Analytical Articles

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s visit to China on February 21-23 was his fifteenth since Kazakhstan’s independence. Yet few have observed that Kazakhstan’s relations with China, resting on expanding energy collaboration since the 1990s, are today evolving to reflect rapidly growing cooperation in areas as diverse as manufacturing, shipbuilding, transport, technology, and trade. It is in these areas that Nazarbayev has secured monumental deals during his visit to the “Middle Kingdom”, and it is development of these sectors that, with a balanced approach, could consolidate rather than weaken the sovereignty of Kazakhstan in the long run.

The three-party government coalition of Armenia has adopted a rather unexpected document whereby its member parties express their support for the nomination of current President Serzh Sargsyan two years before his expected reelection bid. They also declare their intention to help each other during the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012. This can be regarded as very strong support for Sargsyan and his team, which they will certainly need. Considering the considerable political power of the coalition, the declaration promises to maintain its rule well beyond the upcoming elections.

On February 4, the North Caucasian jihadist website Kavkaz-Tsentr published a video featuring the “Islamic Emirate of Caucasus” (IEC) rebel leader, Doku Umarov, in which he said a special operation would be carried out in Moscow. He threatened to “make this year a year of blood and tears” for Russians. Umarov said he had arrived at a base of the Riyadus Salikhiyn brigade before a mujahid was sent on a mission to Russia. Umarov appeared to be sitting beside Amir Khamzat, the chief of Riyadus Salikhiyn, and another person identified as “Mujahid Saifullah,” who was assigned to carry out an unspecified attack in response to the Russian government's actions in the North Caucasus.

Events in Egypt and Tunisia have already triggered apprehensive reactions from Central Asian governments and Azerbaijan.  These authoritarian governments, like Egypt, try to portray their domestic oppositions as Islamist while suppressing human rights and political opposition.  But the issues in Azerbaijan are somewhat different than those in Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s human rights problem is directly tied to the Iranian context.  Azerbaijan’s admittedly defective human rights situation is directly connected not only to Iranian policy but also to Iran’s own much more serious human rights violations.

On January 17, 2011, Kyrgyz authorities arrested several jihadists who had either been engaged in terrorist actions or planned to do so. The group was known as Jaysh al-Mahdi and its members were engaged in killing members of the local law enforcement, robbing U.S. citizens and attacking Jewish targets. They also planned an attack on the U.S. base in Manas. Most of the members of the group were ethnic Kyrgyz. These events indicate the continuous spread of jihadism to an area where it has not previously been recorded and the increasing interaction between jihadist forces throughout Eurasia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has pursued a narrow approach toward Afghanistan that focuses on countering narcotics trafficking from that country and little else. The SCO also engages in little concrete activity regarding Afghanistan besides issuing declarations. The SCO could more effectively achieve its goals in Afghanistan if the SCO focused on developing that country’s legal economy and improving its basic economic infrastructure, including that related to transportation. Measures to promote this goal could include financing joint projects in Afghanistan, reducing barriers to SCO trade with that country, and otherwise helping integrate Afghanistan into the rest of Central Asia.

In November 2010, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia renounced using force to recover its occupied territories in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  He further advocated resumption of dialogue with Russia and stated that Georgia would accept Russian membership in the World Trade Organization if Georgian border guards were posted in these territories, thereby recognizing Georgia’s sovereignty there. Saakashvili also urged the West to help foster a normalization of relations with Russia. Saakashvili here clearly took heed of long-standing Western and U.S. diplomatic representations to Georgia and in fact accepted one of Moscow’s prime demands, namely the renunciation of force. Yet Moscow responded predictably, saying it had nothing to say to Georgia.

As the security situation has worsened in the Northern Caucasus over the past several years, Russian political pundits have taken to theorizing as to what sort of state might emerge there should Moscow become unwilling – or perhaps unable – to maintain its suzerainty in the region. It might be assumed that any economic strategy embraced by this new state would be defined by the political viewpoint of its leadership. When it comes to formulating economic strategy, however, it would seem that Moscow bureaucrats, local pro-Moscow elites and public representatives of the rebel movement in the region are reading from the same manuals.

On December 21, 2010, Turkmenistan’s authorities suspended the license of the local branch of Russia’s major mobile service company Mobile TeleSystems (MTS). The sudden refusal of the authorities to renew or prolong the company’s license led to a major dispute between the Ministry of Communications of Turkmenistan and MTS. The suspension of the service also generated nationwide frustration and live queues of thousands of people across the country trying to quickly switch from MTS to the state owned Altyn Asyr (Golden Age) mobile service provider.

For almost a decade, India has been actively yet unsuccessfully seeking to establish a military foothold in Tajikistan, where it helped renovate the Ayni air base. The facility has long been on the radar screens of many powers, including the U.S., Russia, and France. For India, as a rapidly emerging power, the facility is particularly symbolic as it could be its first military base outside its national borders. Yet Tajikistan recently announced it was only negotiating with Russia on the use of the facility. Tajikistan’s security and economic cooperation with Russia and China and Dushanbe’s own balancing act among great powers have thus far thwarted Indian military ambitions in Central Asia.