By Nicola Ilario
South Ossetia's recent presidential transition, in which Alan Gagloev resigned in favor of Russian administrator Marat Kambolov, marks the latest step in a long-running process of Russo-Ossetian integration. The May 2026 "Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction," marks a significant step in South Ossetia's integration, signifying Moscow's broader strategy toward Georgia and the South Caucasus as well as its limitations.
BACKGROUND:
On June 23, Alan Gagloev resigned from his post as President of the small breakaway republic of South Ossetia, taking a new position as an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The move happened suddenly. Gagloev, in a televised address to the Ossetian people, claimed that after meeting Putin on June 22, he agreed to become an advisor to the Office of the Russian President. The next day he resigned. In his place, Prime Minister Marat Kambolov assumed the responsibilities of the presidency.
Kambolov is, notably, not a native to South Ossetia. A Russian national, Kambolov was sworn in as South Ossetia’s Prime Minister on June 17, 2026, but had until 2025 not been involved in the domestic affairs of the breakaway republic. Born in North Ossetia in 1965, he graduated from Moscow State Social University and the Russian Academy of Public Administration, going on to work in the Russian government. In May, he was tapped to be Gagloev’s advisor, and soon became Gagloev’s nominee for the premiership. Kambolov is expected to deepen Russo-Ossetian ties, implementing provisions of a bilateral treaty signed between Russia and Ossetia on May 9, 2026. Kambolov is expected to become the President of South Ossetia after snap elections planned September 18.
Kambolov’s ascension is part of a continuous effort of Ossetian aspirations for annexation into the Russian Federation. Indeed, since 1991 and with Russian backing, the Ossetians have maintained de facto independence from Georgia and alignment with Russia.
Generally, the South Ossetian separatist project is concerned with the unification of their people, whether it be within a sovereign state or under Russian rule. Indeed, the Ossetians are a transnational people, inhabiting Georgia, the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, as well as the Russian federal subject, the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania. As the vast majority of Ossetians reside in North Ossetia, it has been the wish of many in the south form a union with the north, to share a common state.
Ossetian demands for union with the north began in the early 90s, when the region broke from Tbilisi. In 1992, South Ossetia held a referendum that saw overwhelming support for independence by Ossetians and a 99.89 percent vote in favor for “reunion” with Russia.
Serious promotion of annexation did not begin until 2008, however, when Russia formally recognized the small de facto republic. After the election of Leonid Tibilov as South Ossetian president in 2012, it began making moves towards unionship. Tibilov stated after winning the 2012 elections that “We will certainly continue along the course towards Russia that has been chosen by our people – a course of further integration ... in all existing spheres, including the economy, as well as military, technical, and defense cooperation.” Other efforts towards union, such as the partial integration of the South Ossetian armed forces into the Russian army, also occurred during this period. In 2016, Ossetia signed the bilateral Treaty on Union Relations and Integration with the Russian Federation, strengthening ties between the two countries. Further plans for full annexation emerged at this time as well, with Tibilov suggesting closer union with Russia.
Plans for an annexation referendum did not pan out until 2022, where in March, South Ossetian president Bibilov announced a referendum following the 2022 presidential elections. Bibilov suggested it should take place the day after the presidential elections, thus constituting concrete executive action in contrast with earlier parliamentary debates on the organization of referendums. The referendum was delayed, however, by Gagloev who after winning the elections stated that the time was not right and signed a decree cancelling it.
Despite continued delays, Russo-Ossetian cooperation has continued with the culmination of talks leading to the signing of a bilateral treaty in 2026. On May 9, Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev signed a “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction,” which the Russian Duma ratified on May 13. The document outlines provisions that would enable Russian citizens to hold office in South Ossetia and establish greater energy, transportation, telecommunication integration between the Russian Federation and the de facto republic. In effect, the agreement would bring de facto annexation. Gagloev, the former president of South Ossetia, called it, a “step towards the reunification of the Ossetian people,” further emphasizing that “South Ossetians perceive Russia as [their] great homeland.”
IMPLICATIONS:
The recent appointment of Marat Kambolov as Prime Minister and his ascension to the role of acting president is a continuation of the integration and unification of Russia and South Ossetia, a process that has been ongoing since the South Ossetian war in 1991. Kambolov is a demonstration that Moscow is now installing administrators rather than cultivating local elites.
The events in South Ossetia demonstrate Moscow’s continuing exercise of influence in the South Caucasus, which is otherwise waning against the backdrop of its economic, military and political overextension due to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia has lost considerable influence in Armenia, as Prime Minister Pashinyan moves the country Westward and as President Aliyev of Azerbaijan continues to elevate Baku’s strategic autonomy.
This is evident as Gagloev noted that one of the reasons for the delay of the 2022 referendum was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As he stated, “I believe that the current authorities of the Russian Federation, represented by President Vladimir Putin, are still busy with other issues, I think with more serious ones.”
Setting aside Russia's insufficient political capital for outright de jure annexation, indirect rule is also part of Moscow’s strategy to manage Russo-Georgian relations. Since the Georgian Dream (GD) party’s rise to power in the early 2010s, Georgia began to employ a foreign policy that was multi-axis oriented, engaging in attempts at rapprochement with Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the GD government refused to engage in the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow. GD likely believed that a swift Russian victory in 2022 was inevitable, and that maintaining friendly relations with Russia was Georgia’s most rational course of action. It is unclear whether there is a definitive grand strategy to GD’s foreign policy, yet the Georgian government clearly believes that cultivating better relations with Russia is in their interest.
This certainly incentivizes Moscow to maintain a friendlier attitude Georgia, however, at the same time Moscow acknowledges the utility of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the relationship. By continually utilizing South Ossetia as a bargaining chip, Moscow can promise Georgia speculative future talks on the fate of South Ossetia, and in return Georgia retains a neutral, or even semi-positive attitude towards Moscow. Of course, Russia has no intention of giving away South Ossetia, yet this strategy continues to work as GD continues its attempts at a multi-axis oriented foreign policy.
CONCLUSIONS:
Georgia remains strategically important for Russia, which hopes to control a North-South Axis, from the North Caucasus through Georgia and Armenia, cutting through the Middle Corridor and further linking up with Iran. This competes with the ongoing establishment of a West-East Axis from Turkey, through Armenia/Georgia and Azerbaijan and further to the Caspian and Central Asia.
It is evident that Russia, at least under the current strategic policies of the Putin regime, will seek to retain its influence in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. Moscow’s approach to integration in South Ossetia demonstrates its continued interest in the region, but also the limitations to its capacity for fulfilling them.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Nicola Ilario is an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania. He studies Economics and History, with a concentration in the history of diplomacy. Nicola interned at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute the Summer of 2026, assisting fellows in their research. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .