to encompass the entire European Union. In the broader context of regional affairs, the European Union's Global Gateway strategy remains crucial. This initiative, which has received praise from President Tokayev, is valued for its role in enhancing transport connectivity between Central Asia and the EU. However, Germany’s Central Asia policy is now facing growing pressure and heightened expectations from multiple stakeholders. Many media outlets and academics interpret the Global Gateway as a competitive response to China's influence in the region, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, which has been active since 2013. China's role has faced criticism from various perspectives, leading to increasing calls for Western-centered initiatives. As a key player, Germany is expected to promote policies that advance European strategies across different regions. Nevertheless, the long-term advantages of a regional strategy focused on competing with China remain uncertain for Germany, raising questions about the sustainability and impact of such an approach. International organizations have increasingly urged Germany to adopt a more proactive stance on human rights issues in Central Asia. Human Rights Watch, for example, has called on Germany to address persistent challenges in the region. However, the long-term impact of Germany’s involvement in sensitive matters such as human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian regimes, and non-transparent elections remains uncertain. Scholz has expressed doubt about Germany’s ability to take a leading role on these issues at this time. How Germany navigates these concerns will significantly influence its position within Europe and its reputation as a reliable partner in Central Asia. Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to pose a major challenge for Germany. Scholz has condemned the Taliban’s rise to power as “illegitimate” and described the situation in Afghanistan as "depressing." However, his stance has been interpreted in varying ways by countries in the region. While Germany can adopt a more selective approach to its relations with Afghanistan, Central Asian states do not have the same flexibility due to their geographical and political proximity. As a result, Germany's attempts to influence the policies of regional countries concerning Afghanistan could lead to unintended negative consequences. Germany's involvement in the regional strategies of Afghanistan's neighbors—such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—could potentially create tensions and adverse repercussions, complicating its broader Central Asian policy.

CONCLUSIONS: Germany now stands at a critical juncture, facing important decisions regarding its role in Central Asia. The country has the opportunity to establish a solid presence in the region by adopting a win-win strategy, leveraging its technical expertise, and fostering collaborative relationships with Central Asian countries. Conversely, Germany could also choose to act as an indirect pressure mechanism by criticizing, commenting on, or interfering in the internal affairs of these nations, potentially limiting its influence and creating friction within the region. The way Central Asian republics perceive the notion of "trustworthy partners" will become clearer over time as these dynamics unfold. Although the ambitious rhetoric of leaders like Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and Chancellor Scholz may initially seem promising for Germany and Europe, any negative consequences arising from the region’s complex realities could be viewed as a political failure for the German government. In this context, it would be more prudent for Germany to align its policies with the expectations of the Central Asian republics. Rather than taking a top-down approach, policies should be crafted on an equal footing, emphasizing mutual respect and shared interests to ensure a sustainable and constructive partnership.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.

WILL THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION RECONFIGURE REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION?
By Rafis Abazov

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana has rekindled discussions on the role of the organization in reshaping regional educational cooperation. Historically known for its focus on security and economic issues, the SCO is increasingly recognizing education as a cornerstone for sustainable development and regional stability. This shift is significant for member states—China, Russia, India, and several Central Asian countries—as they navigate the complexities of globalization and seek to bolster their human capital. The main question is whether declarations at the summit denote a shift in the regional educational architecture.

BACKGROUND: Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has primarily concentrated on security cooperation and economic integration among its member states. However, the need for a skilled workforce, capable of driving innovation and economic growth, has brought education into the spotlight. The Astana SCO-2024 Summit underscored this shift, highlighting the potential of educational cooperation to foster mutual understanding, enhance economic ties, and promote cultural exchanges. In recent years, the SCO has launched various educational initiatives. The establishment of the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and regional scholarship themes led to a sharp increase in regional student mobility – for example China reached a milestone in 2022 by attracting one million foreign students, while Kazakhstan attracted almost 30,000. Indeed, these efforts facilitated academic exchanges, joint research projects, and cultural interactions among students and scholars from member countries. The Astana summit built on these foundations, proposing a more structured and collaborative approach to educational cooperation, as almost one quarter of the 31 agreements signed during the summit were dedicated to the area of science and education. On top of this, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Science and Higher Education hosted the regional conference “Cooperation in the field of higher education and production integration,” focused on developing a unified approach to accreditation, curriculum design, quality assurance, student mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the important areas discussed at the Astana summit was the enhancement of academic exchanges and research collaborations. By fostering partnerships between universities and research institutions across member states, the SCO aims to create a robust network of knowledge and innovation. Such collaborations can lead to significant breakthroughs in various fields, from science and IT technology to social sciences and smart agriculture. 

