By John DiPIrro

The Central Asia and Caucasus Institute’s proposed ‘American Strategy for Greater Central Asia’ (ASGCA) offers a timely recalibration of US engagement, centering on sovereignty, investment and regional interconnectivity. It challenges those of us steeped in democracy and governance work – that is, human rights, transparency, rule of law and institutional reform – to look beyond the normative ideals and confront the hard, often uncomfortable realities of power politics. It offers a serious and rare opportunity for the United States to redefine its role in a region that remains strategically vital and capitalize on a fleeting window of geopolitical advantage. Yet, without a robust policy of Russian containment, the strategy misses a key opportunity. To be effective, the US must help solidify a regional bulwark capable of resisting Russian military, economic and ideological coercion, while cultivating durable, mutually beneficial partnerships

BACKGROUND: For decades, U.S. engagement with Central Asia rested on flawed assumptions that development assistance, conditioned on commitments to democratic reform, would gradually yield stable, pro-Western partners. In reality, democratic reforms were largely performative and cosmetic, designed to appease U.S. interlocutors and secure continued funding. Russia and China, by contrast, offered a far more attractive alternative to Central Asian elites, including security guarantees, regime support, non-interference in internal affairs and tacit acceptance of corruption. These partnerships came with fewer conditions, demanding only loyalty.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. promise of prosperity through democratic transformation remained abstract and unconvincing in the face of authoritarian realpolitik. Even reformist leaders or color revolutions were quickly co-opted or violently displaced. In private, many regional elites sought a different offer: security, investment and recognition of sovereignty…without the "democracy business." Beijing and Moscow responded with infrastructure development and military cooperation, creating entrenched dependencies.

The Trump administration’s pivot toward transactional diplomacy that prioritizes economic and security partnerships over ideological demands has opened a window of opportunity to recalibrate U.S. engagement on terms regional governments find more palatable. Washington cannot and should not replicate the corrupt bargains offered by authoritarian powers, but it can offer something categorically superior: access to global markets, cutting-edge technologies, diversified security cooperation and entry into a predictable, rules-based order. This model, though imperfect, offers autonomy without the coercion, instability and dependency imposed by Moscow or Beijing. A pragmatic U.S. strategy grounded in sovereignty, prosperity and alignment could finally forge resilient and durable partnerships.

Meanwhile, Central Asia’s younger, urban, and globally connected populations are increasingly disillusioned with both domestic authoritarianism and foreign exploitation. Nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment has surged, particularly in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its denial of Central Asian sovereignty and its mobilization of ethnic minorities into the Russian war effort have further fueled this backlash. Many citizens across the region have grown tired of being pawns in great-power rivalries.

It is within this context that the ASGCA represents a meaningful shift. By acknowledging regional priorities and accepting transactional diplomacy, it replaces Western idealism with strategic realism. ASGCA’s central innovation is its proposal to view these states not as isolated, vulnerable peripheries, but as a potential collective bloc, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan at its core, and Afghanistan, Mongolia and the South Caucasus anchoring each end. This corridor would align sovereign interests with US strategic goals and offer three critical advantages:

• Strategically, it would anchor a contiguous bloc that counters the Russia-China-Iran axis and dilutes their regional influence.
• Economically, it would unlock immense investment opportunities, from critical minerals and renewable energy, to trade corridors like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), bypassing Russian chokepoints and providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• In terms of security, it would foster regional self-sufficiency in counterterrorism, border control and internal stability, thereby reducing the need for US military presence. This feature aligns with both American and regional preferences.

Yet, ASGCA’s vision omits a crucial dimension. Without an explicit strategy for containing Russian influence, the project risks being strategically incoherent.

