Analytical Articles

In mid-March, a massive redeployment of military personnel from Chechnya to Dagestan took place. According to unofficial sources from Dagestan, up to 20,000-25,000 troops were moved to the neighboring republic. A military column including large amounts of armored fighting vehicles set out from Khankala, a military base to the east of Grozny, to the Karabudakhkent district of Dagestan on the outskirts of the capital city of Makhachkala. Rationalized by the authorities as another move to improve the deteriorating situation in the Caspian republic, the move has caused serious concern both within and outside Dagestan.

Prudent economic management and oil wealth have transformed Kazakhstan from a net recipient of FDI into a major foreign investor of its own. By the end of 2011, Kazakhstan’s stock of cumulative foreign investment abroad topped US$ 16 billion, only slightly below Turkey’s equivalent figure of US$18.5 billion. Neighboring Central Asian states stand out as some of the main beneficiaries of these Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flows, even if Kazakhstan’s investments are now global. Kazakh OFDI promotes economic growth in host states, strengthens Kazakhstan’s integration into the international economic system, and spurs technology transfers in both directions.

The Uzbek-led Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) has made its first inroads in the U.S. In 2012, three Uzbeks were arrested for activities related to their communications with the IJU. The IJU’s recruitment in the U.S. is a new development and likely to be duplicated by other Central Asian jihadist groups intent on expanding their global reach. Although the IJU appears to be on the decline, efforts like this show that the group still warrants heightened scrutiny. Although the majority of the IJU’s attacks since 2005 have taken place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, recent arrests show the desire, if not operational capability, for the IJU or allied groups to direct single-man operations in the U.S.

Since the November 26 incident where NATO/ISAF attacked a Pakistani border post, claiming the lives of 28 troops, Washington’s overtures have failed to impress Islamabad. Fearing a backlash from an angry public and enraged military establishment, the late Benazir Bhutto’s successors have passed the buck onto the Parliament for “advice” on rules of engagement with the U.S.. So far, these relations have been the exclusive domain of the deep state, comprising mainly of the military and bureaucratic elite of the Islamic republic. Whatever the conclusions of the legislature may be, their standing will be anything but mandatory.

The so-called “Emir of the Caucasus Emirate,” Doku Umarov, issued a video statement in early February in which he ordered those under his command to desist from carrying out attacks that might injure or kill Russian civilians. This statement was remarkable given that in the past number of years Umarov has associated himself with several high-profile rebel attacks on civilian targets in the Russian heartland. Some observers have taken the content of Umarov’s statement literally and interpreted his policy shift in the context of ongoing anti-government protests in Moscow and other Russian cities. But is this interpretation entirely accurate?

One of the banes of the Central Asia & Caucasus region is that they have Iran’s hard-line regime as their neighbor. The clerical regime often fights with them over resources, uses their territories to wage spy wars, and exacerbates regional tensions through its generally aggressive policies. From the perspective of Iran’s economic and diplomatic interests, these policies are self-defeating. But intimidating its neighbors through threats and other confrontational tactics lie at the heart of Iran’s regional security policy, and are unlikely to end without a change in its regime.

Secretary Panetta visited Kyrgyzstan on March 13 to solidify that Bishkek honors its commitment to the agreement to host the U.S. military’s Transit Center at Manas International Airport outside Bishkek. The agreement lasts through mid-2014, though U.S. forces will need the base at least through the end of that year. Previous negotiations have been volatile, though each has ended in the U.S. paying a significantly higher price in exchange for business continuing as usual. Yet, given Moscow’s interest in avoiding a haphazard U.S. evacuation of Afghanistan, there is reason to believe that agreements over the Manas base will be extended as long as needed.

While Kyrgyzstan has expressed a desire to join Russia’s Eurasian Union in the future, a close analysis of Kyrgyz foreign policy indicates that it, similar to other Central Asian states who have expressed an interest in the project, regards increased integration with Russia as just one among many possibilities. They could easily change the direction of their geopolitical orientations if they do not receive the benefits expected from Moscow. In the case in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey is increasingly emerging as a leading geopolitical patron whose rapprochement with Bishkek demonstrates Ankara’s increasing geopolitical ambition.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both highly dependent on Russian economic, political, and military support, and it would be natural for Russia to introduce its own system of governance by “siloviki,” the officers of power ministries, in these regions. However, most high officials in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent only one power ministry: the FSB. Officers from other power ministries, such as the Army or police, are very rare on high governmental positions. Yet, the FSB rule over these regions has taken slightly different forms.

The signature infrastructure project of Kyrgyzstan’s new leadership is a 268 kilometer railroad line that would link China with Kyrgyzstan’s southern provinces and Uzbekistan. President Atambayev insists that Kyrgyzstan would profit greatly from inter-regional transit trade if the US$ 2 billion-plus line were built. Restrictions on Kyrgyzstan’s once lucrative practice of re-exporting Chinese goods to Russia and Kazakhstan have been increasingly curtailed by new Customs Union rules, leaving Bishkek searching for new sources of national income and employment. While the railroad would lower the costs for traders, its price tag in both monetary and political terms will not be insignificant.