Analytical Articles

The April 2010 visit of Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, head of Pakistani Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), to China at the invitation of the Communist Party of China (CPC), was yet another move on Beijing’s part to tackle the challenge of terrorism emanating from Islamic fundamentalists. Starting from September 11, 2001, China has expanded its cooperation with Pakistan on counterterrorism through a wide range of activities, including engagement with the religious political parties of the country. This would certainly help China in handling its separatist problem in Xinjiang.

Following the popular revolt that brought an end to President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s regime in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, Tajikistan’s government termed the crisis an “internal affair” of Kyrgyzstan and limited its official comments to the events confronting its southern neighbor. Despite the official silence, events in Kyrgyzstan have generated considerable debate among Tajik analysts and opposition leaders over whether the Kyrgyz scenario is possible in Tajikistan. Although there are ample similarities between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan when it comes to political and socioeconomic settings, most argue that a Kyrgyz scenario is impossible in Tajikistan due to major differences between the two countries in foreign and domestic politics, and in post-independence experiences.

On April 26, 2010, the constitutional working group published a draft constitution for the Kyrgyz Republic, and the head of the interim government announced that the new constitution would be finalized on May 19. These developments have deeply divided the public, local experts and politicians. One group welcomes the decision, stating that the new constitution is a step toward stabilizing the political situation in the country. The other group questions the legitimacy of the working group in the absence of the dissolved Constitutional Court and Parliament, and also the lack of contributions from major parties and political groups, arguing that there should be no shortcuts in the introduction of this fundamental document.

A visible increase has taken place in contacts between members of the North Caucasian elite and Israel. Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent overtures to Israel, in which he acted as an independent ruler, rather than as a governor of the Russian Federation, should demonstrate that Moscow has little power over his actions. By closing its eyes to such activities on part of the North Caucasian elite, or even possibly encouraging them, the Kremlin wants to increase its contacts with Israel. An even more important reason is the persistent instability in North Caucasus, where Moscow is still unable to find any alternative to Kadyrov.

The process of Turkish-Armenian normalization, which could potentially have brought improvements to the regional inter-state political climate in the South Caucasus and helped resolving the current deadlock, is suspended, having encountered serious domestic obstacles to ratification in Turkey. This seemingly puts an end to the international mediation efforts to defuse the explosive situation in the region. As a result, Armenia and Azerbaijan have toughened their positions on Nagorno-Karabakh, and the situation has become increasingly dangerous ahead of the 16th anniversary of the cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Since his inauguration as Russia’s president in May 2008, Dmitri Medvedev has pursued a distinctive cadre policy in respect of the Northern Caucasus. In a little under two years in office, Medvedev has replaced the leaders of three republics – Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan – and has even appointed a new envoy-minister to oversee the region. Recent events have given rise to speculation about Medvedev’s intentions toward Chechnya’s current pro-Moscow political elite, led by Ramzan Kadyrov. Are Medvedev’s intentions toward Kadyrov benign or otherwise? Moreover, in what ways has Medvedev’s presidency changed the decision making hierarchy established by his predecessor in this critical area of Russia’s regional policy?

The gas negotiations between Azerbaijan and Turkey finally seem to have come to an end. According to a statement made by the Turkish Energy Minister Tamer Yildiz on April 27, 2010, Ankara and Baku have agreed on the amount and the price for the sale of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey. Such a deal not only paves the way for further progress in gas pipeline projects between the Caspian and Europe, it also provides for a warming of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations after the tensions arising from the signature of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols in October 2009.

Why did the unrest in Kyrgyzstan turn so violent? The violence on April 7 stands in bright contrast to the Tulip revolution of 2005. In fact, the vast majority of the victims were shot dead by foreign snipers dispatched on the rooftop of a government building in central Bishkek. They were allegedly hired by president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s brother Zhanysh. In the past five years Zhanysh played a key role in increasing the involvement of the security services in politics to protect the regime. To understand why the riots turned violent, one needs to examine the ways in which the Bakiyev regime became increasingly reliant on the security structures.

In Azerbaijan, President Obama’s sweeping and gesturing foreign policy has come unstuck. The White House’s actions have concerned Baku so severely that Azerbaijan is looking to further hedge its already finely balanced international relationships. The last two years, which have witnessed the specter of Russian military intervention and the return of terrorism to the North Caucasus, mean that America’s need for dependable allies in the broader region will likely increase. Washington’s current treatment of Baku, and Azerbaijan’s resulting search for other friends, will make this more difficult than is currently blithely assumed.

Last month, after years of on-again, off-again negotiations, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreement for a bilateral natural gas pipeline to be sourced from the South Pars deposit. India has since asked to reopen negotiations, from which it had earlier withdrawn, to make the project trilateral. While pricing issues between Iran and Pakistan appear to be resolved, questions about pipeline security in Pakistan, pricing with India, and the role or non-role of China, are only three of the sets of problems still awaiting resolution.