IMPLICATIONS:  While international law affirms Russia’s 1991 borders,[1] the Kremlin’s own doctrine tells another story. The Russkiy Mir (Russian World) ideology, a cornerstone of Moscow’s aggressive expansionism, asserts a transnational Russian civilization that overrides international borders whenever it is politically expedient. Russia’s borders, in its own eyes, end only where they are met with sufficient resistance. This has become painfully clear since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale war on Ukraine. The Kremlin’s disregard for sovereignty is not the exception: it is policy. This is why any peace settlement in Ukraine is likely to be tactical, not transformational. Moscow will use the opportunity to rearm and resume aggression when conditions are more favorable. As such, the West cannot afford another cycle of accommodation and illusion. A sustainable US strategy must empower regional actors to deter Russian pressure without direct American military deployment.

For this reason, any effort to unify and empower Greater Central Asia must explicitly incorporate Russian containment. By systematically investing in the region’s defense capabilities, economic integration and institutional resilience, the US can help Central Asia and the South Caucasus form a cohesive bloc capable of withstanding Russian pressure. These nations offer unique strategic value, including deep familiarity with Russian tactics, a pragmatic understanding of hard power and a growing desire to pursue independent paths. Unlike Western policymakers who often misread Moscow through a liberal, rational-actor lens, Central Asians and Caucasians harbor no such illusions, fully recognizing the necessity of strength and self-reliance.

Six reasons underscore this imperative.

First, without containment, sovereignty will remain fragile. Russian influence is not limited to tanks and troops. It manifests itself in cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, political subversion, cultural hegemony, economic blackmail and manipulation of ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s rhetoric about “protecting Russians abroad” has stoked deep anxieties among political elites. In Armenia, Moscow’s failure to intervene during the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive exposed the hollowness of its security guarantees. If Greater Central Asia is to be more than a vision, it must be hardened against the hybrid Russian threats from the outset.

Second, containment is a precondition for regional integration. The Middle Corridor, a central component of ASGCA’s economic vision, cannot function without security. However, these corridors remain vulnerable to disruption without regional security guarantees. Russian influence over rail, road and energy infrastructure, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, makes any ambitious transit strategy susceptible to sabotage or political manipulation. A concerted effort to reduce Russian leverage is essential to ensuring the viability of east-west connectivity.

Third, Russia exploits regional divisions. Moscow excels at divide-and-rule tactics. It amplifies nationalist tensions, exacerbates border disputes and fuels distrust between neighbors. The longstanding water and border tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are fertile ground for Russian interference. A Greater Central Asia bloc must prioritize coordinated responses to hybrid threats, including joint intelligence sharing, cybersecurity collaboration and counter-disinformation mechanisms. Containment is not just a military goal. It is the precondition for durable regional unity. Geographically, this effort should concentrate along Russia’s southern flank, with the support of Turkey, India, Pakistan and the United States.

Fourth, U.S. credibility depends on strategic clarity and continuity. In Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the West’s failure to provide hard security guarantees has had devastating consequences. Central Asian states have taken note. U.S. commitments must be unambiguous and they must endure beyond election cycles. If Washington abandons this strategy after four years, it will validate Russian and Chinese narratives about American unreliability and drive regional partners back into the arms of Moscow and Beijing.

Fifth, containment can be achieved without escalation. A containment strategy does not require US troops on the ground. Instead, it must empower local states to serve as their own first line of defense, resilient enough to resist Russian coercion. This includes arms transfers, defense cooperation, cybersecurity partnerships, sanctions enforcement and media resilience. It also means supporting sovereign decision-making and reducing dependence on Russian economic systems. Containment, if done smartly, is a stabilizing force, not a destabilizing one.

Sixth, a containment strategy accelerates the end of the Ukraine war. Central Asia and the South Caucasus are critical nodes in Russia’s sanctions evasion networks. Enforcing export controls, cutting off trans-shipment of dual-use goods and closing legal loopholes in countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia and Georgia would severely disrupt Russia’s war economy, hasten its operational exhaustion and enable a faster, more favorable resolution to the conflict. Building a coalition of states committed to rejecting Russian revisionism not only weakens the Kremlin. It also creates the conditions for an eventual peace on Ukrainian terms.

