Analytical Articles

Elections have repeatedly played an important role in the evolution of the Georgian political system, far more so than for example in neighboring Azerbaijan. Georgia's twenty-year republican experience can be analyzed through the lens of a three-phase evolution, where each phase has been characterized either by continuity or discontinuity with the Soviet period, though not representing decisive steps toward the full democratization of the country. The parliamentary elections scheduled for October 1, 2012, can potentially become a new “critical juncture” toward a fourth phase, a democratic one, thanks to particular new elements that distinguishes it from previous phases.

Conversion to Islam and the related spread of Islamism has a long history in Russia; however the North Caucasus and jihadists from this region are playing an increasingly important role in this process. While small in number, converts are important assets for jihadists as they provide a cadre of dedicated terrorists who are difficult to detect. Converts hence increasingly provide a pool of recruitment for North Caucasian jihadists. In late July 2012, several women engaging in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus were killed by law enforcement, one of whom was ethnic Russian. The authorities believed that she and the other women were preparing for a suicidal terrorist attack.

Since China imposed export restrictions on Rare Earth Elements (REEs) in 2010, investors have flooded the sector in search of an alternative supplier of these elements, which are critical in high-tech manufacturing. Kyrgyzstan, home of the Soviet Union’s primary REEs industrial complex and one of the world’s few previously-proven asset sets outside China, appeared set to capitalize. Kazakhstan, already a global mining hub, signed investment deals with German and Japanese interests early in 2012. Whether either country will gain from the boom will depend on their ability to attract and maintain investments sufficient to build alternatives to China, a country with entrenched interests in the industry which may prefer to see its neighbors fail.

Jund al-Khilafah (JaK) claimed responsibility for three terrorist attacks carried out by separate cells in Atyrau, Taraz and Almaty between October and December 2011. JaK caught Kazakhstani and foreign governments by surprise since the attacks, which targeted and killed state officials, were unprecedented in the country. However, a review of Kazakh jihadist activity since 2010 challenges the notion of JaK’s sudden emergence. Similar groups, which may even have included JaK members operating under a different name, released propaganda nearly identical to JaK before the fall of 2011.

Pakistan reopened NATO’s logistical route to Afghanistan on July 4. This was made possible by an official apology from the U.S. regarding the November 26, 2011, drone attack on the Salala border post, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. While western analysts are optimistic over the outcome, the Pakistani public at large does not see the recent developments in the Salala affair as a win-win situation. Policymakers in Washington D.C. view Pakistan as an unreliable player in the region, while their Pakistani counterparts increasingly do not view the U.S. as either an ally or a partner. The resumption of NATO supply line hence bears closer resemblance to a fire-fighting mission than a reset of U.S.-Pakistani relations.

While Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov participated in the May 15 CSTO summit in Moscow, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on June 28 that Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the organization. This sudden and seemingly paradoxical decision is a consequence of a changing geopolitical context in the region and indicative of Uzbekistan’s preference for bilateral security arrangements. Not only did the decision once again reveal that the collective security organization lacks collectivity but it also raised the conceptual question of revising the existing regional security arrangements in Central Asia.

Tashkent’s decision to suspend its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on June 20 prompted speculation about Uzbekistan’s apparently sudden policy reversal. Some observers restricted themselves to dismissing Tashkent as a troublesome and disagreeable partner both for Russia and the country’s Central Asian neighbors, while others advanced the argument that President Islam Karimov is preparing to host a new U.S. airbase in Uzbekistan. However, the timing of the decision, delayed public disclosure combined with the cautious statements on the issue by Moscow highlight a much deeper and complex picture. Indeed the unanswered question that emerges from Tashkent’s suspension of CSTO membership is about the timing of a widely anticipated move.

For the first time in many years the SCO held a summit that actually mattered. The attendees at the June 6-7 annual meeting of the heads of state of the SCO member states admitted Afghanistan as a formal observer country and designated Turkey a dialogue partner. Perhaps the reality of NATO’s impending military withdrawal from the region has finally spurred the SCO to assume a more forthcoming role in securing Afghanistan’s security. Nonetheless, the SCO still has a number of important issues to address before it can become a truly effective regional organization.