Analytical Articles

Two decades after the notorious Osh riots, large-scale violence has recurred in southern Kyrgyzstan, resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries, and 400,000 refugees. In the aftermath of April’s unexpected change of government, the weak Kyrgyz state proved itself nearly powerless to prevent local clashes from occurring and sometimes escalating. In Jalalabad, sporadic street demonstrations in May turned violent, and in one instance divided along ethnic lines—between Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority. On June 10, unidentified gunmen sparked a pogrom against the Uzbek minority and the destruction of much of the city’s residential and commercial districts. The implications for Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia are far-reaching.

Kyrgyzstan is today the only Central Asian state where political forces advocating a parliamentary system still have a strong voice. These forces represent a mixture of political leaders’ good will and their pursuit of a share of power in an environment where political competition is robust and memories of the two “revolutions” are still fresh.  The recent ethnic violence in Osh and Jalalabad added serious hurdles to Kyrgyzstan’s ambition of becoming a parliamentary state. Yet, if enough efforts are invested into rebuilding trust between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in south Kyrgyzstan, a parliamentary system could still be accomplished.

Uzbekistan’s reaction towards the violence ravaging southern Kyrgyzstan  has been consistent with its broader attitude towards neighbors and Uzbek co-ethnics in the region. While condemning the clashes, Tashkent has emphasized that these constitute Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs and do not reflect the historical spirit of harmonious co-existence that has defined Uzbek-Kyrgyz relations. Rather, it has hinted at the possibility that the events may have been orchestrated, implying that a key role in igniting the Osh and Jalalabad provinces may have been played by factions loyal to the ousted president Bakiyev.

Though largely overlooked in Western coverage beyond the cozy fuel deals for the Manas Transit Center between the Bakiyev family and the U.S. Department of Defense, energy and water issues figured prominently in the recent unrest in Kyrgyzstan. The corrupt administration of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev stole from both the U.S via fuel sales to Manas, and Russia through the diversion of portions of its $2.15 billion loan, granted in February 2009. But what brought Kyrgyz demonstrators into the streets were massive utility rate increases. Hindsight made the unrest inevitable, though few saw the “perfect storm’ gathering at the time.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' visit to Azerbaijan seems to have succeeded in its likely purpose to exercise damage control. The free fall in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations, which had been ongoing for over a year, seems to have been arrested. Rebuilding trust and re-establishing America's role in Azerbaijan and the wider region will nevertheless require continued and sustained measures.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has thus far played a surprisingly small role in the Kyrgyz crisis despite Kyrgyzstan’s being one of the core members of that institution. The CSTO has done little more than issue alarming warnings about developments in Kyrgyzstan, allowing the OSCE to play a lead role in mediating the power struggle. Yet, while circumstances in Kyrgyzstan did not allow the CSTO to make use of its recently formed Collective Operational Reaction Force, it would be incorrect to presume that the organization could not assume a more prominent role if a crisis erupt in another member state.

On May 30, Georgian citizens went to the polls to vote in local elections. At stake were issues well beyond the socio-economic problems debated during pre-election campaigning. Apart from being an ordeal for the ruling United National Movement, already strained by war and street protests, the local elections served as a critical test of the fairness of Georgia’s electoral framework and, ultimately, for the country’s prospects of overcoming political polarisation. In the end, the ruling party came out of the elections strengthened. More importantly, initial signs indicate that Georgia may be revitalizing the democratic ideals espoused by the “rose revolutionaries”.

From Latin America to the Middle East, Africa to Europe, China’s web of economic expansion has engulfed all corners of the globe. Today, there is hardly any place in the world that does not trade with China. The South Caucasus is no exception. China’s economic and political presence in the region, while less substantial and inconspicuous compared to that of other actors, is no less visionary in its quest for expanded trade, energy resources and transportation corridors. Exploring the limits and prospects of Beijing’s growing engagement with the South Caucasus is therefore pertinent.

The appointment on May 24 of Matthew Bryza to be the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan not only offers an opportunity to overcome the recent chill in relations between the U.S. and Azerbaijan. It also offers a chance to reduce the possibility of a renewed war in Nagorno-Karabakh. As demonstrated by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, so-called frozen conflicts can quickly become hot ones and Nagorno-Karabakh is no exception. There is now an opportunity for the U.S. to add its hitherto missing weight to the resolution of the interlinked issues of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armeno-Turkish normalization.

When Yunas-Bek Yevkurov replaced Murat Zyazikov as president of Ingushetia in 2008 most citizens of the troubled republic were greatly relieved. Yevkurov arrived as a determined bridge-builder, a man of consensus who was expected to appeal to the disaffected citizenry of Ingushetia. He quickly won praise for pledging to put a stop to the much-maligned practice whereby young men were routinely abducted by unidentified members of the security forces. Of late, however, Yevkurov has seemingly revised his attitude toward Ingushetia’s kidnapping phenomenon – and his reached some startling conclusions.