Analytical Articles

Following the sudden passing of Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Bagapsh in May, Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia will hold a snap Presidential election on August 26. This coincides with South Ossetian leader Kokoity serving his last few months in office: unless the South Ossetian constitution is amended, Kokoity will have to step down and allow for elections in November. The outcome of the two elections is unlikely to have a considerable impact on the post-2008 status quo in the region. However – in Abkhazia in particular – the election processes will test the level influence enjoyed by Russia in the two regions and, as such, constitute an important measurement of their independence from Moscow.

During President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Tashkent on June 14, he and Uzbek President Islam Karimov indicated the need for joint approaches to deal with the common threat posed by the Arab revolutions to their rule and that of their neighbors. According to Medvedev, Russian national interest deemed it necessary “that (future) events develop along scenarios that are understandable and predictable for us”. Subsequently at the Tenth Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the members expressed the need to tighten security, with President Hu Jintao of China even advocating improved measures for rapid responses to crises. Undoubtedly revolutions along these lines featured prominently in their thinking.

In early April 2011, the Kyrgyz Government unveiled plans to join the Customs Union (CU) under the auspices of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) led by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. This has sparked heated debate in Kyrgyzstan on the pros and cons of the move, which has received mixed reactions from the expert community. While the CU’s economic rationality is questionable, its character as an institution designed to boost Russian influence over the CIS implies that Kyrgyzstan’s membership will come at the price of reducing its political and economic sovereignty.

With little discussion, Tajikistan’s parliament recently approved a number of government-proposed amendments to legislation. These amendments impose additional restrictions on religious education for Tajik nationals both at home and abroad. Young Tajiks seeking to study Islam abroad will now find it increasingly difficult or impossible to do so, and their options for studying religion at home will be limited to a few government-sanctioned schools. As a result, people wishing to learn more about the religion will have little other choice but to seek such education from clandestine groups.

One year after Kyrgyzstan adopted a parliamentary system the question arises whether a strong parliament can really ensure freedoms better than a centralized presidential system. Introduced after the violent regime change in 2010, Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary system was to bring greater openness and equality after a decade of authoritarian leadership. However, in a recent resolution, the parliament has moved to oppress civic freedoms and freedom of the mass media in a manner more closely resembling the typical governance of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, such moves have previously contributed to stirring social unrest in the country.

Some years ago, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov used the expression “strategic uncertainty” to describe the ambiguous geopolitical situation emerging in Central Asia due to the complex game played by great powers in and over the region. Recent trends in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, especially towards Afghanistan, reveal a strategic uncertainty in its own right due to Uzbekistan’s recent controversial moves on the international arena. In turn, this perplexity reflects the ambiguity of geopolitical trends in the entire region. Uzbekistan is well positioned to play a role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but needs to revise its foreign policy in line with emerging regional realities.

For the sixth year, the annual Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leadership summit declined to allow new countries to join the organization as full members or formal observers. There were strong expectations earlier this year that the June 15 gathering in Astana, which marked the institution’s tenth anniversary, would see the SCO leaders finally overcoming their expansion impasse, but this was not to be. Instead of expanding the number of full members, the SCO has resorted to proliferating new categories of external association. While the memberships of applicants such as India, Pakistan and Iran are opposed by key SCO members, Turkmenistan continues to show disinterest in the organization.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emerged as a clear and present danger to Pakistan’s national security. It is gaining confidence and aiming to expand its area of operations. Since Osama bin Laden’s death on May 2, TTP has killed at least 153 people and injured another 200 in various attacks to avenge bin Laden’s death. Amongst the targets were paramilitary cadets, a U.S. consulate convoy, and Pakistan Navy’s base PNS Mehran. TTP has global ambitions and has claimed responsibility for planning the attempted car bombing at Times Square in New York on July 7, 2010, and training the bomber Faisal Shahzad.

On May 26, the beheaded body of Shamil Jikayev, a venerated Ossetian poet and dean of the Department of Ossetian Philology of the North Ossetian State University was found in a village near the republic’s capital city of Vladikavkaz.  Three days later, in a fierce shootout with North Ossetian police forces, Jikayev’s alleged murderer, David Murashev, was shot dead. As Murashev, himself an Ossetian, is said by authorities to have turned to “radical Islam” few years earlier, this incident stirred up talks about the increasingly uncomfortable coexistence of Christian and Muslim communities within North Ossetia, renewing fears of the “jihadization” of a part of North Ossetian Muslims.   

China’s announcement earlier this year that it would restrict the export of rare earths caused a wave of anxiety among manufacturers, as the elements are used in the construction of everything from iPhones to cruise missiles. China’s sole source for the rare earths is a mine complex in Inner Mongolia near Baotou city. Beijing’s announcement has intensified efforts to find alternative sources of the vital minerals, with neighboring Mongolia quickly becoming a focus of international interest. Adding to Mongolia’s attractiveness is that its government has striven to become more investor friendly, with its Parliament amending the country’s Mining Law to take account of foreign investor concerns.