Analytical Articles

In 2011, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation initiated the creation of a Eurasian Union. This largely amounted to a restoration of the historically recurring idea of reunifying the former Soviet Republics, albeit on a new, “democratic” basis. The initiative revealed, however, a new trend – a geopolitical reversal in the post-Soviet space. By and large, this trend seems incapable of taking the upper hand over other geopolitical tendencies that have been unfolding in this part of the world since 1991 due to the lack of exactly a “democratic foundation”.

The sanctions recently introduced by the U.S. and other states against Iran over its continuing nuclear program constitute the culmination of two years of discussion in the U.S. Congress, the UN, the EU and the IAEA. However, it is unclear whether Iranian investments in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field through the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) will be subject to the new sanctions. Their omission in the new round of sanctions through the Iran Threat Reductions Act (ITRA) makes the Shah Deniz project safe for now. 

During the past year, the Obama administration has developed its first comprehensive strategy for Central Asia. The strategy is still closely tied to Afghanistan, but the intent is to construct a more benign regional environment in which the U.S. and its NATO allies can transfer leadership responsibilities to the Kabul government and its security forces as well as the supporting regional actors. If implemented, the U.S. would remain vigorously engaged in Central Asia in order to promote its security, good governance, and socioeconomic development while these governments partner to support Afghanistan. Yet, as noted in a comprehensive report on "Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan" published last December by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, the strategy faces several major impediments that must be overcome in 2012.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), involving 7 CIS members, each held summits in Moscow on December 20, 2011, where Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov took part. In October, 2011, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made a highly critical statement towards Uzbekistan for the “triple game” the country plays in its foreign policy. Such a game is incompatible with Uzbekistan’s membership in the CSTO, Lukashenko said. Uzbekistan’s participation in the CSTO and CIS summits two months later can be considered a response to Lukashenko’s critique.

From its inception, the Arab spring has had an international cast as revolutions in one country have inspired subsequent revolutions across the Middle East. Consequently there has been much speculation as to whether this inspiration or example could carry over to post-Soviet Eurasia. Clearly the possibility of such a diffusion or inspiration has profoundly frightened leaders in Russia and Eurasia. A mixture of repression and economic concessions imply that leaders in Russia, Belarus and Central Asia have sought to forestall the possibility of aroused public protests. However, these facts hardly exhaust the international implications of the Arab Spring for Eurasia. 

On December 16, when Kazakhstan was celebrating the 20th anniversary of its independence, the small industrial town of Zhanaozen situated in the western Mangystau region was rocked by bloody demonstrations organized by local oil industry workers. With the official count reaching 17 killed and about 100 wounded, some critically, this episode of social unrest sparked negative reactions in both national and foreign media. It also revealed the existence of serious social problems in a region largely believed to continually provide economic opportunities for its population due to the constant inflow of petrodollars.

The NATO attack on a Pakistani outpost on November 26 has resulted in another cold phase in the relations between Pakistan and the U.S. Pakistan reacted strongly to the attack and blocked all NATO supplies to Afghanistan, asked the U.S. military to vacate the Shamsi base and boycotted the Bonn conference. The main question now is whether the two states will still be able to find avenues to improve their relations. Much depends on whether the U.S. will prove willing to address Islamabad’s concerns regarding the future of Afghanistan.

A major CSTO military exercise took place in September 2011, involving Russia and some of the Central Asian members. The exercise was officially aimed at countering threats posed by the potential spread of jihadists from Afghanistan. However, it also involved naval exercises aimed at preventing the construction of an alternative gas line between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. This implies that the CSTO, which does not have a track record of efficiency, is unlikely to ensure stability in Central Asia in the case of major crisis. It is also unlikely that Putin’s recent initiative to create a Eurasian Union will enhance the prospects for creating a viable military alliance in Central Asia.

The November 26 NATO air assault against two Pakistani border posts, killing two dozen Pakistanis, was the most serious “friendly fire” incident along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the decade-long NATO intervention. But the likelihood of cross-border incidents has increased since the involvement of Pakistan-based insurgents in the fighting in Afghanistan has prompted the Afghan and NATO governments to adopt a more vigorous policy along the frontier. The worsening relations between NATO and Pakistan and the closure of the border to NATO convoys has increased the importance of the Northern Distribution Network to the allied mission in Afghanistan, and has underscored the need to draft more effective rules of engagement in the border region.