THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA.
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus
13 December 2001
S. Frederick Starr
Chairman
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
202 663 7720
Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Sub-Committee!
Ten
years ago there was not a single map in the U.S. Government that placed Central
Asia at the center of anything. Either
it was on the southern edge of the so-called “former Soviet Union,” the far
west of Asia, or the extreme east of the Middle East. Your sub-committee, established before September 11, marks the
US’s acceptance of an important reality, namely, that this region, surrounded
by
four
nuclear powers (and perhaps, soon, a fifth) and a NATO member, is important in its own right. We should not consider it an appendage of
anything else, or any one country’s “backyard.”
Thanks
to Soviet rule, Central Asia boasts one of the most literate and numerate
Muslim populations anywhere, and is ruled by secular governments. Due also to Soviet rule, nearly two fifths
of its native peoples died in savage collectivization. The rest were left with
a heritage of authoritarianism, corruption, and disrespect for law and human
rights that persists to this day.
In
these respects the states of Central Asia mirror the fates of Russia, Ukraine,
and other countries formerly ruled from Moscow. We are only gradually coming to appreciate the seriousness of the
birth defects present in all the post-Soviet states. It is important that we recognize this, and
apply the same standards and extend the same patience to all, rather than
selectively, according to who happens to be in favor in Washington at the
moment. Bluntly, we cannot
nod
at authoritarianism in Moscow and preach against it in Central Asia.
For
all their shortcomings, no Central Asian state has suffered the collapse of
health and the shortening of human life that we have seen in Russia, nor the
government’s callous disregard of these conditions. Several Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, invest more
heavily in education than Russia, and
bravely
send thousands of their young people abroad to acquire modern and western ways
that must eventually clash with current realities at home.
Ten
years of independence is a very short time.
In 1786 the US had no Supreme Court, slavery existed even in parts of
the North, women were excluded from citizenship, and one of the models for the
White House included a throne room.
Let
your sub-committee therefore approach its work with a long and strategic view,
with both tenacity and patience, and in the confidence that by addressing the
specific needs of this region the United States will at the same time advance
the values for which this country stands.
* * *
There
exists a fundamental misunderstanding about the relationship of Central
Asian
states (and Russia, for that matter) to the war on terrorism. We hear about their “cooperation with the
US,” as if they are doing us a favor that should be rewarded. Nothing could be further from the
truth. For a decade, the Central Asian
states have faced the threat of Islamic radicalism, terrorism, and drug
trafficking, with which the first two are closely linked. All of the Central Asian states have
identified these issues as their main security threat, and Afghanistan as the
locus of that threat. So has Russia,
which has used the issue to justify the stationing of troops in four of the
five countries of the region.
To
address this threat, Central Asian governments have arrested countless
suspects, abrogating the civil rights of many who are doubtless innocent. All of the countries have resorted to the
same primitive policies, the differences among them being only of degree, not
of kind.
Some
commentators have argued that these measures are largely responsible for the
growth of terrorism in the first place.
There is some truth in this, but we must be careful in levying this
charge. When we demand that Messers,
Musharraf, Arafat, or Mubarrak crack down hard on jihhadist groups, Palestinian
terrorists, or Muslim brotherhoods, are we not asking them to do exactly what
we criticize Central Asian governments for doing? Americans bridle when our critics abroad blame September 11 on
the US’ actions, yet we come close to doing the same thing with respect to the
Central Asians.
Both
the Central Asians and the Russians, who have claimed a special role in the
region, have been notably unsuccessful in their campaigns against
terrorism. But now the situation is
changing, thanks to the United States.
We are risking American soldiers’ lives and expending billions of our
citizens’ resources to address a threat that hangs over their countries as much
as ours. The fact that we have our own
interests at heart in no way qualifies this truth. Early signs of progress in the war on terrorism already exceed
what has been accomplished locally in a decade.
And
so let us cease all talk of some payment owed Central Asians (or Russians) for
their cooperation. If anything, it is
they who should thank us.
However,
this does not mean that US actions are without risk to the Central Asian
states. Quite the contrary. For a decade they have faced not only the
dangers
arising from Afghanistan but also the constant
threat posed by certain groups in Russia, notably the military and
security forces, who are not yet reconciled to the loss of empire. This “imperial hangover” is not unique to
Russia. France exhibited the same
tendencies in Algeria, the Spanish in
Cuba
and Chile, and the British when they burned the White House in 1812.
This
imperial hangover will eventually pass, but for the time being it remains a
threat. It means that the Central
Asians, after cooperating with the US, will inevitably face redoubled pressure
from Russia if we leave abruptly and without attending to the long-term
security needs of the region. That we
have looked kindly into Mr. Putin’s soul does not change this reality.
The
Central Asians face a similar danger with respect to our efforts in
Afghanistan. Some Americans hold that
we should destroy Bin Laden, Al Queda, and the Taliban and then leave the
post-war stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to
further waves of instability from the South.
