Analytical Articles

From its inception in 1992, the Russo-Chinese rapprochement has prominently featured Central Asia as the object of mutual geopolitical interests. Both governments have endeavored to prevent domestic unrest from receiving Central Asian support or from extending into all of Central Asia. This relationship sought to put Central Asia "on ice" and safeguard Russo-Chinese internal stability and territorial integrity. China hoped to do so by recognizing Russian leadership in Central Asia and by launching its own program of large-scale economic reform in Xinjiang. Such policies, intended to avert violence, actually make its incidence all the more likely.

Lieutenant General Feliks Kulov, Kyrgyzstan’s former Vice-President, former Minister of Defense, former Governor of the Chui region, former Mayor of Bishkek, and leader of the "Ar-Namys"(Dignity) opposition party was arrested in March after he had declared his candidacy to run in the presidential elections in December, 2000. He was accused of abuse of office, of selling military goods and of abetting official forgery. On August 7 after a long and complicated struggle for justice, Kulov was cleared of the charges against him. The release of Feliks Kulov from prison is sure to spell further trouble for Akaev’s government.

Under the "Go West" program announced last June, China intends to build up nine provinces including Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan, as well as the city of Chongqing, into the next motors of the country's economic development over the course of several decades. In this context, the chairman of the West-East Pipeline Project has announced that foreign investors would be welcome in all upstream and downstream phases of the project without limits. The reason, as he said, is that China lacks the skills, capital and technology to build the project on its own.

Russia has accused Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev of not only invading the Russian republic of Dagestan, but of masterminding a bombing campaign in Russia in fall of 1999. One of the stated aims of the recent Russian campaign in Chechnya is to destroy Basayev and his militia and end the rule of warlords in the self proclaimed Chechen state of Ichkeria. Russia claims its latest invasion of Chechnya is a defensive action to defend its borders from Chechen 'terrorists'. Bashayev, who had his foot blown off by a land mine, considers himself a modern incarnation of the legendary Caucasian mountain warrior/raiders ("abreks") and vows to continue the struggle against the Russians. There is every reason to believe that he will lead a determined partisan war against the Russian forces in Chechnya, a war that Russia has little hope of "winning."

Almost all analysis of Iranian nuclear capabilities focuses on the Middle East and Europe. Israel, Iraq, or US forces in the Gulf are presumably Tehran’s priority targets. While this assessment may be correct, it overlooks the strategic and political conundrums that will face Central Asia and Russia, which supports Iran’s proliferation, when Iran achieves that capability. Will Iran attempt nuclear blackmail against a Transcaucasian and/or Central Asian state? And like Pakistan in its incitement of conflicts in Kashmir, will Iranian nuclearization lead Iran to support secessionist minorities throughout the region in the belief that other nuclear states are deterred by its capability?

An 'arc of instability' ranges from the Caucasus, over the Caspian Sea through Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These areas have in common the weakness of state authority, the lack of legitimate let alone democratic institutions, protracted economic difficulties and widespread poverty, porous borders, as well as the salience of ethnic tensions and religious extremism. Washington needs to be involved in the Caspian-Asian region to maintain a security balance, ensure the safe flow of oil, and undermine activities such as terrorism and drug trade that threaten its declared vital interests--the area certainly warrants priority status in America's global agenda.

Following the shock of the Russian financial collapse in August 1997, the Central Asian states experienced a deteriorating regional trade environment. But efforts to combat trafficking of drugs, weapons, and terrorism have inclined the states into self-protective policies, defeating prospects for greater regional cooperation. Recently, the Central Asian presidents, with the exception of Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, agreed to recreate a common economic space and to develop a five-year strategy of economic development and integration to establish a Central Asian free trade zone.

The U.S. Justice Department confirmed at the beginning of July that James Giffen, a New York banker and official adviser to Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, was under investigation for laundering money to Switzerland. Giffen had served as an advisor to Kazakhstan’s president during negotiations with Western oil companies for drilling rights. Giffen is under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is likely that this investigation will continue and implicate more than just James Giffen before the end of the Clinton administration.

The governments of Central Asian perceive the Internet as a threat. For years, the Central Asia governments have been harassing journalists, closing down TV stations, and penalizing independent news outlets for alleged tax violations and administrative abuses. The Internet has become the latest battleground in the war to control information. With control, the governments would have a potent tool to restrict information without the inconvenience of attacks from brick-and-mortar news organizations. But repressing information is a losing battle, as the region greatly needs the access to new ideas and political alternatives that the Internet provides.

Uyghur militants are acquiring much wider connections to the world-wide Jihad movement than ever before, forcing Beijing to cast an equally wide net to contain them. China has no option but to become a major player in Central Asia due to this rising tide of Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang province, along with security threats along its long and porous borders with three Central Asian republics, weapons and drug smuggling, and Islamic militancy from Taliban controlled Afghanistan. China's regional partner in this drive for security is likely to be Iran, rather than its long time ally Pakistan, Russia or the United States. An increased Chinese military and political presence in the region will further complicate the Great Game of influence in Central Asia.