Analytical Articles

Following the parliamentary elections and Bidzina Ivanishvili’s installation as Prime Minister, Georgia has undergone a series of arrests of former high government officials and members of the security establishment. While the now ruling coalition Georgian Dream (GD) promised during the election campaign that it would prosecute alleged misdeeds of the former government, the actions also carry the signs of a politically motivated campaign to weaken the former ruling party. While the case can be made that certain practices of the previous government should be investigated and prosecuted, the pattern of arrests risks damaging Georgia’s relations with international partners as well as its domestic development process.

In recent years, Moscow has considerably been reducing the share of conscripts to the Russian Army from the republics of the North Caucasus, particularly from Dagestan. Military service remains popular in Dagestan, in stark contrast to much of the Russian Federation. Yet, the changing draft policy appear to be motivated by the perceived difficulty of North Caucasians to conform with the hierarchic traditions of the Russian army, and by the dangers of providing young Dagestanis with military training in the context of the North Caucasus insurgency, which is increasingly centered on Dagestan.

Whatever their political affiliation, Georgians can join with Russia’s other neighbors in contemplating how the leadership changes in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) might affect their security. During his years as Russia’s first civilian defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov and the Russian government made the unprecedented decision to purchase expensive Western defense equipment. The decision was designed partly to fill gaps in Russian military capabilities, and partly to use the threat of foreign competition to induce its military-industrial complex to modernize its means of production and contain its costs. Now the recent shakeup in the leadership of suggests that Russian policy makers are reconsidering their decision to import advanced foreign military equipment and experts.  

Shifts in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy over the fall, including the decision to “suspend” its membership in the Russia-sponsored CSTO and President Islam Karimov’s announcement in September that conflict over water distribution in Central Asia could lead to war, have led both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to boost their defense-related cooperation with Russia. Recent developments open for new geopolitical arrangements in the region with an increased potential for military conflicts. However, the constant flux in Central Asia’s geopolitical configurations escapes easy prediction and the region’s current tendency toward division into two opposite political and military camps is just one among many trends

Starting in early October, troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense are again participating in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North Caucasus. The recent decision of the Moscow-based National Anti-Terrorist Council to bring the army back to the area has marked another shift in Russia’s longstanding efforts to break down the Islamist insurgency rooted in the Caucasus Emirate, a virtual theocracy claiming the territories of the North Caucasus. While the reintroduction of the army to the theater reflects a need to combat the insurgency in rural areas, the new tactics involved imply an increased risk of civilian casualties as well as coordination problems with local law enforcement.

While Georgia in October succeeded in carrying out its first truly competitive election since independence, the power transition process has not come without controversy. A number of incidents, including the arrests of members of the former governing elite, suggest the challenges ahead in achieving political collaboration and dialogue. Yet the post-election process carries important opportunities as well. Georgian politics now possess the components of pluralism and competition that have been largely missing since the Rose Revolution. Thus, given enough time, and, importantly, continued support from Georgia’s Western partners, the coming months will provide important momentum for further consolidation of Georgian democracy.

The security of Central Asia partly depends on the ability of these countries to transition from the state-controlled and inefficient command economic systems they inherited from the Soviet Union to more dynamic free-market economies, which can more easily attract foreign investment and generate employment and economic growth. These enhancements could reduce potential sources of domestic alienation and provide their governments with more resources to support regional security initiatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Silk Road strategies of the U.S. and other countries also would achieve greater success if the Central Asian countries were more dynamic and better integrated into global economic processes. Uzbekistan and its recently announced economic reforms is a case in point.

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was responsible for a series of bomb blasts and knife attacks in Hotan, Xinjiang last year in which reportedly more than 20 people were killed and many more were injured. Chinese officials pointed out that these militants were trained in the Pakistani tribal areas and hence for the first time publicly blamed Pakistan for the troubles in its Xinjiang province, in a state media broadcast during an official visit of Pakistan’s then Inter-Services Intelligence chief. Islamabad and Beijing are already cooperating closely on anti-terrorism issues but if not addressed properly, this issue can become a major irritant between the two countries.

As the U.S. and ISAF forces leave Afghanistan, U.S. policy in Central Asia must necessarily change too, from a primarily military strategy into one based on economics and political support. Continued military emphasis is ruled out because there is no discernible military threat other than Afghanistan, because Washington cannot afford protracted military deployments, and because such deployments would further antagonize Moscow and Beijing and confirm those governments’ deepest suspicions about U.S. objectives. However, can the New Silk Road, Washington’s highly touted economic program of building infrastructure and trading networks among Central and South Asian states,  fill the place of military forces in enhancing security and stability in Central Asia?

As fighters from militant groups based in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia transfer from one theater to other “hot” conflict zones, they are able to share their experiences and skills with a newer, younger generation of militants. Militants who are European citizens are uniquely valuable in this form of knowledge transfer because their passports allow them to travel with less scrutiny than non-Europeans. The recently made public story of Moez Garsallaoui, a Tunisian-born Swiss citizen who became the amir of Jund al-Khilafah and mentored the French citizen of Algerian descent Mohammed Merah, exemplifies how this knowledge transfer works and how it can help internationalize otherwise nationally or regionally-oriented militant groups.