By Tomáš Baranec

On March 1, 2025, the second round of the de facto presidential elections took place in Abkhazia. The incumbent de facto President, Badra Gunba, secured 55.66 percent of the vote, defeating opposition candidate Adgur Ardzinba, who received 42.25 percent. The 2025 elections were marked by two notable features. First, Russia directly intervened in the electoral process for the first time since the 2004 presidential elections, during which Moscow openly supported Raul Khajimba. Second, a political faction recently ousted through mass protests returned to power through electoral means. Both developments may have significant consequences for Abkhazia’s political trajectory.

Photo source: Andrey Danilov

BACKGROUND: The latter half of 2024 in Abkhazia was characterized by widespread public mobilization against the proposed so-called investment agreement with Russia. Critics expressed concern that the agreement would strip the region of its remaining de facto sovereignty and potentially threaten the precarious demographic majority held by ethnic Abkhazians. These tensions culminated in an assault on the presidential palace in Sukhumi and the subsequent resignation of de facto President Aslan Bzhania and de facto Prime Minister Alexander Ankvab on November 19.

Following the first round of the presidential elections held on February 15, 2025, two traditional political factions competed for power. Gunba represented the interests of the Ankvabist bloc (United Abkhazia), aligned with Alexander Ankvab and the ousted president Aslan Bzhania. Adgur Ardzinba of the Abkhazian National Movement led the opposing group—the Khajimbists. Initially, Ardzinba received support from Kan Kvarchia, chairman of the Aidgylara movement, and Leuan Mikaa, chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Abkhazia’s Sovereignty. However, both opposition figures ultimately refrained from actively participating in Ardzinba’s election campaign.

The catalyst for the early elections was the "unfinished revolution" of November 2024, during which President Bzhania and Prime Minister Ankvab were compelled to resign, leading to the abandonment of the highly unpopular investment agreement with Russia.

Gunba, as a representative of the recently ousted political faction, was initially expected to enter the early elections as a marginal contender. Despite the apparent achievements of the revolution, it remained incomplete. Prior to the elections, Ankvab’s faction continued to control all key ministries, administrative apparatuses, and the media landscape.

The Ankvab faction also secured a strategic advantage during the election campaign. Employing black PR tactics, they compelled Ardzinba’s campaign team to focus their efforts on countering numerous accusations and rumors. Consequently, the opposition leader had limited opportunity to engage with issues that were critical and sensitive for the Ankvab group, including cryptocurrency mining, the investment agreement, and the deterioration of the energy infrastructure.

The Ankvab faction structured its campaign around two principal narratives. In the first, Ardzinba was portrayed as anti-Russian, implying that only Gunba could guarantee the continuation of Russian support. In the second, Ardzinba was depicted as a proponent of Turkish interests, thereby suggesting that the opposition harbors hostility toward the Armenian community in Abkhazia.

By maintaining control even after the revolution, Ankvab’s supporters were able to utilize the local media’s propaganda apparatus and deploy the standard array of administrative resources in the lead-up to the elections.

However, the Kremlin’s overt intervention in support of Gunba introduced a new variable into an otherwise conventional electoral equation. In addition to supplying Abkhazia with so-called humanitarian gas at a reduced rate, senior Kremlin officials publicly aligned themselves with the candidate representing the Ankvab faction. Simultaneously, Russian media at all levels, along with coordinated bot networks on social media, intensified the black PR campaign against Ardzinba and the opposition with unprecedented intensity. Within this framework, the revocation of Russian citizenship from Mikaa and Kvarchia at the end of January functioned as a broader signal of warning to the entire Abkhazian populace.

