REGIONAL REALIGNMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA?
Shifts in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy over the fall, including the decision to “suspend” its membership in the Russia-sponsored CSTO and President Islam Karimov’s announcement in September that conflict over water distribution in Central Asia could lead to war, have led both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to boost their defense-related cooperation with Russia. Recent developments open for new geopolitical arrangements in the region with an increased potential for military conflicts. However, the constant flux in Central Asia’s geopolitical configurations escapes easy prediction and the region’s current tendency toward division into two opposite political and military camps is just one among many trends
BACKGROUND: While all Central Asian countries have their own foreign policy ambitions, Uzbekistan stands out as the most assertive among them. While emerging as one of the key U.S. allies in Central Asia after 2001, Tashkent’s relationship to Washington soured after the 2005 Andijan massacre. The U.S. evacuated the Karshi-Kanabad airbase and Karimov instead aligned with Moscow. The close ties with Russia seemed to be reinforced further during President Putin’s visit to Tashkent in June 2012, when he was warmly greeted by Karimov.
Yet shortly thereafter, Karimov made a foreign policy U-turn, proclaiming that Tashkent would suspend its participation in the Russia-sponsored military alliance CSTO (see the 09/05/2012 issue of the CACI Analyst). Instead, Tashkent has sought to refurbish its relationship with the U.S., which has seemingly responded to Tashkent’s advances and downplayed the obstacle to enhanced cooperation previously posed by the authoritarian nature of the Uzbek regime. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tashkent in August 2012 and was later followed by U.S. military top brass who visited Tashkent in October 2012, which implicitly promised Karimov a substantial amount of military hardware – leftovers from the war in Afghanistan – and other similar assistance. These developments alarmed Bishkek and Dushanbe and pushed them closer to Russia albeit their move toward Moscow was not decisive and still enables them to engage with other possible sponsors. In addition, Moscow and Washington are far from fully committed to any of the three Central Asian republics. Hence, the increasing prospects for military conflict in the region by no means necessitate the direct involvement of the great powers.
IMPLICATIONS: In similarity with Uzbekistan, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan display unstable foreign policy behavior. While both countries have long participated in Russia-sponsored security arrangements under the CSTO, their relations with Moscow have been turbulent in the past year. The newly elected president of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambaev, was disappointed during his early visits to Moscow in February 2012, as he did not receive the expected financial help or other tangible support, and retorted by questioning the continued presence of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan; especially in the absence of Russian rent payments. Rather than Moscow, Ankara has emerged as a key patron for Bishkek and Atambaev has embarked on several trips to Turkey. Bishkek has later managed to raise the rent for Russian basing rights and received promises of considerable military help and investments, while it retains its ties with Turkey, China and the U.S.
Simultaneously, the relationship between Dushanbe and Moscow has worsened considerably over the last year. The problems first emerged when Dushanbe arrested two Russian pilots in November 2011, whose plane crossed Tajikistan’s airspace without permission. In retaliation, Moscow threatened to deport thousands of Tajik guest workers and some Russian nationalists even suggested that Russia could use its military forces deployed to Tajikistan to liberate the pilots and the plane. Following the Kyrgyz model, Dushanbe demanded a huge payment for allowing Moscow to keep the base in republic.
Yet, Uzbekistan’s shift toward the U.S. and the potential of a dramatic increase in Uzbekistan’s military capability, combined with Karimov’s direct threat of war, had implications for both Dushanbe and Bishkek, both of which have unresolved problems with Tashkent. While the regulation of rivers and water supplies remains the most serious problem, both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have territorial disputes with Uzbekistan and the Tajik elite claims that Bukhara and Samarkand – two ancient cities presently in Uzbekistan – are actually Tajik cities. Kyrgyzstan has a considerable Uzbek population which was brutally attacked during the 2010 revolution. In light of Uzbekistan’s increasingly assertive posture in the region, Russia has emerged as the most plausible patron for both Dushanbe and Bishkek, who clearly lack alternatives. These developments imply a possible scenario featuring two military and geopolitical alliances with a U.S.-backed Uzbekistan on one side opposing Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with Russia as major sponsor. Yet, this is just one of many possible trends and firmer alliances between the regional states and their geopolitical patrons are yet to develop.
While Kyrgyzstan expresses its interest in a closer relationship with Russia, it simultaneously develops its economic and military ties with Turkey – a NATO member with currently problematic relations to Russia due to its support for the Syrian revolution. Bishkek’s economic relations with Beijing continue to grow and Atambaev’s administration has maintained a good relationship with Tbilisi throughout President Saakashvili’s tenure in spite of Moscow’s attempts to isolate Georgia internationally. A similar flexibility can be observed on Uzbekistan’s part. Tashkent has merely “suspended” its membership in the CSTO but stopped short of exiting the organization, leaving the door half open for a future change in posture. Moscow has also refrained from making any absolute commitments to either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. In the case of Tajikistan, it has not directly supported the construction of the Rogun dam and sought to appease Tashkent by inviting it to participate in the hydroelectric project.
The current trend toward the formation of two opposing military alliances in Central Asia is clear but open-ended. The increasing interplay between external powers in the region over the past decades increasingly allows the regional states to continually recalibrate their foreign policies in response to regional geopolitical developments. Bishkek’s relations with Turkey and China aside from its ties to Russia are telling in this regard. In addition, it remains to be seen whether Bishkek will close the U.S. airbase at Manas.
As all parties involved continue to maintain divergent geopolitical relationships on the side and entertain a variety of options, the present trend could well change and in any case, the process of building alliances in Central Asia or elsewhere evidently does not follow a rigid Cold War model.
CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s quest for a dominant position in Central Asia and Tashkent’s quarrel with Dushanbe and Bishkek over water distribution in the area has led to an increasing threat of military conflict. In this situation, both Bishkek and Dushanbe are currently seeking assistance from Moscow as Tashkent improves its relationship to Washington. Yet, all three states clearly entertain a variety of geopolitical options. Not only are the small states of Central Asia skeptical of the support to be had from any of the stronger global players but these players also refrain from firm commitments to their potential clients.
While a military confrontation between Uzbekistan and its neighbors cannot be excluded, such a conflict would not imply any direct participation of either the U.S. or Russia. Moreover, the support that Russia or the U.S. would be willing to provide for their prospective regional clients would be limited at best. In any case, the current trend is just one among many in the complex geopolitics of Central Asia.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.