The proposed initiatives include exchange programs for students and faculty, joint research projects, and the creation of cross-border academic networks and joint research labs to study the impact of climate change at the regional and sub-regional levels. These efforts are expected to enhance the quality of education and research in member states, making them more competitive on the global stage. Another critical focus is the harmonization of educational standards across SCO countries. This alignment would not only enhance educational opportunities but also support a more integrated approach to developing double diploma programs between universities. 

The summit proposed the creation of a common framework for higher education within the SCO. This framework would include standardized guidelines for curriculum development, accreditation processes, and quality assurance mechanisms. Such harmonization can make it easier for students to transfer credits between institutions in different countries and for professionals to have their qualifications recognized across the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of digital education and technological integration. 

The SCO members acknowledged that there is a rapid shift towards online learning, and an urgent need to invest in digital infrastructure and resources. The Astana summit highlighted the potential for collaboration in developing e-learning platforms, distance education programs, and digital literacy initiatives. In this context, the leading Chinese universities (such as Chinese Agriculture University) took initiatives to exploring ways of leveraging technology to bridge the digital divide among member states by promoting access to quality education and facilitating lifelong learning and upskilling, essential for adapting to the rapidly changing job market.

The creation of cohesive and inclusive frameworks would help to upscale the internationalization of education by integrating educational systems, and organizational cultures across SCO member states, and developing joint digital infrastructure. However, these initiatives require significant investments. Indeed, economic disparities among member states pose significant challenges. While some countries have advanced educational and digital infrastructures, others may struggle with limited resources and capacity. At least three countries – China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – have allocated significant resources for bridging this gap, supporting deeper educational collaboration, and accelerating the adoption of online learning, access to digital tools and other resources.

CONCLUSION: The Astana summit SCO-2024 has set the stage for the SCO to play a transformative role in regional educational cooperation. As member states work to align their educational systems and policies, the organization is poised to reshape the regional educational architecture significantly. With a focus on academic collaboration, standardization, and digital innovation, the SCO is on a path to create a more integrated and dynamic educational ecosystem. 

The success of future initiatives will depend on building on the foundations laid by existing programs. Strengthening and expanding platforms like the SCO University Network, the SCO Youth Council and numerous educational consortiums can provide a solid base for more ambitious projects. These platforms can serve as hubs for collaboration, innovation, and cultural exchange. Effective implementation requires the active engagement of various stakeholders, including governments, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society. Collaborative efforts and partnerships can ensure that initiatives are well-designed, adequately funded, and effectively implemented.

The SCO has the potential to reconfigure regional educational architecture by enhancing educational cooperation and recognizing education as a cornerstone for regional development and peaceful integration. The outcomes of the Astana meeting signal a promising future for educational collaboration in the SCO region, with the potential to yield significant economic, social, and cultural benefits. As the SCO continues to evolve, its focus on education can play a transformative role in shaping the region’s future. By fostering a more interconnected and innovative educational landscape, the SCO can contribute to a more prosperous, stable, and cohesive region. 

The Astana summit has marked a new chapter in this journey, setting the stage for the SCO to reconfigure the regional educational architecture in meaningful and impactful ways. Joint research projects and academic exchanges can generate new ideas, technologies, and solutions to common problems. This, in turn, can drive economic growth and increase competitiveness, positioning the SCO region as a leader in various fields.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and participated at the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan.

THE NEW CHALLENGE TO THE SCO 

By: Stephen Blank

The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana reveals that both Moscow and Beijing are seeking to reformat the organization in order to meet their global rather than its original regional goals. That process represents a serious challenge to the foreign policy autonomy and interests of Central Asian states and probably to regional security. As the center of gravity of world politics shifts ever more to Asia, the role and importance of Central Asia is likely to grow. These trends should be recognized and acted upon to assure that Central Asia does not become a closed sphere of Sino-Russian influence, which would retard its growth and transform it into a breeding ground for conflict.

