Analytical Articles

On December 7, 2012 Russia began construction of its South Stream gas pipeline.  Earlier in 2012 the European consortium behind the Nabucco pipeline formally submitted a revised scenario called Nabucco West to Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan and Turkey announced plans to build the Transanatolian pipeline or TANAP from the Shah Deniz gas field to Turkey’s border with Bulgaria. Nabucco West would then take gas all the way into Central Europe. Hence, Azerbaijan is now emerging as a potential major gas supplier to Eastern European states, whose governments are now eagerly courting Azerbaijan. This also means that Azerbaijan is emerging as Russia’s rival in this market.

Since January 17, a special operation has been underway in the wooded mountains of Chechnya’s Shatoy and Vedeno districts. Following a week of intense fighting, the infamous Gakayev brothers, in command of the Southeast Chechen wing of the Caucasus Emirate, were killed, along with around eleven members of their group including emir Abuyezid Jabrailov. The recent success of the kadyrovtsy units is likely to considerably weaken the Chechen sector of the North Caucasus insurgency, even though it is still premature to anticipate the end of hostilities in this war-torn region of Russia.

Pakistan has handed over the management of its southeastern Gwadar deep-sea port to the China Overseas Port Holdings after failing to turn the strategically located port into a financial success. With an outpost on the entry to the risk-prone Strait of Hormuz, China not only secures its petroleum supply through the shortest land route but also mounts a challenge to the U.S. and India in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan’s reliance on China as a partner has increased significantly during its post-9/11 engagement with the U.S. While Islamabad seems relieved by its belated act, Beijing seems to shift some pressure it has been withstanding in South China Sea.

Pakistan understands and realizes that a stable Afghanistan is key to its own stability. A number of issues are of crucial importance for the improvement of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: the Durand line, the return of Afghan refugees, the Indian presence in Afghanistan, and the implementation of various pipeline projects transporting Central Asian oil and gas through Gwadar. Above all, Pakistan wants a stable and friendly Afghanistan which does not pose a threat or allow any other state to use its territory against Pakistan. After 2014, will Pakistan and Afghanistan develop a neighborly relationship or will Afghanistan become another theatre for India-Pakistan rivalry?

At their January 11 meeting, Presidents Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai pledged renewed cooperation as they transition the lead role in the Afghan War to the Kabul government. But many in Washington and beyond also saw this affair as an attempt to manage, if not a divorce, than at least a separation, as to the two leaders and their countries move off in different directions. Yet, the painfully slow peace talks, the expected upsurge in fighting as winter wanes, and the uncertainties surrounding the upcoming Afghan elections makes evident that the two sides may not be able to disentangle their fates anytime soon.

There has been an increase in Hizb ut-Tahrir members operating in northern Kyrgyzstan after the ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. This can be attributed to the high numbers of displaced persons who fled from the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad to Bishkek, the dissatisfaction of ethnic Uzbeks with Kyrgyzstan’s government for its failure to protect ethnic Uzbeks, and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s effective recruiting methods. These developments do not imply an Islamist political change in Kyrgyzstan; it is one of the factors that are widening the country’s divide between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups, and between religiously conservative and secular segments of society.

In November 2012, Russian authorities discovered a criminal scheme designed to transfer considerable amounts of gold from the Magadan region in Russia to the North Caucasus where it is used to finance the insurgency. These and similar criminal activities indicate important changes in the financial arrangements of the North Caucasian resistance. While foreign funding played a considerable role in the early years of the resistance, such sources have clearly declined, inducing Russian Islamists to rely increasingly on the domestic sources, and engage in a constant process of innovation. Increasing connections between jihadists and common criminals and in some respects a criminalization of the movement which is absorbing many features of the criminal underworld facilitate this process.

Eight candidates are nominated to run in Armenia’s presidential elections scheduled for February 18, in which the incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan seeks re-election for a second five-year term. However, despite the abundance of nominees, no close struggle is expected and Sargsyan is in a good position to be reelected with relative ease. The official election campaign started on January 21 but a number of candidates began their public addresses ahead of this date. Others who had their candidate registrations rejected have declared that their rights have been violated and that they will pursue these by judicial means.

Georgian politics have entered a turbulent period after the October parliamentary elections. The situation is exacerbated by a difficult cohabitation process between the newly elected government of Bidzina Ivanishvili and the outgoing President Mikheil Saakashvili. While both sides are reluctant to engage in cooperation and the prospects for a stabilization of Georgia’s political life are limited, the election also marks an important crossroads in the country’s emerging foreign and security policy. While many uncertainties remain regarding Georgia’s new foreign policy, it has opened an opportunity to repair Georgia’s relations with Russia. While such prospects could help alleviating Georgia’s security predicament, they also contain risks to the country’s long term strategic interests.

Despite repeated statements by Kazakhstani and Chinese officials that they aim to increase mutual defense ties, the bilateral defense military between the two countries remains modest, especially compared with their growing economic, energy, diplomatic, and even security cooperation. However, the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the region, combined with an inability of Russia to maintain general security in Central Asia, could compel Kazakhstan and China to establish much deeper defense ties sooner than either side would currently prefer. China’s growing economic presence in the region is compelling it to also develop strategies for protecting its investments, which should gradually also increase Beijing’s security influence in the region.