Analytical Articles

Even as bombs rain on Kabul and Kandahar, plans for a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan are advancing on every front.  Some of these plans should be cause for concern. In particular, voices are advocating a federal solution for post-Taliban Afghanistan. While federalism has many virtues in the developed world, it is an inherently problematic non-solution to the reality in Afghanistan. Afghanistan needs a unitary government, but one that accords a substantial role to local initiative.

Turkey’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia have been focused on diplomatic, political and economic issues. In particular, attention to energy issues has been prevalent. While pursuing its own interests, Turkey has been careful not to antagonize Russia or Iran. However, in the last few months Turkey’s approach has acquired a dramatically increased military component. The standoff with Iran in the Caspian sea initiated this trend, but has continued with Turkey’s pledge to involve itself in the war in Afghanistan.

A meaningful yet vague ending of the Musharraf-Vajpayee Agra Summit may have been caused by hard-line approaches, probably at some bureaucratic level. An opportunity to acclimatize the impact of post-Soviet geopolitical realities on South and Central Asian affairs appears postponed, if not lost. Being land-locked is not only hurting the economic and political development of central Asia but also equally hindering similar processes in both southern and western Asia. The geopolitical access of Pakistan to Central Asia had been among the major motivations behind both Vajpayee’s 1999 Lahore visit and the July summit. Domestic politics in both India and Pakistan and the prospects of new opportunities in Central Asia seem to be reshaping the perceptions of Indian and Pakistani leadership to normalize relations and resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Routing the pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean coast through Armenia has been excluded from almost all the economic projects for transport of Caspian oil due to the political situation in the Caucasus, though Armenia would be the most cost-effective route. Notwithstanding, all pipelines pass close to Armenia’s borders, implying Armenia’s role in Caucasian security cannot be dissociated from pipeline politics. Armenia’s inclusion in the regional energy architecture is hence long overdue.

Almost all the Central European countries but also Baltic States, Georgia and Mongolia acceded to WTO. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan was the 133th country in 1998 to obtain the full-fledged membership but things have remained unchanged so far. Central Asia is lagging behind voluntarily. Having an economy in transition in not a valuable excuse because many countries, which experienced the same chaos, have joined the organization. The internal situation in these states and the WTO perception of Central Asia mainly explain why these countries are not fighting hard to become members of the Geneva-based organization. The accession of a Central Asian country is not to be expected in the near future. Even in the long term, the entry of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan seems rather problematic.

Recent political events have demonstrated the increasing tension in intra- and inter-state relations in the Caucasus, and have revealed the fragility of the current no-war-no-peace situation. The failure of Armenia and Azerbaijan to progress toward a settlement of the dispute, as was expected, has increased the risk of a renewed war. Instability has increased in Georgia too. In June and July, there was a growing demand by the opposition parties for a war to end the practical independence of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also, tensions have risen in two other regions. In July, the supporters of deceased President Zviad Gamsakhurdia demanded autonomy for their region, while ties between Ajaria and the Georgian central government worsened. Should the current fragile situation continue, there is an increasing danger that the entire Caucasus will be drowned into conflict and instability. Such a scenario would have dire political and economic consequences for the region and its neighbors.

The increased pace of negotiations between Armenia ad Azerbaijan this spring led to great optimism, especially given the high level U.S. interest in the conflict. Increased U.S. cooperation with Moscow has been repeatedly praised. While this is a positive development, there is a risk of this cooperation becoming an end in itself while Russia is aggressively pursuing its interests in the region without any western reaction. The situation calls for a principled U.S. approach where the achievement of a lasting peace is seen as the main objective, rather than as a vehicle for ‘cooperation’ with Moscow.

On 31 July, Chechen and Russian civilians would have begun a peace march from Grozny to Moscow had its organizers not been prevented through unceasing FSB harassment. Nevertheless, calls for peace have been heard from many quarters: the refugees in Ingushetia who have signed petitions, formed active grass roots societies, and been on hunger strike for well over a month. Recent opinion polls show that less than a third of Russians support the war. Several Russian Duma deputies, some Russian generals, the democratic press, prominent pro-Russian Chechens, and Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov have all endorsed talks. Only President Putin, his immediate entourage, and other chekisty have consistently opposed such talks. They have used this war to instill fear in society and solidify authoritarian practices in Russia.

Doubts about the completion of the Blue Stream project have recently been fueled, first by the continuing crisis in Turkey's economy, including a corruption investigation into the contract itself; and second, by proponents of the long-stalled Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project for Turkmenistan's gas to be taken across the Caspian Sea floor and then into Turkey via an overland pipeline through Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, there is little reason to believe that Blue Stream will not come on line, even if this happens a little later than scheduled. More important, the project sets the stage for deeper industrial cooperation between Turkey and Russia in other sectors including defense production. A strategic entente between the two countries may arise over time on the basis of convergence over particular issues such as an already-existing tacit agreement not to discuss either Chechnya or the Kurds.

The UNDCP has verified that the Taliban’s ban on growing opium is close to 100 per cent effective in the areas of Afghanistan it controls. While traffickers can draw on substantial stocks to continue the trade in the short run, sooner or later they will run out of "product" if the ban is sustained. This has serious implications for Tajikistan, which became a major transit route for Afghan opium and heroin in the late 1990’s. The profit for getting the opium and heroin across Tajikistan probably measures in the range of $100 to $300 million a year, which has come at the time of the implementation of a fragile peace accord. While a decline in trafficking is ultimately positive, the short term loss of this income will hurt the already struggling economy and could drive the traffickers into alternative money-raising schemes.