Analytical Articles

Dmitry Rogozhin, Russian representative to NATO, and General Boris Gromov, a general who fought in Afghanistan, recently published an open letter about NATO in The New York Times. NATO was presented as an alliance lacking a will to fight, where especially the Europeans members were ready to cut and run in Afghanistan. They concluded this would be a great disaster and that the West should remember that the USSR had defended “Western civilization” at large in Afghanistan. Still, the U.S. should not expect much cooperation from Russia. A considerable segment of the Russian elite continues to be quite suspicious of U.S. intentions and its general ability to pursue realistic policies in Afghanistan.

The U.S.-Kyrgyz negotiations on opening a military center in Batken have raised controversial security and geopolitical considerations that might become momentous for the Fergana Valley and Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. Kyrgyzstan entertains legitimate concerns about its poorly protected borders that have seen activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and drug trafficking networks extending from Central Asia to Europe. But amidst intensified water and border disputes, competition of great powers, an enhanced ability of the Central Asian states to influence regional dynamics, U.S. plans to withdraw from Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan’s own unstable domestic position, the center might well spur militarization of the region.

In recent days, energy diplomats on both the Azerbaijani and Turkish sides have revealed that an agreement in principle over the price that Turkey will pay for Shah Deniz gas from Azerbaijan has been reached. However, there are several ongoing sets of simultaneous negotiations over Shah Deniz, also taking place in the context of larger implicit bargaining games over other the Caspian Sea basin deposits of natural gas and indeed the geo-economics of their supply to Europe over the next several decades. These subtleties must be unpacked in order to understand the wide-ranging significance of even seemingly small agreements.

The opening of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline in December 2009 has focused deserved attention on China’s growing presence in Central Asia, particularly in the energy field. But the larger story transcends China and is really about the growing connections between Central Asia and East Asian  countries in general, not just China.  In this context, South Korea’s reinvigorated moves to consummate energy and infrastructure contracts with Central Asian producers are particularly revealing.  Following President Lee Myung-Bak’s visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2009, there has been a series of acquisitions and search for assets by Korean companies.

The January 14 meeting by east European leaders in Batumi, Georgia, marked an important step toward the realization of the southern energy corridor. Among them, Ukrainian and Azerbaijani participation is of utmost importance. Both countries demonstrate a certain degree of pragmatism in their relations with both Russia and the West, trying to reap the benefits of partnerships on both sides. Azerbaijan’s duality is shown by its agreement to sell 1 bcm of gas to Russia while still supporting the southern corridor. During the 2010 Presidential elections in Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich spoke of mending Ukraine’s relations with Russia while simultaneously integrating with Europe.

The ongoing polemic between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the latter’s decision to construct the Rogun hydropower station has intensified, threatening to escalate amidst regional environmental challenges, widespread poverty, border disputes, and lack of inter-state cooperation, especially on water management issues. This context creates a potentially explosive environment in Central Asia that has witnessed a number of ethnic and resource-related conflicts in the past, primarily in the Fergana Valley, requiring effective intra and extra-regional policy responses to avoid water wars that are to some extent already under way across the region.   

The recent developments in the Black Sea/Caspian region indicate a dramatic shift in the geopolitical environment of the region. The reduced strategic ties between regional actors; diminishing U.S. interest and capacity to enforce strategic access to Central Asia through the Caucasus; and increased pressure from Russia on the entire region could ultimately lead to a different strategic picture of the region in the next decade. The new geopolitical realities have a profound impact on the development of energy infrastructure in the region, and more importantly, on the prospects of integrating the region in broader Euro-Atlantic security and economic system.

The main topic of discussion at the January 28 London conference on Afghanistan was the renewed coalition support for the Afghan government’s reintegration and reconciliation initiatives. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other members of the international coalition endorsed Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s call for national reconciliation. Seeking to weaken the Taliban insurgents by dividing the group’s less committed members from its hard-core supporters makes tactical sense, but the initiatives entail serious risks that must be understood and reduced.

Viktor Yanukovych came first in the presidential elections in Ukraine, but Yuliya Tymoshenko has instructed lawyers to bring to the courts evidence of voting irregularities to put Yanukovych’s margin of victory under question. Even if the latter is able to muster a negative majority to oust her from office and form his own parliamentary majority, he may be forced to call new parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, he has already moved on the energy front through floating new proposals, if not yet able to offer them formally for legislative consideration. The elections in Ukraine change the odds also for other projects in the east-west energy corridor from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe.

The Kremlin has sprung something of a surprise by re-embracing the influential Magomedov clan in its efforts to bring stability to the republic of Dagestan. The head of this clan, Magomedali Magomedov, steered Dagestan through a difficult post-Soviet transition phase before finally being replaced in 2006. It is not entirely clear what lies behind the Kremlin’s change of heart regarding the utility of the Magomedov clan. It seems likely, however, that this sudden volte face is related somehow to the Kremlin’s failure to convince Dagestan’s truculent political elite as to the merits of its preferred candidate: Magomed Abdullayev.