Analytical Articles

The situation in Dagestan is becoming increasingly grim. Russia’s leadership has started to complain about President Magomedsalam Magomedov’s failure to jump-start the republic’s economy; meanwhile, Magomedov blames local security services for their failure to provide a favourable investment climate by stabilizing the security situation in Dagestan. Amid this latest round of finger-pointing, Magomedov has set forth a controversial proposal that would see volunteer militias, comprised of native Dagestanis, tasked with tackling the rebel organization in the republic. However, the social conditions in Dagestan and the Kremlin’s limited patience with Magomedov suggest such a replication of Kadyrov’s counter-terrorism tactics will be difficult to implement.

During the December 1-2 OSCE summit held in Astana, a separate document about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was adopted, which largely expressed the OSCE’s ambition to maintain the status quo in the conflict and prevent the situation from deteriorating further. This implies that Nagorno-Karabakh is considered the most serious conflict on the OSCE’s territory. However, the Azerbaijani and Armenian positions voiced during the summit reconfirmed that the OSCE’s ambitions for conflict resolution do not match its capabilities. The positions of the conflicting parties remain far apart; underscoring the risk that Nagorno-Karabakh may not only remain an unresolved conflict, but may see a future return to military violence.

A recent series of statements and concrete actions by leaders from Ashgabat shows a clear willingness and desire to implement the “European direction” as a component of the country’s international gas export policy. Technical obstacles are mainly solved, and the only remaining political obstacle appears to be Europe’s difficulty in concentrating its attention to take the necessary steps from its own side. The last chance for this seemingly will begin to expire early next year.

Azerbaijan’s recent parliamentary elections once again highlighted the economic factor in the country’s domestic politics. In an era of rapid economic growth, the opposition finds it very hard to compete with the ruling party. At the same time, the latest elections showed the changing dynamics within the ruling party. Compared with previous elections, The Yeni Azerbaijan Party spoke with a more unified voice and fewer party members dared to run against each other, as had been the case in 2005.

On September 14, 2010, the Romanian, Azerbaijani and Georgian presidents and the prime minister of Hungary signed the Baku Declaration on the implementation of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI) energy project. This project, which is expected to transport liquefied natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe via the Black Sea, has received little media coverage, and was almost entirely absent at some important events on energy issues such as the 2010 Baku Caspian Oil and Gas Conference. Experts have been skeptical about the chances of carrying out the AGRI project, which was initially interpreted as a means for Baku to exert pressure on Ankara during a difficult period in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations.

On the morning of October 19, as Russia’s Minister of Internal Affairs was preparing to meet Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov at the Parliament building in the Chechen capital of Grozny, militants stormed the Parliament compound with assault rifles, RPGs, and suicide vests in an attack that left six killed and seventeen others wounded. This bold assault on one of the region’s most significant government institutions was the product of a developing schism within the region’s insurgency, which, rather than weakening the insurgent movement, foreshadows a new challenge for a government that appears to have few ideas for addressing the longstanding problem of violence in the North Caucasus.

Shortly after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the Georgian government declared the launch of a “new wave” of democratic reforms to better balance branches of government, strengthen judicial independence and private property, and increase media freedom. The cornerstone of this effort was to be a constitutional reform that would devolve power away from Georgia’s traditionally strong presidency. After sixteen months of development, deliberation, and discussion, Georgia’s parliament approved a set of far-reaching constitutional amendments on October 15, 2010. These will go into effect in 2013, after Georgia’s next round of parliamentary and presidential elections. 

In early October BP and Azerbaijan concluded a long-discussed deal, granting both partners a 50 percent share to develop the Shafag-Asiman gas site for 30 years in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea. This field is about 1,100 square kilometers in size and has never been explored before. The field holds an estimated 17,000 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas and that size would put it on a par with the Shah Deniz field where BP has a 25.5 percent share. This deal has importance for both partners beyond the sheer size and fact of its announcement.

Despite the success of the October 20-22 U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, the recent confrontation between NATO and Pakistani forces along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier has complicated alliance efforts to supply their sophisticated and high-maintenance military forces in distant and land-locked Afghanistan. Allied planners must ensure the delivery of large quantities of food, fuel, munitions, and construction materials to their forces through Pakistan as well as Russia and a variety of transit countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, each with their own distinct conditions and motivations.

Kazakhstan is well known for its mineral riches. The country is a top producer of uranium, chrome and zinc, along with several other metals. Reputation sings in Kazakhstan – the successful mining companies operating in the country, mostly on legacy Soviet mines, know that strong relations with both the local and national governments via intensive and expensive social projects lead to investment security and new opportunities. However, as the next generation of mining companies – smaller exploration and development companies such as Frontier Mining Ltd. – begins to break ground on undeveloped or underdeveloped fields, new political risks emerge. What will the Kazakh government expect of them?