Analytical Articles
IS AZERBAIJAN BECOMING AREA OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL?
In January, Azerbaijani authorities made a series of announcements stating they had revealed a plot by three Azerbaijani citizens to assassinate leading members of Azerbaijan’s Jewish community and a prominent Israeli official. Of even higher significance were Baku’s allegations of Hezbollah and Iran being the masterminds of the prepared assassinations. The circumstances around the event signify Azerbaijan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Iran and highlight both the country’s vulnerability to Iranian leverage and its strategic significance as a conduit for intelligence and potential military operations against Iran.
IMU REESTABLISHES BASES IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
On January 25, NATO-led German forces handed over to Afghan forces control of Badakhshan Province and Balkh Province, bordering Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. By 2014, all 130,000 soldiers in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are scheduled to depart Afghanistan and the U.S. will end its combat mission. On December 29, 2011, U.S. forces evacuated their bases in Panjshir Province, north of Kabul. As U.S. and ISAF forces reduce their footprint in Northern Afghanistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is reclaiming its former bases in the region. Not only will the IMU help the Taliban to reassert authority in Northern Afghanistan; it will also be in prime position to launch operations into Central Asia.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE U.S. LEAVES AFGHANISTAN?
In June 2011, President Obama announced the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Afghanistan. Another 23,000 are scheduled to pull out by next summer, and all American troops will return home by 2014. Although the U.S. has a clear intention to end the war, some pessimistic voices warn that it will be a critical blow to U.S. security and a retreat in the war on terror. However, a sober analysis shows that the U.S. still has a range of strategic options that would protect major U.S. interests in post-American Afghanistan and minimize the negative consequences of the withdrawal.
RUSSIAN TREATMENT OF TAJIKISTAN UNDERLINES FEAR OF DEPENDENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus recently agreed on a Customs Union and Russia has proclaimed its ambition to create a more integrated political body – the Eurasian Union – in the future. Russia, the largest of the countries involved, has promised that the Union would be based on absolute equality. However, Russia’s approach to Tajikistan – a potential participant of the Union – have put Russian intentions into doubt and have apparently made the other prospective members the Union consider other options to prevent Russia’s absolute domination in the post-Soviet space. Some post-Soviet states have flatly rejected the idea of the Union.
EURASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: SOVIET SYNDROME AND GEOPOLITICAL REVERSAL?
In 2011, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation initiated the creation of a Eurasian Union. This largely amounted to a restoration of the historically recurring idea of reunifying the former Soviet Republics, albeit on a new, “democratic” basis. The initiative revealed, however, a new trend – a geopolitical reversal in the post-Soviet space. By and large, this trend seems incapable of taking the upper hand over other geopolitical tendencies that have been unfolding in this part of the world since 1991 due to the lack of exactly a “democratic foundation”.
KAZAKHSTAN’S ELECTIONS: ASPIRATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY AMIDST EXPECTATIONS OF PATERNALISM
IRAN SANCTIONS: WHAT IMPACT FOR THE SHAH-DENIZ PROJECT?
The sanctions recently introduced by the U.S. and other states against Iran over its continuing nuclear program constitute the culmination of two years of discussion in the U.S. Congress, the UN, the EU and the IAEA. However, it is unclear whether Iranian investments in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field through the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) will be subject to the new sanctions. Their omission in the new round of sanctions through the Iran Threat Reductions Act (ITRA) makes the Shah Deniz project safe for now.
OBAMA’S NEW CENTRAL ASIAN STRATEGY AND ITS IMPEDIMENTS
During the past year, the Obama administration has developed its first comprehensive strategy for Central Asia. The strategy is still closely tied to Afghanistan, but the intent is to construct a more benign regional environment in which the U.S. and its NATO allies can transfer leadership responsibilities to the Kabul government and its security forces as well as the supporting regional actors. If implemented, the U.S. would remain vigorously engaged in Central Asia in order to promote its security, good governance, and socioeconomic development while these governments partner to support Afghanistan. Yet, as noted in a comprehensive report on "Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan" published last December by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, the strategy faces several major impediments that must be overcome in 2012.
CSTO SUMMIT RAISES AMBIGUITY REGARDING UZBEKISTAN’S MEMBERSHIP
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), involving 7 CIS members, each held summits in Moscow on December 20, 2011, where Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov took part. In October, 2011, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made a highly critical statement towards Uzbekistan for the “triple game” the country plays in its foreign policy. Such a game is incompatible with Uzbekistan’s membership in the CSTO, Lukashenko said. Uzbekistan’s participation in the CSTO and CIS summits two months later can be considered a response to Lukashenko’s critique.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB SPRING IN EURASIA
From its inception, the Arab spring has had an international cast as revolutions in one country have inspired subsequent revolutions across the Middle East. Consequently there has been much speculation as to whether this inspiration or example could carry over to post-Soviet Eurasia. Clearly the possibility of such a diffusion or inspiration has profoundly frightened leaders in Russia and Eurasia. A mixture of repression and economic concessions imply that leaders in Russia, Belarus and Central Asia have sought to forestall the possibility of aroused public protests. However, these facts hardly exhaust the international implications of the Arab Spring for Eurasia.
