Analytical Articles

In spite of its current messiness, Kyrgyzstan’s revolution provides an illustrative example for those who claim that Internet freedom leads to political freedom.  They find in Kyrgyzstan, as they did in Iran, a wired population and a political revolution, and assume that one causes the other. There is only tentative evidence of this claim, but there is more substantial evidence of the reverse causal relationship; that is, political freedom causing Internet freedom in the Turkic world.

Rosa Otunbaeva’s initiative to invite the OSCE Police Advisory Group to take part in post-conflict rehabilitation in Kyrgyzstan has led to wide discussions. Supporters of bringing in the Advisory Group believe that it will help stabilize the situation and ease public distrust in the national police. The opponents insist that the Advisory Group will interfere with Kyrgyzstan’s domestic affairs, which could in turn escalate the conflict and reinforce separatist movements in Kyrgyzstan’s South. Under pressure from both sides, Otunbaeva openly declared that she will consider inviting the mission only after the parliamentary elections on October 10.

On September 14, Presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, Traian Basescu of Romania and Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary gave new impetus to the realization of a revolutionary liquid natural gas (LNG) project. The high level attention to the project, named AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector) is likely to attract other states to join. Experts say AGRI may be the most promising route for delivering LNG from the Caspian to Europe. It would connect existing and planned natural gas grids in Eastern Europe via Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and possibly Austria, as well as via an existing interconnector in Hungary.    

Since August 2010, a rumor is spreading that the Azerbaijani State oil company, SOCAR, would be about to bid for the North-South pipeline, which ships Russian gas from Mozdok to Yerevan through Georgia. Such a move would give Baku control over 10-15 percent of the pipeline that delivers 80 percent of the Armenian gas imports, hence giving it new leverage over Yerevan. It especially sheds light into the new strategy of Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the shootouts have been increasing lately, Baku intends to use gas development to exert more pressure over Armenia.

Within 24 hours, two prominent think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean released alternative strategies for conducting the war in the Afghanistan. The reports issued by the Afghanistan Study Group (ASG) in Washington and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London both call for a dramatic scaling back of the coalition’s war goals and military efforts in Afghanistan. They shared the basic underlying position that the means being spent on the war have exceeded the value of the objectives being sought. Yet, while the two reports raise important points, implementing their recommendations would be premature.

During the global economic slowdown, commodity prices have both soared and plummeted.  As gold’s value recently reached all-time highs, journalists discussed gold-bar-dispensing ATM’s in Abu Dhabi, and investment experts proffered dire warnings of a crash. Industrial commodities, in contrast, suffered deep contractions in demand. Just as individual investors faced increased risk, the government of Kazakhstan saw its tax revenue stream swing with the vicissitudes of the world’s commodity markets. To enhance stability in the private and public sectors, new transfer pricing regulations were introduced in July. The goals were to increase transparency, smooth out price fluctuations, and conform to accepted international standards.

Many factors have been cited for Russia’s failure to intervene in the rioting in southern Kyrgyzstan. An overlooked factor appears to be the strong opposition from, and coordination between, Tashkent and Beijing. The growing approximation between the two was at open display during the June SCO summit in Tashkent, where unprecedented language of friendship was used in the communiqués of Sino-Uzbek meetings, compared to the correct but reserved tone that Russian leaders were confronted with. While both the CSTO and SCO appear unable or unwilling to respond to acute crises in the region, a growing Sino-Russian rivalry appears to developing in Central Asia.