IMPLICATIONS: The Ankvab faction secured electoral victory shortly before the plebiscite through the implementation of several active measures. At the last moment, it blocked the establishment of a polling station in Turkey, out of concerns that the diaspora electorate there might favor the opposition. Conversely, reports of significant, organized voter fraud surfaced at polling stations in Moscow and Cherkessk. Additionally, allegations emerged that Abkhaz authorities were distributing driver’s licenses in exchange for votes cast in favor of Gunba.

However, none of these measures alone guaranteed a seamless victory. The decisive factor was a targeted campaign directed at the Armenian minority, bolstered by substantial support from Russian media and the influential Armenian diaspora based in Sochi. For the first time, a majority of this demographic explicitly endorsed a single candidate—Gunba. Given that ethnic Armenians constitute approximately 17 percent of the population, according to local expert Said Gezerdava, their unified support proved pivotal in enabling the Ankvab faction to retain political control.

Despite achieving a lead of over 13 percent against the opposition candidate, the position of the Ankvab faction remains precarious, particularly considering probable expectations from Moscow. A victory by the Khajimba faction would have brought minimal change for Russia regarding Abkhazia, as one pro-Russian bloc would have merely supplanted another. The intensity with which the Kremlin committed to overtly supporting Gunba—even at the expense of discrediting the opposition and estranging segments of the local populace—indicates that it anticipates reciprocal concessions.

Moscow’s demands are well known. The Kremlin outlined them in the so-called protocol of August 19, calling on Sukhumi to lift restrictions preventing Russian citizens from purchasing real estate in Abkhazia and to adopt a commercial pricing model for electricity supply. An additional, longstanding demand includes the privatization of Abkhazia’s energy sector in favor of Russian enterprises.

In such a scenario, the outcome of the presidential election would merely represent a return to the political deadlock of summer 2024, which culminated in Bzhania’s downfall only a few months later. Given this reset, it is unreasonable to expect that identical measures, implemented under the same conditions, will yield a different result.

Therefore, if Russia and the de facto administration under Gunba aim to produce a different outcome, they will be compelled to fundamentally alter either the basic conditions or their approach.

Altering the terms in this context effectively entails changing public opinion within Abkhazian society regarding the agreements, which are widely perceived as posing a threat to the survival of the Abkhazian nation. A more conciliatory final version of the agreement, accompanied by a comprehensive and persuasive information campaign, could potentially lessen societal resistance. However, this would necessitate significant concessions from oligarchic groups in Russia closely affiliated with the Kremlin. A shift in approach would likely involve heightened repression, relying on coercion and intimidation to impose compliance amid sustained and widespread local opposition.

Events following Gunba’s electoral victory quickly revealed that the Kremlin is amenable to this scenario. On March 7, prominent Abkhazian journalist Inal Khashig was added to Russia’s list of foreign agents. That Khashig’s case was not an isolated incident, but indicative of a broader trend became evident two weeks later, when two other well-known journalists, Izida Chania and Nizifa Arshba, were similarly designated as foreign agents.

CONCLUSION: For Russia, the 2025 Abkhazian presidential election was less about preserving regional influence and more about securing the passage of a widely unpopular investment agreement. Two key factors support this interpretation: the unprecedented extent to which the Kremlin committed its support to Gunba, despite the fact that an Ardzinba victory posed no real threat to its position; and the revocation of citizenship from Kvarchia and Mikaa—not for their early endorsement of Ardzinba, but for their involvement in the events of November 2024.

Gunba’s victory, secured with Russian support, is likely to result in three key developments: increased direct control by Moscow over the region (with both Bzhania and Ankvab reportedly being gradually sidelined from power, according to Gezerdava); the advancement of Moscow’s interests through the use of repressive measures; and heightened tensions between ethnic Abkhazians and Armenians.

Drawing on the experience of recent years, it is reasonable to expect that local resistance to Russia’s unpopular demands will persist. However, the effectiveness of this resistance will largely depend on the extent to which the new repressive strategy impacts local elites, journalists, and activists. A key early indicator of future developments will be whether self-censorship emerges among local journalists following the designation of three of the most prominent media figures as foreign agents.

