Analytical Articles

Cotton growing is exacerbating water problems in Central Asia, which embraces the main producers – Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to a lesser extent. Diversification of the economic base of these countries by increasing domestic cotton processing and textile industry may help reduce dependency on cotton as primary product and contribute eventually to the reduction of water use, which has been one of the main factors causing ecological problems. In that context, the acceleration of the step towards WTO accession is necessary to lead the countries in achieving more diverse and stable economies with less ecological problems.

In late 2002, the Russian Air Force deployed Frontal Aviation and Military Transport Aviation aircraft to Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the trial deployment was ostensibly not to create a Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, but to develop a joint Russian-Kyrgyz military operational airbase to support the multinational Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) that is established under the Collective Security Treaty (CST). One battalion from each member state (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) are committed to the CRDF.

While global attention has been focused on Iraq, Moscow has utilized this opportunity to make several increasingly visible coercive moves in Central Asia. It has secured air and land bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, mainly by muscling those regimes into accepting this “protection” and it evidently facilitated the attempted coup in Turkmenistan in November 2002. These programs signify Moscow’s determination to counter the U.S. presence in Central Asia, but also a broader joint campaign of the military, intelligence organs, and MFA to reduce, if not eliminate, partnership with Washington. There is a continuing nostalgia for an imperial presence in Central Asia that cannot be sustained in the long run.

As the United States is engaging in regime change in Iraq, the political turmoil in the Middle East is driving up the oil prices. Kazakhstan is flush with oil and gas revenues. However, without targeted government policy, the long term economic consequences of the hydrocarbon boom may lead to crowding out investment in the non-petroleum sectors and appreciation of the Kazakh currency, the tenge. If President Nazarbaev’s administration will continue to preside over increases in income disparities and underdevelopment, it eventually may face political instability due to inflated popular expectations. Kazakhstan has done little to prevent the Dutch disease, despite warnings from the World Bank.

During Armenia’s recent presidential election and in the post election period, government authorities have detained scores of opposition supporters under dubious charges. These developments highlight the lack of independence within the judiciary and will likely further undermine already low public confidence in the legal system. They may also be an omen of pending troubles in the forthcoming May 2003 parliamentary elections and may complicate Armenia’s relationship with Western donors and such European institutions as the Council of Europe.

Although a Doctrine on National Security is considered of paramount importance in the modern world, most of Azerbaijan’s neighbors possess one, and the law obligates a President-elect to create one, this process is only recently beginning in Azerbaijan. The process of creating a National Security Doctrine is complex in states like Azerbaijan, where regional an clan allegiances are strong, and where special consideration is needed to distinguish regime interests from truly national interests. The process of formulation of an Azerbaijani Security Doctrine, while crucial given the challenges the state faces, is likely to be time-consuming and complicated.

As the supply of oil pipes begins to arrive at construction sites along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline route, which will transport Caspian oil west to the Mediterranean Sea, thoughts are turning to the next phase of development of the region’s oil and gas reserves. Until recently, the long dormant plans for a new pipeline, connecting the oil fields of Uzen and Tengiz in Kazakhstan directly with China, barely figured in oil industry calculations. However, China’s acquisition of significant stakes in the Tengiz oilfield in March 2003 and new diplomatic attention indicates that China may be poised to become a formidable commercial and political influence in the Caspian region.

On 23 February 2003 the Tajik armed forces celebrated the tenth anniversary of the creation of independent military forces within the Republic. Colonel-General Sherali Khairulloyev, Tajik Defense Minister, believes that the Tajik army has made promising improvements within its first decade. Recently interviewed in Krasnaya Zvezda, the official publication of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Khairulloyev expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the military, even speaking of entering a qualitatively new phase in its further development. Nonetheless, its capabilities are limited and Tajikistan continues to rely on military assistance primarily from Russia to preserve its regional security credibility.

Iran has sought with varying success since the mid-1990s to implement oil swap deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In January, the Russian company Lukoil announced that it would increase its own contract signed in November 2002 with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for such swaps. This development will not kick-start Iran’s energy sector. However, it does hold the prospect not only for re-balancing the energy equation around the Caspian Sea littoral in the medium term but also for restructuring the geo-economics, and hence geopolitics, of Central Eurasia in the longer run.

The eighth session of the special working group for drawing up a convention on the Caspian Sea\'s legal regime was held in Baku on February 26-27. The attending deputy foreign ministers of the five littoral countries discussed a proposed draft convention, which sought to lay grounds for an acceptable legal regime to all of them. While its proposals such as the shared use of Caspian waters for navigation may satisfy their common interests, certain others on the division of the Caspian seabed and undersea pipelines will likely create disincentive for Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan to accept it in its current format.