BACKGROUND: The SCO was first set up to create an institutional framework by which China’s growing importance in and to Central Asia could be regulated. At the same time, it also constituted a forum for Central Asian governments whereby they could address not only each other but also Russia and China concerning their interests and needs and where all the parties could reach agreement on how to contend with shared threats, e.g. the genuine and continuing threat of terrorism. As such the SCO gradually evolved into a viable regional security forum where both Moscow and Beijing could present or implement their regional security initiatives and Central Asian states could present their interests and needs. Thus, it functioned to satisfy all the members’ needs as a purely regional security organization.

However, as world politics evolved towards a world order characterized primarily by great power rivalry and even threats of nuclear confrontation, Russia and China clearly intend to impart a wholly new purpose and direction to the SCO that threatens the interests of the Central Asian states. Membership now includes India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. These additions to the SCO’s roster are primarily attributable to Sino-Russian maneuvers – great power calculations that outweigh regional concerns. Moreover, these new members of the SCO have also brought their rivalries, especially those between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan and Kashmir, and India and China over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into the SCO, probably rendering the organization less effective as a security provider.  Finally, Russia’s war in Ukraine has also undermined its reputation as a security provider in Central Asia, not least because high-ranking scholars like Sergei Karaganov and officials regularly make veiled and even unsubtle threats against Kazakhstan, which they claim to be part of Russia. 

Recent trends, as expressed at the SCO summit in Astana and other high-level Russo-Chinese gatherings, indicate that both Russia and China have abandoned the idea that the SCO serves mainly as a regional security institution. In numerous speeches, Putin, Xi, and spokesmen for their policies now openly state that the SCO, like the BRICS, manifests a new and evolving form of multipolar politics led by Moscow and Beijing, which herald the rise of the East and South against a supposedly decrepit West. In this self-serving ideological depiction of the emerging world order, these formerly regional or economic organizations function to attack the West and validate Moscow’s and Beijing’s hegemony over weaker neighbors like Central Asia. This hegemony entails an unquestioned division of the world into spheres of influence and the extreme minimization of foreign influence in Central Asia.  

IMPLICATIONS: In this new world order, Russia’s visibly declining hegemony over Central Asian security and culture would be restored, possibly by force, and to judge from ongoing economic trends, under Chinese sufferance. While this may well be a delusional dream, it now holds sway in Moscow and represents another desperate effort to hold on to the wrecks of empire. As Sergei Radchenko demonstrates in his superb account of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow cannot claim the mantle of great power and imperial status if it lacks willing clients. Therefore, it will consistently attempt to subordinate its neighbors, including Central Asia. 

China shares this imperial world view. Its methods in Russia and Central Asia are primarily economic, yet no less coercive than Russia’s more heavy-handed approach. However, Beijing is happy for now to let Russia bear security burdens that it prefers to avoid, given the challenges it faces in Korea, the South China Sea, and India. And it certainly welcomes Russia’s growing dependence on China in economics and as provider of strategic technologies.

If this interpretation of the SCO gains traction, it entails several challenges to Central Asian members and India. First, the vision of the SCO as a Sino-Russian artifact of a multipolar order entails a diminution of Central Asian states’ sovereignty as free international actors. Beijing and Moscow will seek to coerce them into following their agenda, not a Central Asian one. The idea that the SCO is merely an artefact of a great power struggle over multipolarity and spheres of influence not only justifies pressure upon Central Asia to oust U.S. and European presence and influence from the region. It also aims to curtail Central Asia’s increasing outreach to the West and vice versa that is now finally taking place. This exclusionary Sino-Russian approach can only lead to economic isolation, stagnation, and subordination to Moscow and Beijing when both those economies have long since entered upon their own periods of stagnation.

Second, the triumph of this view of the SCO enhances Russia’s and China’s economic leverage on Central Asia. It allows Moscow to continue threatening Central Asian migrants and economies by playing the increasingly popular anti-migrant card in Russian politics.  Beijing will similarly employ the leverage it possesses through trade and investment deals to coerce local governments into an inferior position, especially if other alternatives are unavailable.

Third, Russian and possibly Chinese military threats, particularly against Kazakhstan, will increase. And fourth, at the same time Moscow and China will collaborate at China’s behest, given Russia’s extensive dependence on China, to exclude India from future major trade and transport routes as China has already done. Thus, the SCO will become a vehicle whose purposes also comprise the stifling of India’s growing power and interests in Central Asia. One form these processes will likely take is already underway whereby Russia will seek alignment with Afghanistan, ostensibly to stop terrorism and reaffirm its military hegemony over Central Asia. Indeed, its ambassador to Kabul now proclaims an alliance between the two states, an alliance that can only suppress Indian and Central Asian interests in expanding ties.

