Twenty Theses on Afghanistan.

Prepared for Brookings Institution/Asia Society Conference.

18 May 2001

by: Frederick Starr
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS
Tel. 202 663 7720
sfstarr@jhu.edu

The “Afghanistan crisis” is no longer confined to one country. It is now a regional crisis, adversely affecting conditions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  It impinges directly on conflicts as diverse as Chechnya, the Fergana, Kashmir, and Xinjiang.  Through drugs and the spread of AIDS, its impact is felt from Western Europe through the Middle East to East Asia.  

The following theses are offered in an effort to clarify United States thinking on this major international crisis.

 

I. The Human Apocalypse and Its Relation to Economic and Political Development.

1.     The humanitarian crisis has reached such apocalyptic proportions that immediate emergency action is called for, even before a political solution is achieved.

2.     No feature of Afghan life today, including political, ethnic, and religious conflict, more comprehensively defines that country’s fate than the prevailing poverty.

3.     No solution to the political, ethnic, and religious conflicts in Afghanistan is possible without addressing the problem of poverty, i.e., without economic development.

4.     It is no longer acceptable, from either a practical standpoint or in terms of elemental morality, to delay large-scale emergency relief and major economic initiatives in Afghanistan until an “acceptable” political solution has been found.  Instead, efforts should focus first on helping the Afghan people to survive and feed themselves.  The best way to improve conditions for a political solution is to demonstrate first that progress can be made in the struggle for survival and in the renewal of basic necessities of life.

II.  The International Dimension

5.     Afghanistan’s 20 year crisis was created and sustained by international political factors, including a Soviet invasion that cost a million lives, an international response to that invasion that  left tens of thousands more fatalities, and a civil war fought with weapons and money from abroad.  This crisis can be resolved only by actions at the international level.

6.     No one country or small group of countries in the region or elsewhere can be effective guarantors of peace in Afghanistan.

III.  Need for Non-Interference and Even-Handedness.

7.     The modern history of Afghanistan, and especially the experience of Britain and Russia, shows that foreign efforts to create governments in that country are doomed to failure.

8.     There is no “good” or “humane” faction or party within a country in which all forces have been brutalized by foreign invasion and civil war.

9. Because of this, foreign countries and international groups should stay out of the business of state building in Afghanistan, however well-intentioned they may be.

10.Instead, they should define political criteria that would lead to international acceptance and a major redevelopment effort and allow the Afghans themselves to work out political solutions that meet them.

IV.  An International Conference

 

11.The most productive path forward is through an  international conference. The first task of such a conference would be to organize large-scale emergency relief and development in Afghanistan.   Such a conference should welcome the involvement and collaboration of all forces within Afghanistan that will cooperate with this effort.

 

12.Political issues should be addressed only at the second stage of this effort.  The main task would be to define political criteria that would lead to international acceptance and a major redevelopment effort.  The conferees should then allow the Afghans themselves to work out political solutions that meet these criteria, committing themselves to strict non-interference.

V.  Conditions for a Political Solution

13.No long-term solution to the Afghan problem is possible without a government in that country that can be recognized by major states and international organizations, including the UN.

14.In order to achieve US and international recognition (and to qualify for major redevelopment support), a government of Afghanistan must:

 a) be national in character.  It must represent all Afghan peoples, but not necessarily all current Afghan leaders.

b) stop terrorist intervention beyond its borders by Afghanistan-based forces.

c) be committed to the reduction of narcotics production and trafficking.

d) meet at least minimal international standards of human rights.

     e) be prepared quickly to open trade routes connecting Central Asia, the Indian sub-continent, and the Middle East.  This step is absolutely essential for regional economical revival.

VI.  Special Role of US

 

15. While nearly all the regional states affected by the Afghanistan crisis are engaged in forming informal alignments and groupings aimed against other regional states (Russia-Iran-India; China-Pakistan-Turkmenistan, etc., etc.), it is in the United States’ interest to build and maintain cordial relations with all the states involved. 

16.Because of its support for Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and commitment to humanitarian relief today (providing 9/10 of all UN aid) the US is in a unique position to provide leadership in any international effort directed towards Afghanistan. 

17. The US should therefore lead in the convening of this conference. It can either do this alone or through the otherwise flagging “Six Plus Two” process.  The UN should be included actively and centrally in the conference, as indeed it would be if the Six Plus Two route is chosen, as that grouping was created by the UN.  However, as long as the UN is perceived by the most powerful political force in Afghanistan as having taken sides in the conflict, others—preferably the US-- must take the first steps by convening the conference.

18. America’s effectiveness will depend on its impartiality and lack of favoritism among the contending factions in Afghanistan.  To strengthen this, the US should propose extending the UN sanctions against Taliban to all factions within the country, and vacating the UN Afghanistan seat until such a time as a government exists that can meet the conditions enumerated

VII.  Position of Pakistan.

19. No external country has been as adversely affected by events in Afghanistan as Pakistan.  Its efforts to address the crisis on its western border have earned both warm praise (1979-89) and harsh condemnation (1995-present) from the US and other countries.  Acknowledging this, it is clear that the historic intimacy between the territories now occupied by Afghanistan and Pakistan requires that peace-making efforts fully and non-coercively engage Pakistan.  No workable solution in Afghanistan can be achieved without Pakistan’s support.

   20. Many of those features of Pakistan today that most arouse   concern abroad can be alleviated only with a resolution to the problem of Afghanistan.