Analytical Articles

Next month’s NATO heads-of-state summit in Chicago will likely devote considerable attention to the alliance’s troubled military campaign in Afghanistan. In the eyes of many observers, a NATO failure to consolidate peace in Afghanistan would call into question the organization’s perceived status as the world’s most effective military alliance precisely at a time when NATO leaders are eager to demonstrate its potential contributions to global security with an Asian-focused Washington. Yet, challenges abound, including the prospects for negotiating a peace agreement with the Taliban after years of ineffective counterinsurgency tactics.

Tensions between Iran and the West were exacerbated even further by Israel’s sale of sophisticated weapons to Baku in February this year. The regional states hold differing views on the crisis depending on their interests and geopolitical outlook. In Russia’s case, the objectives are clear. On the one hand, Russia is not interested in a full-fledged war which would hold unpredictable consequences for all parties involved, including Russia itself. On the other hand, it is in Moscow’s interest to keep the area unsafe and unstable as this will improve Moscow’s chances of monopolizing the supply of gas to Europe.

In October 2001, “Operation Enduring Freedom” was launched in Afghanistan as a U.S. retaliation act against Al-Qaida and the Taliban for the 9/11 attacks. Since then, this primary goal of the mission has transformed from sole retaliation to nation- and state- building in this war-torn country. A third aspect of the overall Afghan campaign has recently gained increased interest, namely the role of regional countries in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and regional security problems that will emerge after the withdrawal of international forces from this country by 2014.

A sharp cut in the production forecast of Kyrgyzstan’s lone large industrial enterprise could spell disaster for the country’s finances. A labor strike by workers at the mine in February led to an immediate freeze on production, which led to the company revising its 2012 production forecast from around 600,000 to around 400,000 ounces. The announcement led to an immediate downward revision of Kyrgyzstan’s industrial output and GDP for the first quarter of 2011 by 2 percent. But the government’s growing reliance on indirect taxation for revenues means Bishkek can expect ever greater fallout when the operations of Kumtor are disrupted.

In mid-March, a massive redeployment of military personnel from Chechnya to Dagestan took place. According to unofficial sources from Dagestan, up to 20,000-25,000 troops were moved to the neighboring republic. A military column including large amounts of armored fighting vehicles set out from Khankala, a military base to the east of Grozny, to the Karabudakhkent district of Dagestan on the outskirts of the capital city of Makhachkala. Rationalized by the authorities as another move to improve the deteriorating situation in the Caspian republic, the move has caused serious concern both within and outside Dagestan.

Prudent economic management and oil wealth have transformed Kazakhstan from a net recipient of FDI into a major foreign investor of its own. By the end of 2011, Kazakhstan’s stock of cumulative foreign investment abroad topped US$ 16 billion, only slightly below Turkey’s equivalent figure of US$18.5 billion. Neighboring Central Asian states stand out as some of the main beneficiaries of these Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flows, even if Kazakhstan’s investments are now global. Kazakh OFDI promotes economic growth in host states, strengthens Kazakhstan’s integration into the international economic system, and spurs technology transfers in both directions.

The Uzbek-led Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) has made its first inroads in the U.S. In 2012, three Uzbeks were arrested for activities related to their communications with the IJU. The IJU’s recruitment in the U.S. is a new development and likely to be duplicated by other Central Asian jihadist groups intent on expanding their global reach. Although the IJU appears to be on the decline, efforts like this show that the group still warrants heightened scrutiny. Although the majority of the IJU’s attacks since 2005 have taken place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, recent arrests show the desire, if not operational capability, for the IJU or allied groups to direct single-man operations in the U.S.

Since the November 26 incident where NATO/ISAF attacked a Pakistani border post, claiming the lives of 28 troops, Washington’s overtures have failed to impress Islamabad. Fearing a backlash from an angry public and enraged military establishment, the late Benazir Bhutto’s successors have passed the buck onto the Parliament for “advice” on rules of engagement with the U.S.. So far, these relations have been the exclusive domain of the deep state, comprising mainly of the military and bureaucratic elite of the Islamic republic. Whatever the conclusions of the legislature may be, their standing will be anything but mandatory.

The so-called “Emir of the Caucasus Emirate,” Doku Umarov, issued a video statement in early February in which he ordered those under his command to desist from carrying out attacks that might injure or kill Russian civilians. This statement was remarkable given that in the past number of years Umarov has associated himself with several high-profile rebel attacks on civilian targets in the Russian heartland. Some observers have taken the content of Umarov’s statement literally and interpreted his policy shift in the context of ongoing anti-government protests in Moscow and other Russian cities. But is this interpretation entirely accurate?

One of the banes of the Central Asia & Caucasus region is that they have Iran’s hard-line regime as their neighbor. The clerical regime often fights with them over resources, uses their territories to wage spy wars, and exacerbates regional tensions through its generally aggressive policies. From the perspective of Iran’s economic and diplomatic interests, these policies are self-defeating. But intimidating its neighbors through threats and other confrontational tactics lie at the heart of Iran’s regional security policy, and are unlikely to end without a change in its regime.