Print this page
Wednesday, 04 July 2001

HOSTAGE-TAKING AND UNREST IN EASTERN TAJIKISTAN

Published in Field Reports

By Alexei Igushev (7/4/2001 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On 22 June, at 4 a.m. detachments of the Tajik Ministry of Interior together with other law enforcement military units started an operation on annihilation of illicit armed groups of Rakhmon Sanginov.

On 22 June, at 4 a.m. detachments of the Tajik Ministry of Interior together with other law enforcement military units started an operation on annihilation of illicit armed groups of Rakhmon Sanginov.

Sanginov, known in Tajikistan by the nickname of Rakhmon Hitler, one of the former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) field commanders, now claims to be a farmer. On 11 June, in the village of Teppai Samarkandi, on the outskirts of Dushanbe, he took five police officers and two Interior Ministry servicemen hostage, demanding to release some of his accomplices. The police had recently arrested a number of these armed “peasants”, members of “Hitler’s” gang, sparking the fury of Sanginov. Reportedly, all the hostages were released last week.

For the time being, the area of the so called 9-th kilometer on the eastern outskirts of Dushanbe is besieged. The highway leading to Kofarnihon, the administrative center closest to Dushanbe, is blocked by traffic police. During the past two months, tensions in Tajikistan have been heating up, mostly in the Romit Valley, some 30 kilometers southeast of the capital. Most of the actors in the incidents are former UTO commanders. In April, there was an attempt on the life of Mr. Ghulov, head of Kofarnihon district administration. The attackers who shot from a grenade thrower at the Mayor’s vehicle failed to kill him, but his driver died.

A link in the chain of events is the 11 April assassination of Major General Khabib Sanginov, first Deputy Minister of Interior in Dushanbe. Sanginov played significant role in the resolution of the inter-Tajik conflict. The ministerial department headed by him carried out operations on annihilation of illicit military units in Gharm and Kofarnikhon.

On 15 June, the commander of a special battalion of the Ministry for Emergency Situations in Gharm took 15 workers from the German Agro Action (GAA) famine-relief agency, Security Ministry servicemen, and one U.S. citizen hostage. The hostages were not harmed, and were released from captivity during the next two days after Emergency Situations Minister Mirzo Ziyoev--also a former UTO commander--was sent by the Tajik president Emomali Rakhmonov to negotiate with the hostage-takers. The circumstances of the hostage-taking incident still remain unclear. Allegedly, the hostage takers demanded the release of their relatives, who are in prison in connection with the April assassination of Deputy Interior Minister Khabib Sanginov.

Although there is no coordination between the gangs in the East of Tajikistan, the social and economic unrest in the society, especially in such a particular area as the Gharm group of districts, create grounds for deterioration of the security environment in general. It is unlikely that these localized conflicts would grow into a wider regional conflict, and, luckily, nobody conscripts compatriots to serry under the banner of Islam. After the conclusion of the Peace Accord in 1997, between the lawful authority and the UTO, some five thousand fighters returned from Afghan camps to Tajikistan. Most of them settled down in Karategin valley, the most unsafe area in the country. Those who wished to continue military service took a medical examination and joined the Tajik regular army on a contract basis; others came back to civilian life having become farmers. A number of former mujahids left for Russia and other neighboring countries to find earnings. After a while, President Rakhmonov abolished the decree on contract military service, and the former mercenaries went into the wilderness.

One of the recommendations given in the report of the International Crisis Group to donors and international organizations (published on 8 June) is to “Shift funds from programs favoring the national capitals towards ones focused on localities at risk of violent conflict and seek implementation partners less in national governments and more in local governments, NGOs and community organizations”.

By Alexei Igushev

Read 4774 times