While Georgia in October succeeded in carrying out its first truly competitive election since independence, the power transition process has not come without controversy. A number of incidents, including the arrests of members of the former governing elite, suggest the challenges ahead in achieving political collaboration and dialogue. Yet the post-election process carries important opportunities as well. Georgian politics now possess the components of pluralism and competition that have been largely missing since the Rose Revolution. Thus, given enough time, and, importantly, continued support from Georgia’s Western partners, the coming months will provide important momentum for further consolidation of Georgian democracy.
BACKGROUND: On October 1 Georgia held its 7th parliamentary election since independence, which concluded in defeat of President Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) party against the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition, headed by business tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili. While the votes were still being counted, President Saakashvili went on national television conceding defeat, and shortly thereafter appointed Ivanishvili as the country’s new Prime Minister. On October 25, a new cabinet, largely dominated by members of the GD coalition, was formed.
While the execution of a peaceful and competitive election constituted an important step in Georgia’s democratization process, the post-election period has proven challenging. Since taking office, Mr. Ivanishvili has embarked on a determined route to clean up in what he throughout his election campaign referred to as mismanaged political structures. Among the most significant actions in this regard were the arrests of former Defense and Interior Minister Bacho Akhalaia – largely blamed for the prison abuse scandal that unfolded in the week before the election - and the Chief of the Armed Forces, Giorgi Kalandadze. Akhalaia, who left Georgia shortly after the October election, returned on November 5 with the stated ambition of responding to any allegations posed against him. Shortly thereafter Akhalaia, along with Kalandadze and 4th brigade commander Zurab Shamatava, were arrested and charged with abuse of powers and illegal deprivation of freedom of prisoners. On November 10, Kalandadze and Shamatava were released on bail, while Akhalaia remains in pre-trial detention, awaiting trial. The arrests have been strongly criticized by the UNM, which refers to them as the launch of a process of political retribution by the new government.
Mr. Ivanishvili has also cracked down hard on Government expenditures - particularly targeting the part of the state budget allocated to the presidential administration, the National Security Council and the Tbilisi municipality. On November 6 the President’s office responded by announcing that the outdoor lighting of the presidential palace would be turned off to save electricity cost, albeit at the same time underlining that the presidential palace constitutes an institution belonging to the Georgian state – countering accusations of the President treating it as his private property. Adding to the row over excessive utility costs, Mr. Ivanishvili has suggested that the President and his staff move back into the old Chancellery office which served as the President’s office until the completion of the new presidential palace in 2009. Meanwhile, the National Security Council, headed by one of Saakashvili’s closest allies, Giga Bokeria, has faced a budget cut of up to 90% – funds that according to the new Prime Minister were spent predominantly on international lobbying for the benefit of the UNM.
In his stated quest to normalize relations with Russia, Mr. Ivanishvili has moreover appointed the former Georgian ambassador to Russia, Zurab Abashidze, as his special envoy to coordinate relations with Moscow. Ever since Georgia’s diplomatic ties with Russia were cut in late 2008, communication between Tbilisi and Moscow has been handled mainly through the Swiss Embassy in Tbilisi. Moscow’s response to Mr. Abashidze’s appointment has, however, remained lukewarm. On November 3, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that while paying attention to Georgia’s stated ambition to improve ties with Russia, further, concrete steps are now needed from Tbilisi’s side. For Mr. Ivanishvili, this may constitute a daunting task ahead. Political concessions vis-à-vis Russia, especially should they concern Tbilisi’s policy toward its secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, would likely give rise to strong criticism domestically, and carry serious implications not only for Georgia but for the region as a whole – including the unresolved conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria.
The post-election rows in Georgia have already given rise to international concern. In a statement after a meeting of the NATO parliamentary assembly in Prague on November 12 (in which President Saakashvili participated), NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed “extreme concern” about the developments in Georgia after the October election, clearly referring to the recent arrests of Akhalaia and Kalandadze. He went on to underline the importance of avoiding political interference in the judicial processes, hinting at potential political motivation being behind the arrests. Following a visit by Mr. Ivanishvili to Brussels on November 12, the Head of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso also raised a warning against cases of “selective justice” in Georgia, noting that those could harm Georgia’s international image and pose a threat to the rule of law.
Mr. Ivanishvili’s decision to choose Brussels as his first foreign destination as Prime Minister was surprising to many, as the PM stated in early October that his first official trip would be to Washington. Notably, his visit to Europe coincided with President Saakashvili’s participation in the NATO parliamentary assembly meeting in Prague, followed by a visit by the President to Brussels on November 13-14. The simultaneous visits by the two leaders to Europe suggest that both sides are attempting to solidify their respective relations with the EU and NATO. Worryingly, however, it displays a lack of coordination and unity that is likely to raise eyebrows among Georgia’s Western partners.
IMPLICATIONS: While the current power transition is important to Georgia’s democratic progress, recent developments suggest that the coming year will be a challenging one for Georgia. Both sides will now need to step up to the task of cooperating in the new parliament and government structures. This, in turn, will require that focus is shifted away from personal animosity and that retaliatory actions are avoided. It is also crucial that the two sides adopt a united front vis-à-vis Georgia’s Western partners, as attempts to discredit one other on the international scene will do nothing but harm Georgia’s image – with the potential consequence of slowing down the process of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Indeed, for both the UNM and the GD important challenges are looming. Since coming to power, Mr. Ivanishvili has eagerly repeated his campaign goals of creating jobs, raising pensions and lowering electricity prices to improve living conditions nationwide. It is now important that the GD leader steps up to his stated promises and focuses on the needs of the Georgian population rather than acts of political retribution. Since the election, thousands of workers, most recently Tbilisi’s yellow bus drivers, have already gone on strike demanding higher salaries and better working conditions, which underlines the that the Georgian population is expecting true action from the new government in realizing its policy objectives. The GD will also face a challenging task in keeping the ideologically very diverse 6-party coalition together in the new parliament. While the coalition succeeded in securing 85 of the 150 parliamentary seats in the October election, it fell short of a constitutional majority, which means that staying united, as well as cooperating with the UNM is crucial to achieve important changes, especially as regards constitutional ones.
The UNM, for its part, equally has an important task ahead to prove itself as a political party and to stay united in the parliamentary structures. Out of its 65 parliamentary representatives, 6 MPs have already defected from the party and formed an independent faction, which has stated that it is ready to cooperate with both sides. In order to avoid further fragmentation of the party, the former elite will need to take on the challenge offered by the election and emerge as a competitive opposition force with a clear political agenda ahead of the next election. In this process, it will be crucial for the UNM to move away from its tendency to base its party identity on personalities, and allow for broader power-sharing within the party structure.
In spite of the recent controversies, the post-election period offers important opportunities as well. While still struggling with the challenge of lack of cooperation and compromise, Georgian politics now include two strong political blocs that, given the right support and time to mature, will contribute to a more plural and competitive political environment in Georgia. It is therefore essential that Georgia’s Western partners adopt an attitude of patience and provide continuous support for political dialogue and a system that is equipped to manage political controversies in a constructive way.
CONCLUSIONS: While it is still early to judge what the power transition in Georgia will bring, the coming period is likely to be marked by continued lack of coordination and falling-outs between the two sides, at least in the short-term. This is not unexpected, given that Georgia has had little experience of power-sharing and political compromise in the post-revolutionary era. In this light, it is neither the October election per se, nor the immediate post-election process, that will determine Georgia’s democratic progress – rather the ability to use the current power-transition as a momentum for creating an environment conducive to building a stronger state in the years to come.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Johanna Popjanevski is Deputy Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, currently based in Tbilisi.