But in the next round it will not only be Russia that is tempted to
throw its weight around in the region but possibly China, or even Iran or
India. All have as much right to claim
Central Asia as their “backyard” as Russia has had until now. Central Asia may be a distant region but
when these nuclear powers begin bumping heads there it will create terrifying
threats to world peace that the U.S. cannot ignore.
This
prospect, along with the unresolved problem of Russia’s imperial hangover,
is
the reality that the Central Asian states must face if the US precipitously
withdraws from their region once the military campaign has achieved its
goals.
It
requires that the United States develop and implement a longer-term strategy
for regional security in Central Asia of a sort which, until this moment, has
existed only in fragmentary form, if at all.
Such a strategy is essential for the viability and sustainability of the
states of Central Asia. No less, it is
essential for the United States’ own long-term interest in helping build a
stable world.
What,
then, are the elements of such a post-war strategy for Central Asia?
The
question demands the most serious attention of this sub-committee and of the
American government as a whole. At the
risk of simplification, I would suggest that it must contain three elements,
pertaining to (1) security, (2) politics, and (3) economics.
Is
that no single country, or pair of countries, can provide an adequate
security
environment
for the Central Asian region. Bordered by nuclear states and formidable regional
powers, all of which have close historic and cultural ties with the region,
Central Asia cannot depend for its security on any one of them without
imperiling the security of all the others.
Thus,
the long-term presence in the region of either American or Russian troops,
alone or together, will not advance the long-term security of Central
Asia. Nor will any other combination of
outside forces achieve this end. This
means that American forces should neither stay permanently in Central Asia nor
leave quickly and permit the situation to revert to the status ante quem,
with only Russian forces there.
The
best and only alternative is for all external military forces to leave Central
Asia. The same holds for Afghanistan
which is, after all, the historic heart of the region. But this will not be easily achieved, since
Russia and, at some future point, China or any of the other powerful neighbors,
might aspire to fill what it perceives as a vacuum of power. The United States must therefore be prepared
to keep its forces in the region until a comprehensive security structure is in
place. That this is not only possible
but likely is indicated by Secretary of State Powell’s statement of 11 December
that the US intends to maintain a military presence in Central Asia for some
time.
The
simple notion underlying a workable long-term security structure should be “We
will withdraw our troops from Central Asia but you must do the same, or not
introduce your forces if they are not there now.” The result will be a Central Asia without foreign forces.
Such
a condition is not the first choice of any of the powerful neighbors. All, and especially Russia, would prefer, or
at some future point aspire, to be the key player in the region. However, all would find an “all foreign
forces out” arrangement to be their second choice, provided the other neighboring
powers and the United States agree to abide by the same understanding.
This
forms the basis for what in earlier times was called a “concert” of powers.
The
United States should take the lead in forging such a concert. It must include
China,
India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey, as well as the United States and
NATO.
To
achieve such an understanding, the United States should initiate a dialogue
with each of these states, leading to joint discussions of the entire group,
and eventually to a formal agreement.
Such an arrangement would not prevent the Central Asian states or
Afghanistan from participating in security links with any external powers,
provided these do not include the introduction of foreign troops onto the
territory of Central Asia and Afghanistan.
After the concert is brought into being it would have to be
maintained through a steady process of dialogue and meetings involving the
participants and the Central Asian states themselves.
Through
such process, potential threats to the concert would be identified and
addressed
through joint action.
The
exclusion of foreign troops from Central Asia and Afghanistan will not be easy.
Only the United States is in a position to initiate it, by renouncing
unilateralism on its own part on the condition that others renounce it as well.
Whatever
the difficulties of creating such a concert, it has the immense
virtue of not being directed against any state or its interests.
Politics: Openness Built on Security.
The
development of these security arrangements creates the essential pre-condition
for political development in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Without exception, Central Asian governments
have justified their concentration of power in the hands of the executive, the
avoidance of elections, the retarded development of participatory government,
and their curtailment of civil liberties in terms of national security. The establishment of an internationally
protected security environment will remove this element as an overriding factor
in domestic politics.
Under
these circumstances, the United States and other open societies can reasonably
propose that the Central Asian states take concrete steps towards establishing
the rule of law and building democratic institutions on their territories. Expectations of greater openness must extend
beyond domestic affairs to international relations within the region. The opening of borders, removal of onerous
tariffs, and greater regional cooperation can then become
practical
objectives of U.S. policy and not merely declamatory goals promoted through
fruitless hectoring, as has been the case for a decade.
None
of this will be possible unless the Central Asian countries build military and
security forces that are modern, adequate for their needs, and appropriate to
open societies. The United States,
together with other partners, should support this development within the
framework of the security concert.
Economic Development to Support Open Societies in a
Secure Environment.