AUTHOR BIO: Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He worked as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. 

By Marat Iliyasov

Ramzan Kadyrov, Kremlin-backed Chechen leader, faces serious allegations. A German NGO, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, accuses him of leading LGBTQ+ purges in Chechnya; Georgia alleged that he plotted journalist Giorgi Gabunia’s murder; while Ukraine accuses his forces of committing war crimes. Reports also link him to kidnappings, torture, and the murder of Chechen opposition figures and bloggers across Europe and Turkey. These accusations could place Kadyrov alongside internationally tried criminals such as former president of Serbia Slobodan Milošević or the Deputy Führer of the Nazi Party Rudolf Hess. But…, is this scenario plausible?  

Photo source: tatarstan.ru

BACKGROUND: To begin with, it is important to examine how the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc tribunals are formed, who can submit a case to the ICC, and which individuals can be indicted.

The establishment of international tribunals and ICC are rooted in international law and the broader aim of creating a more just and accountable world. This development began after WWII, when military and political leaders from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were tried for their war crimes. These tribunals set a crucial precedent purported to halt crimes against humanity that concern the international community.

The Cold War (1946-1991) between the US and the USSR severely curtailed the enforcement of international justice. Crimes committed during this era often went unpunished because the perpetrators had the backing of these superpowers, which could effectively obstruct investigations or prosecutions via the UN Security Council. Without the willingness and cooperation of world powers and the countries involved, tribunals either could not be created or lacked enforcement mechanisms. For example, it took decades to try the Khmer Rouge’s crimes committed in 1970s in Cambodia. It became possible only when the Cambodian government finally supported the idea of establishing the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC).

The fall of Communism in 1991 triggered more international armed conflicts and consequently war crimes. It also created new opportunities for international justice. The tribunals for former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone strengthened the possibility of prosecuting high-ranking officials for crimes against humanity. Notably, these courts succeeded in convicting former Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević and former Liberian President Charles Taylor—figures once deemed untouchable. These trials, same as the tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Liberia were made possible by key shifts in the internal power structures of these countries.

Even today, the willingness and collaboration of the domestic power structures remain the most important element in determining the feasibility of initiating a case. To prosecute Kadyrov, such cooperation would be required from Russia, which has consistently demonstrated its unwillingness to collaborate with the international bodies. Therefore, building a case against Kadyrov could potentially achieve only limited success, similar to the international tribunal for Lebanon. Established in 2009 to prosecute Hezbollah members for the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, this special tribunal convicted and sentenced the identified culprits in absentia. This means that they can be punished only if captured, which renders this trial largely symbolic.

IMPLICATIONS: Various actors could theoretically initiate proceedings against Kadyrov, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), prosecutors from the International Criminal Court (ICC), national governments appealing for UN intervention, international organizations such as Amnesty International, and supreme courts of foreign countries invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals.

However, the likelihood of any of these actors successfully leading such an initiative against Kadyrov and bringing him to justice remains low. The UNSC could act only if Russia, as a permanent member of the Council, either refrains from using its veto or initiates the process itself—both of which are highly unlikely. Russia has a long history of misusing its veto power in the UNSC and is a country where the rule of law is frequently breached. Moreover, given Kadyrov’s strong ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is nearly inconceivable that Russia would support or initiate such efforts.

Initiatives could also come from international organizations, the ICC, national governments, or national courts of foreign countries under the principle of universal jurisdiction. To build a case, these initiators must gather substantial evidence and secure the cooperation of experts and witnesses. The ICC’s 2023 indictment of Vladimir Putin for war crimes demonstrates the institution's willingness to take bold action, such as cases initiated by Ukraine for war crimes committed on its territory by the Russian military. However, this does not guarantee that Kadyrov will be brought to court. The ICC's arrest warrant for Putin demonstrates the limitations of international justice. The warrant has neither been enforced, nor has it prevented him from visiting countries where he should have been arrested.

