Analytical Articles

On July 9, a 500-strong mob armed with a truckload of stones, sticks and weapons, attacked and ransacked the Pakistani embassy in Kabul and destroyed almost everything they could get hold of. Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmed Jalai traveled to Islamabad to hold “structured talks” with his Pakistani counterparts on the recent escalation in hostility between the two countries. This effort might prove fruitless if the distrust that is there between the two remains. For now, officials of both countries have tried to downplay the incident, but tensions remain high though neither country can afford an escalated conflict.

Both China and Russia have separatist movements in territories that are majority Muslim, China’s Xinjiang and Russia’s Chechnya. Chechnya has been through two brutal wars and suffered numerous acts of terrorism. The character of the Uyghur resistance in Xinjiang has become more violent since 1997, and the rise of militant radicalism in Chechnya offers the Chinese government an important lesson about its policies in Xinjiang.

In 2003, the United States and the European organizations stepped up pressure on three South Caucasus countries to uphold democratic norms. Unprecedented and open diplomatic pressure, backed up by the conditionality of financial assistance will affect the actions of the governments and increases opposition influence on the eve of elections in Azerbaijan and, especially, Georgia. The consensus that seems to be emerging internationally is that the fragile stability achieved by the incumbent regimes in the South Caucasus is unsustainable, and thus counterproductive for the wider Middle East peace policy.

China’s plans to develop its arid northwestern region continue unabated, and entails the exploitation of water resources which could have a significant impact on Xinjiang and on relations with its Central Asian neighbors, especially Kazakhstan. The region’s high water demand stems in large part from increased cotton farming and development of energy resources. However, these development goals may not be environmentally sustainable and could well lead to unrest among the region’s ethnic population. Beijing has relied on the diversion of rivers that neighboring countries, especially Kazakhstan, depend on. Poor management of the region’s water resources could have a negative long term impact both on the stability of Xinjiang and relations between China and Central Asia.

In July 2003, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson visited Kazakhstan during a trip to Central Asia to promote NATO’s relations with these states. Whilst generally praising Kazakhstan for its increasingly deepening cooperation with the Alliance, Robertson particularly thanked President Nazarbayev and the Kazakh parliament for deciding to offer a small number of troops in support of post-war reconstruction in Iraq. This development clearly signals Astana’s commitment to its cooperation with NATO, contributing to the stabilization forces within Iraq, despite the international controversy that surrounded the US decision to prosecute the war. However this is only a small part of growing evidence that Astana is actively pursuing a more pro-western approach to its foreign policy and military cooperation.

As the election campaign intensifies before the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2 November 2003, the unwillingness of President Eduard Shevardnadze to seek compromise with the strong opposition over key issues of the election code prompted former U.S. State Secretary James Baker to suggest election guidelines during his July 5-6 visit in Georgia. The election race is entering an increasingly confrontational mode, which is likely to further discredit already weak state institutions, and to push the mounting protest voters out of the non-violent political domain into violent civil disobedience and anarchy.

Late in June, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliyev stated that his government would welcome the resumption of the activities of the Turkmen embassy in Baku. He insisted that the embassy could resume its operation \"at any moment\", while referring to the Azerbaijani embassy\'s operation in Ashgabad as \"quite normal\". The Turkmen government, which closed its embassy\'s in Baku about two years ago over disputes with Azerbaijan, has recently sought to improve ties with its neighbours as reflected in its interest in normalizing relations with Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan seems to have appreciated this new conciliatory mood in Ashgabad, which they want to explore to end the current unfriendly relations with their Caspian neighbour.

Since December 2002, Russian authorities have sent two extradition requests to Washington for the return of eight Russian citizens held in Guantanamo Bay. The eight were held after being captured fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan, but extradition requests have seen no reply. Russian displeasure with American silence on this matter was expressed by Deputy Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky, who pointed out to U.S. authorities that these requests were not simply ‘friendly correspondence’, but require a response. The eight ‘Russian Taliban’ demonstrate dissatisfaction with the squabbling leaders of Russian ‘Official Islam’ in the Russian Islamic community.

Security is at the top of the Georgian political agenda, but Georgia still lacks a clear and coherent security concept. This bears importance for reform of the military and security structures in addition to showing political priorities for domestic and international actors. The general election of 2 November and the Presidential election in 2005, along with NATO aspirations, Russian unwillingness to let go of the South Caucasus as a sphere of influence and the many frozen conflicts in the region, illustrate the urgency of adopting a national security concept. The passing of such a concept will provide predictability and legitimacy for Georgia’s future undertakings and be the compass for reform and policymaking.

Many observers have commented on the implications of the recent Russia-Turkmenistan gas deal for Russian energy and gas policy or on Russian policy in Central Asia. But with the passage of time since the deal was announced, it has become clear that other aspects of this deal that at the time received less attention are now becoming much more important. Two of them in particular merit close scrutiny, the importance of the agitation in Russia against the deal’s implications for Russians in Turkmenistan and the importance of the Trans-Ural firm to this deal.