Analytical Articles

Why did the unrest in Kyrgyzstan turn so violent? The violence on April 7 stands in bright contrast to the Tulip revolution of 2005. In fact, the vast majority of the victims were shot dead by foreign snipers dispatched on the rooftop of a government building in central Bishkek. They were allegedly hired by president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s brother Zhanysh. In the past five years Zhanysh played a key role in increasing the involvement of the security services in politics to protect the regime. To understand why the riots turned violent, one needs to examine the ways in which the Bakiyev regime became increasingly reliant on the security structures.

In Azerbaijan, President Obama’s sweeping and gesturing foreign policy has come unstuck. The White House’s actions have concerned Baku so severely that Azerbaijan is looking to further hedge its already finely balanced international relationships. The last two years, which have witnessed the specter of Russian military intervention and the return of terrorism to the North Caucasus, mean that America’s need for dependable allies in the broader region will likely increase. Washington’s current treatment of Baku, and Azerbaijan’s resulting search for other friends, will make this more difficult than is currently blithely assumed.

Last month, after years of on-again, off-again negotiations, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreement for a bilateral natural gas pipeline to be sourced from the South Pars deposit. India has since asked to reopen negotiations, from which it had earlier withdrawn, to make the project trilateral. While pricing issues between Iran and Pakistan appear to be resolved, questions about pipeline security in Pakistan, pricing with India, and the role or non-role of China, are only three of the sets of problems still awaiting resolution.

The upheaval in Kyrgyzstan – the second in five years – raises the question whether Kyrgyzstan has any serious prospects of developing into a stable, sovereign state, let alone one with a pluralistic political system. The opposition that has claimed power faces major challenges, including curbing corruption, breaking the links between the state and organized crime, and creating a political order conducive for social and economic stability. Whether the members of the interim government fit this ticket remains doubtful. In case of continued instability, a scenario in which Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty is effectively reduced cannot be ruled out.  

In 2005, the Kyrgyz “Tulip Revolution” toppled Askar Akaev’s regime and put Kurmanbek Bakiyev in power, opening for what many hoped would become a more just and democratic government, capable of addressing economic and social ills. But five years on, Kyrgyzstan is even further from democracy and a similar fate has befallen President Bakiyev. Events in the country over the recent years have clearly demonstrated the ineffectiveness of government institutions and policies that failed to ensure stable and democratic functioning of the state and, in so doing, threatened its integrity amidst internal pressures and external designs.

Kyrgyzstan’s upheaval was not totally unexpected. Foreign media and observers pointed out mounting disaffection, profound economic crisis, and the possibility that the opposition could actually come to power. Kyrgyz domestic politics had become increasingly authoritarian and nepotistic. Yet Kyrgyzstan also remained at the center of the great power rivalries among Russia, China, its direct neighbors, and the United States. Thus domestic and foreign challenges are interlinked at several points – and that circumstance arguably catalyzed the upheaval – what Eric McGlinchey called the “hijacking” of the Kyrgyz government. Indeed, evidence is now visible that the rebellion or coup was clearly helped along if not actually incited by Moscow.

Chinese government officials in both Beijing and Xinjiang are greatly concerned about the current developments in Kyrgyzstan, but have largely refrained from commenting on the situation. Trade and regional stability are two of the main reasons behind China’s concern. However, possible consequences such as an impact on China’s domestic political discourse, and fears of the crisis leading to a more pivotal U.S. role in the region may be even more important. The unpredictable nature of the changes in Kyrgyzstan and the region is in many ways the most threatening development for Beijing.

The French government’s decision to sell several Mistral-class amphibious warships to Russia has aroused concerns, especially in Georgia and the Baltic states, that the Russian Navy will use the vessels to intimidate or even invade its neighbors. Yet, the ship would add little to Russia’s already substantial military advantage over these countries. The real problem with the sale is two-fold. First, it could help revitalize Russian military shipbuilding. Second, the transaction could divide NATO members, weakening their leverage with Moscow.

Throughout the 1990s, the uranium riches of Central Asia and the existence of nuclear weapons were mentioned only in the context of the denuclearization program that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. While international attention is focused mainly on oil and gas, the region is poised to rediscover its uranium resources and the potentially important role to be played by nuclear power in an area with a chronic deficit of energy. The exponential growth of nuclear power worldwide, and especially in Asia, draws attention to Kazakhstan, which seeks to exploit its potential.

Kazakhstan looks set to continue the implementation of a strategy designed to reclaim its national influence in the decision-making over the scale and pace of industrial expansion in significant natural resource development projects. Having achieved such an outcome over several years as regards the restructuring of the consortium that develops the offshore Kashagan oil (and associated gas) deposit, Kazakh government officials last month initiated moves that could bring about a similar result as regards the Karachaganak natural gas deposit.