Another question to consider is: what crimes could Kadyrov be prosecuted for? He has long been accused of systematically violating human rights in Chechnya and beyond. Journalistic investigations and witness testimonies suggest that he has personally overseen or ordered acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, the persecution of LGBTQ+ individuals (including the execution of dozens during an alleged "purification" campaign), enforced disappearances, and repression of dissent. If substantial evidence—including testimonies, forensic analyses, and classified documents—supports these claims, he could be directly prosecuted.

However, gathering such proof would be extremely difficult. Despite the existence of survivors and witnesses, most would be reluctant to testify due to fears of retaliation against themselves or their family members still living in Chechnya. Given that witness protection programs in the EU and the US do not cover the relatives of witnesses, it is hard to imagine any foreign government taking the risk of extracting multiple family members from Chechnya, resettling them elsewhere, and supporting them financially. Without such assurances, convincing people to testify against Kadyrov and prove his involvement in these crimes would be an immense challenge.

Another set of crimes Kadyrov could potentially be tried for are war crimes in Ukraine. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kadyrov’s forces—known as the Kadyrovtsy—have faced multiple accusations of violating the rules and regulations of international humanitarian law, known as jus in bello. These allegations could support the building of a case against Kadyrov under the principle of command responsibility. However, given difficulties of documenting of documenting crimes during wartime, it is unlikely that sufficient evidence implicating Kadyrov in issuing direct orders to commit war crimes will ever be found.

Lastly, it is important to note that Kadyrov's troops are part of the broader Russian military. This means that any tribunal would need to address not only Kadyrov, but also the entire Russian military command and political leadership. This brings us back to the minimal likelihood of such a scenario, given the strong political resistance from the Russian leadership against international justice.

CONCLUSION: Establishing an international tribunal against Kadyrov faces considerable legal, technical, and political obstacles. The biggest of these is the lack of willingness and cooperation from the Russian leadership, which shields Kadyrov from legal consequences both domestically and internationally. The likelihood of Russian collaboration, even if international bodies were to initiate a case against Kadyrov, is minimal. This is largely because Kadyrov’s case cannot be investigated in isolation from the Russian political leadership. Therefore, creating an international tribunal for Kadyrov is a highly unlikely scenario. It cannot happen without a significant overhaul of Russia's power structures, as historical examples of successful international tribunals demonstrate.

AUTHOR BIO: Marat Iliyasov is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the College of the Holy Cross. His focus is post-Soviet politics and conflicts in wider Eurasia.

Laura Linderman and Anna Harvey

April 17, 2025

Kadyrov's Chechnya presents a deepening dilemma for Russia's federal state. Putin relies on Kadyrov for stability in exchange for unprecedented autonomy—a system where "personalized loyalty substitutes for institutional coherence." This arrangement has created a parallel power structure where Kadyrov implements religious legal codes, commands his independent Kadyrovtsy militia, and pursues contradictory foreign policies.

The paradox is clear: Moscow's strategy to suppress separatism has created a regional actor whose "loyalty is conditional and whose power increasingly transcends the bounds of federation." This precedent could inspire other republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to seek similar arrangements. With Russia facing pressure from sanctions and war costs, Moscow's options are limited if Kadyrov's loyalty wavers.

Read Kadyrov's Chechnya: The State Within Putin's State (PDF) 

Inal Sherip

April 3, 2025

Ramzan Kadyrov's transformation from a stalwart defender of Russia's policy of support for traditional Islam in the North Caucasus to an increasingly independent actor with divided loyalties represents a significant threat to Russia's regional security strategy. This shift, marked by his growing ties to Gulf monarchies and subtle adoption of the very religious practices he once opposed, signals a critical juncture in Russia's decades-long approach to managing Islamic influence in its southern territories.

Read Kadyrov and the Middle East: Threats to Russia's Strategy (PDF)