RUSSIA REDEPLOYS ARMY TO DAGESTAN
Starting in early October, troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense are again participating in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North Caucasus. The recent decision of the Moscow-based National Anti-Terrorist Council to bring the army back to the area has marked another shift in Russia’s longstanding efforts to break down the Islamist insurgency rooted in the Caucasus Emirate, a virtual theocracy claiming the territories of the North Caucasus. While the reintroduction of the army to the theater reflects a need to combat the insurgency in rural areas, the new tactics involved imply an increased risk of civilian casualties as well as coordination problems with local law enforcement.
BACKGROUND: The Russian army was gradually pulled out of the North Caucasus between 2004 and 2006 after crushing an insurgency largely concentrated within Chechnya’s borders. Subsequently, the burden of fighting a counterinsurgent war was placed on the Ministry of Interior (MVD), while also encouraging the participation of local police units. The kadyrovtsy units in Chechnya, formally part of the republic’s interior ministry, have proven quite effective in carrying out counterinsurgent activities supported by the East and West battalions, composed of Chechens and subordinated to the GRU until their disbandment in 2008.
The reintroduction of army units is concentrated to Dagestan, a republic of three million east of Chechnya that has recently become the hotbed of Islamist insurgency (see the 09/29/2010 issue of the CACI Analyst). According to some estimates, army units numbering up to 40,000 troops have been located in a number of mountainous areas (Botlikh, Buynaksk) and on the crucial Khasavyurt-Makhachkala route, as well as in the outskirts of the Dagestani capital. What made Moscow reassess its strategy in the North Caucasus, opting for the redeployment of army units in the counterinsurgency campaign?
In fact, Moscow is actively strengthening its military presence in the region, with a particular focus on Dagestan. In the spring months of 2012, it deployed up to 25,000 MVD police units to Dagestan, the majority of which had previously been stationed in Chechnya. The recent decision to deploy army units to Dagestan seems to have been made in August or September and confirms that the success of the MVD troops has been limited. Indeed, the police units recruited from all over the Russian Federation and deployed to Dagestan for only a few months have proven incapable of grasping the peculiarities of local counterinsurgency warfare. In addition, the death toll on MVD troops deployed in the Dagestan campaign has increased steadily in recent months.
IMPLICATIONS: Notwithstanding the application of better tactics including concentrated attacks on insurgent cells in geographically close areas while simultaneously cutting off ways of retreat, particularly main roads from the urban centers to rural areas in the mountains, the insurgency has survived and even proved capable of carrying out deadly attacks. While the pressure exerted on insurgents in urban areas seems to have been rather effective, the isolation of the urban and rural bases of local jamaats has largely failed. As a rule, the insurgents have escaped from urban areas unarmed and unidentifiable, rendering the police tactic of blocking the main roads inefficient. Drawing on the support of local populations, the insurgents have in large numbers moved to rural areas and taken advantage of their extended network of mountain bases that have provided them with shelter and munitions for relatively long periods.
MVD units have demonstrated little efficiency in mountainous areas, not least since they lack heavy weaponry. While useless in urban warfare, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and especially artillery and aircraft including military helicopters are key to success in mountainous terrain. Across the North Caucasus, the MVD has relied on one single artillery battalion. Communication between the MVD and army units during episodes when army weaponry has been used has displayed serious shortcomings as well, as exemplified by the heavy casualties inflicted on counterinsurgent forces during the fighting on the Chechnya-Dagestan border in February. This seems to be one of the reasons for reintroducing battalion tactical groups to the region. In addition, MVD units lack the sufficient experience and skills to carry out effective counterinsurgency warfare in mountainous terrain and the redeployment of army units is intended to compensate for this.
According to some sources, Moscow also plans to resurrect the so-called VSOG (Temporary Specialized Operative Groups) that used to be widely employed throughout the North Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya. The core of these groups consisted of three high ranking and highly professional MVD officers, who were directly subordinated to the MVD command in Moscow and thus exempt from the authority of local operative headquarters in the North Caucasus, as well as local police forces. Instead, local police were obliged to provide the VSOG with any necessary support including weapons and reinforcement during special operations. As a rule, VSOG units were deployed to regions for periods of at least one month with the aim of liquidating key members of the insurgency or carrying out special operations based on intelligence that could not be entrusted to the local police whose loyalty was often doubted in Moscow.
The VSOG groups have been found responsible for a significant number of “disappearances” and extrajudicial executions that has ensured them a vicious reputation among the local populations and police forces. The upcoming deployment of VSOG groups to Dagestan is testimony to Moscow’s doubt regarding the loyalty of local Dagestani police. Yet, the presence of such units in the republic will likely deepen the already existing animosity between local police and federal security forces. In any case, the deployment of VSOG groups to Dagestan illustrates that in addition to engaging the army, Moscow is willing to use all tools at its disposal to combat the Islamist insurgency.
The deployment of army units to Dagestan has already caused serious discontent among the local population. A widely discussed incident in the relatively independent Dagestani media was a concentrated attack carried out on October 9 by heavy bomber aircraft and helicopters on targets on the Tarki-Tau Mountain close to Agachaul outside Makhachkala. The attack was launched at 5 a.m., causing panic among local residents who had not been informed about the barrage. It seems that the authorities made no attempt to ensure there were no civilians on the wooded mountain that is otherwise a favorite location for picnics and camping among locals as well as Makhachkala residents.
Similar massive attacks employing heavy bombers were recently carried out in the Khasavyurt district and some other areas of the republic, stirring serious discontent among locals.
CONCLUSIONS: It is likely that military operations involving army units and heavy weaponry will be considerably more indiscriminate and destructive than actions by MVD troops. This risk increases in the case of Dagestan where insurgents draw on the tangible support of local populations particularly in rural areas. While cutting off popular support is an indispensable part of counterinsurgency operations, a rising death toll among Dagestani non-combatants will cause more Dagestanis to opt for revenge and increase local support for the insurgency.
Even though Russian authorities assert that they will primarily use GRU elite troops in the fighting, these will obviously constitute a tiny share of the dozens of thousands of army troops deployed to Dagestan and some other critical areas of the North Caucasus where insurgency has been on the rise. Instead, army units comprising contract units, the so-called kontraktniki, and a portion of young recruits will be deployed which might cause serious pitfalls. First, while relatively more professional than young recruits, the contract units are known for their inclination toward xenophobia and racism especially toward Caucasian peoples. Hence the likelihood of conflict between the contract units, predominantly composed of ethnic Russians, and local police in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus will rise, complicating the cooperation between the different forces involved in the counterinsurgency campaign. Many local police officers resent the ongoing transfer of tactical command and financial means to federal police and army forces.
The growing conflict among local police and federal security forces reduces the ultimate chances of conducting an effective counterinsurgency campaign, which requires a close coordination between police units employed in urban warfare and army units deployed in rural areas.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Emil Souleimanov is assistant professor at the Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Wars in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia Reconsidered (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming in 2013) and An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007).
