Analytical Articles

In June 2002, Kyrgyz Defense Minister Esen Topoyev announced that Kant airbase would be made available for CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), apparently signaling the intention of the Kyrgyz government to re-enter the fold and reorienting its security needs toward Moscow. This demonstrated that Bishkek looks for multiple security partners, including the West, to support its own fragile security. By November, components of the VVS began arriving at Kant, and further air movements soon followed this high profile deployment, with three Su-27 fighters from Lipetsk, two Su-25 attack planes from Dushanbe and two Il-76 military cargo planes constituting the total Russian deployment at Kant.

What appeared at first to be a serious but unfortunate accident involving a long distance bus travelling from the Kyrgyzstan capital, Bishkek to China took a more serious turn when it emerged that the passengers and drivers had been shot and killed before the bus caught fire. Diplomatic relations between China and Kyrgyzstan, already tense, were once again thrown into focus.

In late 2002, the Russian Air Force deployed Frontal Aviation and Military Transport Aviation aircraft to Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of the trial deployment was ostensibly not to create a Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, but to develop a joint Russian-Kyrgyz military operational airbase to support the multinational Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) that is established under the Collective Security Treaty (CST). One battalion from each member state (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) are committed to the CRDF.

While global attention has been focused on Iraq, Moscow has utilized this opportunity to make several increasingly visible coercive moves in Central Asia. It has secured air and land bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, mainly by muscling those regimes into accepting this “protection” and it evidently facilitated the attempted coup in Turkmenistan in November 2002. These programs signify Moscow’s determination to counter the U.S. presence in Central Asia, but also a broader joint campaign of the military, intelligence organs, and MFA to reduce, if not eliminate, partnership with Washington. There is a continuing nostalgia for an imperial presence in Central Asia that cannot be sustained in the long run.

Last week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Ankara to try to mend fences with Turkey. Turkey is in dire financial straits, and dependent on multilateral financial aid, chiefly from the IMF and the World Bank. This aid forces Turkey to cut back on very important social expenditures while maintaining heavy military spending. The economic well-being of the Turkish public is likely to decline further. Prime Minister Erdogan’s January visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, geared towards increasing Turkish business in these countries, is unlikely to bear fruit for the time being. Currently, neither the public nor the private sector in Turkey has the will (or the cash) to push for further expansion of their economic influence in Central Asia.

Cotton growing is exacerbating water problems in Central Asia, which embraces the main producers – Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to a lesser extent. Diversification of the economic base of these countries by increasing domestic cotton processing and textile industry may help reduce dependency on cotton as primary product and contribute eventually to the reduction of water use, which has been one of the main factors causing ecological problems. In that context, the acceleration of the step towards WTO accession is necessary to lead the countries in achieving more diverse and stable economies with less ecological problems.

As the supply of oil pipes begins to arrive at construction sites along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline route, which will transport Caspian oil west to the Mediterranean Sea, thoughts are turning to the next phase of development of the region’s oil and gas reserves. Until recently, the long dormant plans for a new pipeline, connecting the oil fields of Uzen and Tengiz in Kazakhstan directly with China, barely figured in oil industry calculations. However, China’s acquisition of significant stakes in the Tengiz oilfield in March 2003 and new diplomatic attention indicates that China may be poised to become a formidable commercial and political influence in the Caspian region.

As the United States is engaging in regime change in Iraq, the political turmoil in the Middle East is driving up the oil prices. Kazakhstan is flush with oil and gas revenues. However, without targeted government policy, the long term economic consequences of the hydrocarbon boom may lead to crowding out investment in the non-petroleum sectors and appreciation of the Kazakh currency, the tenge. If President Nazarbaev’s administration will continue to preside over increases in income disparities and underdevelopment, it eventually may face political instability due to inflated popular expectations. Kazakhstan has done little to prevent the Dutch disease, despite warnings from the World Bank.

During Armenia’s recent presidential election and in the post election period, government authorities have detained scores of opposition supporters under dubious charges. These developments highlight the lack of independence within the judiciary and will likely further undermine already low public confidence in the legal system. They may also be an omen of pending troubles in the forthcoming May 2003 parliamentary elections and may complicate Armenia’s relationship with Western donors and such European institutions as the Council of Europe.