Analytical Articles

Alexander Khloponin is no economic visionary. His economic values are based on open markets, free movement of capital, public-private partnership – in short, what might be termed the neo-liberal economic agenda. These economic values brought him success as governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai. Now, as President Medvedev’s representative to the North Caucasus Federal District, Khloponin proposes to use many of the same economic policies to bring prosperity to Russia’s most destitute region. However, these policies will hardly suffice to attract significant investment to a region which remains the base of an armed insurgency.

This spring, hundreds of young professionals, scholars and PhD students across Central Asia packed their books, research projects and CVs and headed for foreign countries to get professional training, education, or internships. This movement of highly skilled specialists has become a hotly debated issue among intellectuals in the region. One camp argues that it is a brain drain, as much needed specialists leave their home countries, contributing to shortages of highly skilled professionals. Others argue that it is a brain gain, because if even a few of them come back with world-class expertise, they will contribute to reforming national economies – and those who do not return will transfer remittances from developed countries to their nations.

On June 9, the director of Russia’s federal security service, the FSB, announced that his organization had detained Emir Magas, the leader of the rebel insurgency in Ingushetia. The capture of Magas comes on foot of a series of recent successes by security forces against the insurgent organization in the Northern Caucasus. In February, security forces accounted for Seif Islam, a military counsellor to rebel leader Doku Umarov. In March, Anzor Astemirov and Said Buryatsky, two leading rebel ideologists, were eliminated. These losses have created vacancies in at least two key leadership positions within the Caucasus Emirate organization. 

The ceasefire in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has for the past two years appeared ever more fragile and a recent shootout, which left six soldiers dead, once again demonstrates that the conflict is far from frozen. This incident was explained as a consequence of a breakdown in the ongoing peace talks, but it also reflects mounting tensions ever since the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008. Kosovo’s recognition, the war in Georgia and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia stirred things up and led to a change in the dynamics of the conflict.

Turkmenistan has broken Russia’s stranglehold on its gas exports by opening a pipeline through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. The country’s president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov has just made his first trip to New Delhi where the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline project was discussed. Earlier this year a short pipeline was opened in order to increase exports to Iran, and gas is in the process of being identified for eventual export to Europe via a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the EU’s Southern Corridor. The era of Russian control over the country’s exports is over, and Ashgabat is taking care to make certain that it is not squeezed between Moscow and Beijing.

The ferocity of the interethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan has caught many international players off guard. The OSCE could be an obvious candidate for an unbiased and trusted mediator and a key international coordinator for the stabilization efforts, however, Kyrgyz experts are deeply divided over its role. Some believe that this organization has played a positive role in stabilizing the country, pointing to the quick response in negotiating a deal with ex-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to leave the country and thus averting a possible civil war. Others believe that the OSCE was quite ineffective in responding to the conflict in Kyrgyzstan, as it failed to prevent conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities.

Two decades after the notorious Osh riots, large-scale violence has recurred in southern Kyrgyzstan, resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries, and 400,000 refugees. In the aftermath of April’s unexpected change of government, the weak Kyrgyz state proved itself nearly powerless to prevent local clashes from occurring and sometimes escalating. In Jalalabad, sporadic street demonstrations in May turned violent, and in one instance divided along ethnic lines—between Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority. On June 10, unidentified gunmen sparked a pogrom against the Uzbek minority and the destruction of much of the city’s residential and commercial districts. The implications for Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia are far-reaching.

Kyrgyzstan is today the only Central Asian state where political forces advocating a parliamentary system still have a strong voice. These forces represent a mixture of political leaders’ good will and their pursuit of a share of power in an environment where political competition is robust and memories of the two “revolutions” are still fresh.  The recent ethnic violence in Osh and Jalalabad added serious hurdles to Kyrgyzstan’s ambition of becoming a parliamentary state. Yet, if enough efforts are invested into rebuilding trust between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in south Kyrgyzstan, a parliamentary system could still be accomplished.

Uzbekistan’s reaction towards the violence ravaging southern Kyrgyzstan  has been consistent with its broader attitude towards neighbors and Uzbek co-ethnics in the region. While condemning the clashes, Tashkent has emphasized that these constitute Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs and do not reflect the historical spirit of harmonious co-existence that has defined Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Rather, it has hinted at the possibility that the events may have been orchestrated, implying that a key role in igniting the Osh and Jalalabad provinces may have been played by factions loyal to the ousted president Bakiyev.

Though largely overlooked in Western coverage beyond the cozy fuel deals for the Manas Transit Center between the Bakiyev family and the U.S. Department of Defense, energy and water issues figured prominently in the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan. The corrupt administration of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev stole from both the U.S via fuel sales to Manas, and Russia through the diversion of portions of its $2.15 billion loan, granted in February 2009. But what brought Kyrgyz demonstrators into the streets were massive utility rate increases. Hindsight made the unrest inevitable, though few saw the “perfect storm’ gathering at the time.