As part of this projected reorientation of the SCO, therefore, it will be subordinated to the exigencies of great power rivalry with the U.S. while the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia will be institutionalized within it. The consequences may to some degree be unforeseeable; but are unlikely to redound to the benefit of Central Asian governments.

CONCLUSIONS: For interested parties, i.e. not only regional governments, but also the U.S. and the EU, it is necessary to prevent the resubordination of Central Asia to the renewed imperial fantasies of Russia and China. This entails constant high and low-level interaction among these states with regard to critical issues: terrorism, which clearly remains a real threat, future ties to Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral energy, trade, transportation routes, rare earths, environmental reclamation projects, education, and defense cooperation. Only by such means can the West and its leading organizations contribute to the preservation of regional peace, trade, investment, growth, and mitigate looming environmental threats in Central Asia.

India too must step up its game here and realize the long-held but unfulfilled promise of enhanced ties with and support for Central Asia by carrying out an increasing number of projects on this same agenda with local governments. This would forestall a Chinese-led but Russian-supported effort to curtail Central Asian ties with both the West and Asia’s other key players. The newly announced South Korean plan for increased ties with Central Asia exemplifies what could be done. 

Finally, both the West and leading Asian powers should lend growing support to the rising trend among Central Asian states to enhance their mutual and regional cooperation. To the degree that foreign support and local perceptions foster regional cooperation on the many challenges facing Central Asia, they enhance local and regional capabilities while also raising the cost to Beijing and Moscow of interference in Central Asia. In other words, Western support for individual country projects and especially for multilateral cooperative projects encompassing the agenda presented above, are win-win and mutually beneficial. They build peace, economic growth and development, and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Central Asian states that is openly at risk from both Beijing and Moscow.

Enhancing Western influence and regional cooperation are proven ways of reducing conflict whereas spheres of influence invariably foster neo-imperial rivalries. The masquerade of Sino-Russian multipolarity will not have different results if we neglect Central Asia. Instead, we will only increase the costs to that region and to our own interests.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fprpi.org.

By Farkhod Tolipov

August 21, 2024

During a state visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Uzbekistan in May 2024, after his re-election, it was officially announced that the long-anticipated construction of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received a green light. A corresponding agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan. This decision caused wide public debate about the NPP, regarding its expediency, the environmental and security risks, as well as the geopolitical consequences associated with it. At the same time, the project signifies Uzbekistan’s growing dependence on Russia and a more pro-Russian drift in Tashkent’s foreign policy. 

BACKGROUND: The first signals of the possible construction of an NPP in Uzbekistan appeared several years ago. It was then stipulated and justified with reference to the lack of sufficient gas reserves in the country. This pretext surprised many economic experts, political analysts as well as the public since Uzbekistan has for a long time, even during the Soviet period, occupied the highest positions in international rankings of gas reserves and gas production.

The issue of dwindling gas reserves is a big and ambiguous question because neither the government nor specialists have provided convincing explanations for the exhaustion of gas fields in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, frequent blackouts have become a “normal” phenomenon during last two-three years – roughly corresponding to the period during which the NPP project has been officially promoted. Sudden and frequent blackouts taking place across the country have created the suspicion that they are not so much caused by the inability of existing energy infrastructure to satisfy the country’s growing energy needs and a lack of gas reserves, but are man-made and deliberate in order to convince people that there is no alternative to an NPP.
However, the overall agreements between Uzbekistan and Russia regarding the NPP, including the costs of the plant, environmental aspects, the disposal and utilization of nuclear waste, and many other concomitant questions of interest to the public and media remain opaque and secretive. It was in this context that Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev announced the official start of the NPP construction project.

Initially, the NPP project was intended to consist of 2 large reactors of 1.2 Gigawatt each, at a cost estimated to US$ 11 billion. However, it has now been decided that the NPP will be a small plant consisting of 6 small reactors of 55 Megawatt each. Overall, the electricity that will be produced by the NPP is supposed to constitute about 15 percent of the total energy produced in the country. The NPP is supposed to become operational in 2033.

