Analytical Articles

Secretary Panetta visited Kyrgyzstan on March 13 to solidify that Bishkek honors its commitment to the agreement to host the U.S. military’s Transit Center at Manas International Airport outside Bishkek. The agreement lasts through mid-2014, though U.S. forces will need the base at least through the end of that year. Previous negotiations have been volatile, though each has ended in the U.S. paying a significantly higher price in exchange for business continuing as usual. Yet, given Moscow’s interest in avoiding a haphazard U.S. evacuation of Afghanistan, there is reason to believe that agreements over the Manas base will be extended as long as needed.

While Kyrgyzstan has expressed a desire to join Russia’s Eurasian Union in the future, a close analysis of Kyrgyz foreign policy indicates that it, similar to other Central Asian states who have expressed an interest in the project, regards increased integration with Russia as just one among many possibilities. They could easily change the direction of their geopolitical orientations if they do not receive the benefits expected from Moscow. In the case in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey is increasingly emerging as a leading geopolitical patron whose rapprochement with Bishkek demonstrates Ankara’s increasing geopolitical ambition.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both highly dependent on Russian economic, political, and military support, and it would be natural for Russia to introduce its own system of governance by “siloviki,” the officers of power ministries, in these regions. However, most high officials in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent only one power ministry: the FSB. Officers from other power ministries, such as the Army or police, are very rare on high governmental positions. Yet, the FSB rule over these regions has taken slightly different forms.

The signature infrastructure project of Kyrgyzstan’s new leadership is a 268 kilometer railroad line that would link China with Kyrgyzstan’s southern provinces and Uzbekistan. President Atambayev insists that Kyrgyzstan would profit greatly from inter-regional transit trade if the US$ 2 billion-plus line were built. Restrictions on Kyrgyzstan’s once lucrative practice of re-exporting Chinese goods to Russia and Kazakhstan have been increasingly curtailed by new Customs Union rules, leaving Bishkek searching for new sources of national income and employment. While the railroad would lower the costs for traders, its price tag in both monetary and political terms will not be insignificant.

As Kyrgyzstan approaches the two-year mark of the April 2010 revolution, its future socio-economic prospects have gone from bad to worse. Anti-foreign investment rhetoric since the parliamentary and presidential elections has encouraged an unprecedented level of instability in the business environment for multinational companies. Foreign development assistance will decline significantly following the 2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 2015 Millennium Development Goals target date, especially given the financial austerity measures demanded by the domestic politics of leading donor countries. Taken together, decreasing foreign investor interest paired with decreasing foreign aid will come to a head in 2015 with serious budget deficits, unemployment and consequently real socio-economic challenges for the country.

Pakistan’s energy resources are increasingly receding and consumption rising. The only solution to this problem is to import gas. The Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline provides the most viable option but international compulsions, especially pressure from Washington and sanctions on Iran, makes it problematic. So far, Islamabad remains firm in its position and is committed to the IP pipeline. Is Islamabad’s recent response to U.S. messages simply posturing in line with the recent state of Islamabad-Washington relations or a realistic assessment of the available options and choices?

The parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan held on January 15, 2012, were criticized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other western observers as having failed to “meet fundamental principles of democratic elections.” Yet, the criticism had less to do with the conduct of the elections than with the lack of democratic culture in Kazakhstani politics and society, albeit not stated directly. Rather than holding its elections and political system to the standards of mature democracies, the OSCE should encourage political reforms in Kazakhstan – and other post-Soviet states – by developing a set of measurements that would capture the degree of change from the old traditions and practices.

The Azerbaijani and Turkish governments have endorsed the construction of a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TAGP, also called TANAP after its initials in Turkish) for carrying natural gas from deposits in the Caspian Sea offshore to European customers. This new project is not part of the European Union’s Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project, but its advantages are such that, with the backing of Baku and Ankara, knowledgeable observers estimate it to have moved quickly to the “front of the pack” among competing Euro-Caspian natural gas pipeline projects.

From the vantage point of 1991, Kazakhstan has to have made the most unexpected progress of any of the former Soviet Republics. The country has achieved the most dynamic economy, its diplomacy has managed to not only balance but also co-opt nearby great powers, and the country looks free from major external or even internal security threats. The main uncertainties relate to how the country will manage its looming presidential succession and whether Kazakhstan will follow other strong national economies and develop a more pluralistic political system.

The collapse of the USSR intensified the already existing ethnic rivalries between Central Asian ethnicities, which had now formed sovereign states. Tensions are exacerbated by competition for water and other resources and have in some cases made possible military conflict between these states.  Uzbekistan’s conflict with Tajikistan is a telling example, since it has reinforced Tashkent’s desire for regional dominance and underscored the limitations to the role of great powers in the region. Developments over the last few years suggest that conflicts in Central Asia may develop between the regional states themselves as especially control over water is playing an increasingly important role in the geopolitical rivalry.