IMPLICATIONS: Proponents of the NPP construction argue that nuclear energy is widely used in the world, pointing to France, Germany, Japan, the U.S. and others. According to them, constructing the NPP is in Uzbekistan’s strategic interests and an instrument of sustainable development, since it will positively affect both economic growth and the population’s living standards. Moreover, they say that nuclear power is the only source of energy generation that meets all three pillars of the so-called energy trilemma established by the International Energy Agency – reliability of energy infrastructure; availability of energy for the population and industry; and no harmful effect on the environment.

While these assertions seem aimed to calm the excited public opinion, they do not withstand critical counterarguments. Numerous physicists, environmentalists, energy experts, political scientists and public activists have raised their voices against the NPP. In particular, according to estimates, it will be more expensive to produce electric energy in small reactors than large ones. Uzbekistan will face a large financial burden that will be carried by consumers. Also, according to estimates, Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sources can fully satisfy the country’s energy needs even without the NPP.

Meanwhile, multiple questions related to the construction and operation of the NPP as well as its geopolitical implications have not been addressed and no transparent calculations of key aspects of the NPP’s operation have been provided. These include the enrichment of Uranium from U²¹⁸ to U²³²; the system for cooling the reactor; the utilization of nuclear waste; the overall cost of the project; security aspects; as well as the increased reliance on a Russia that wages a war of aggression against Ukraine and threatens other former Soviet republics with its neo-imperial policy. In addition, the digitalization of the NPP operation raises questions regarding possible cyber-security aspects of the plant, which will definitely be exposed to such threats.
Importantly, this type of small NPP does not exist even in Russia itself, which uses small reactors only for icebreaker engines. Thus, the NPP in Uzbekistan will in fact constitute a first experiment with a number of risks attached.

When journalists and pundits began to inquire about the details of the NPP project and requested relevant information from governmental agencies, they received no response. To the contrary, media organizations were told by authorities that they should refrain from highlighting topics relating to the NPP. Despite the reluctance of government agencies to communicate information on the NPP and attempts to curtail media coverage, social networks and independent experts do discuss the issue and seek to keep it on the public agenda. A special group was even created on Facebook titled “Uzbekistanis are against the NPP.” Simultaneously, a similar NPP project is being discussed in Kazakhstan. In contrast to Tashkent, Astana has officially made it clear that a referendum will be held on NPP construction. However, in Uzbekistan, the decision comes before its justification.
The social and political drama related to the NPP has created the impression that the project corresponds to Russia’s interests rather than those of Uzbekistan. The enthusiasm with which Russia promotes this project cannot be considered and understood independently from the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Indeed, the NPP will serve triple objectives for Moscow. First, it will constitute political leverage for exerting pressure upon Uzbekistan. Second, it will provide one among very few instruments for mitigating economic decline and crisis in Russia due to international economic and financial sanctions. Third, it will help creating a false image that Russia is not isolated in world politics and has partners and allies. Given the establishment of a partnership in nuclear energy, Uzbekistan will hardly vote against Russia at future UNGA sessions.

It should be recalled that since 1997, Central Asia is proclaimed a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The NWFZ by its nature and essence is a broad concept; its ultimate goal is to safeguard the region against any form of nuclear threat. The question therefore arises whether the NPP can be considered a dual-purpose object, which could in certain circumstances be transformed into a weapon? After Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP, this question cannot be ignored and obscured.

Instead, Uzbekistan’s government seems to reiterate Napoleon’s saying: “One jumps into the fray, then figures out what to do next,” or “You commit yourself, then you see.”

CONCLUSIONS: While a number of countries utilize NPPs to produce electricity, most countries resolve their electricity needs by developing alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro. Many countries are also cancelling their nuclear energy programs in favor of renewable sources. The straightforward and very simplistic attempts by proponents of Uzbekistan’s NPP to propagate for the project, in combination with the secrecy displayed by Uzbek authorities, are not only unconvincing but also raise suspicions that Tashkent engages in a mutual geopolitical gamble with Moscow.

The agreement signed between Tashkent and Moscow on the NPP lacks due scientific elaboration and national debates concerning all aspects and risks involved in the deal. Many experts, media as well members of the public are now raising their voices against the project, claiming that Uzbekistan is losing its sovereignty and independence and falling into dependence on Russia.

Indeed, this issue is far from routine and conventional, just like a nuclear weapon is considered a non-conventional weapon. Accordingly, policy in this special area also should be unconventional, taking into account the vital national interests of the country.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.