TATARSTAN INFLUENCED BY NORTH CAUCASUS RESISTANCE
On 19 July, 2012, a car bomb seriously wounded the mufti Il’dus Faizov in Tatarstan while his deputy, Valiulia Iakupov, was shot dead. Almost simultaneously, a pro-government mufti was shot in Dagestan. It has been argued that the three attacks are related, implying that North Caucasian jihadists are making inroads into Russia’s heartland. Indeed, the murders indicated a clear escalation of violence in Tatarstan. The specter of interconnections between the North Caucasian resistance and jihadists in the Volga region has increased with the declining influence of moderate Tatar nationalism, giving way to a new popular ideological makeup merging nationalism with jihadism as the ideology and practice of anti-Moscow resistance.
BACKGROUND: Tatar nationalism is a direct product of the political context in which it is evolved. More than any other enclave in Russia aside from the North Caucasus, Tatarstan benefited from Moscow’s weakening grip over Russian provinces in early post-Soviet era. In 1992, the idea of a Federation Compact (Federativnyi dogovor) had emerged and an agreement was signed between Tatarstan and Moscow in 1994, providing considerable autonomy for Kazan.
While receiving considerable concessions from the Kremlin, the Tatar elite was not willing to push for complete independence in the beginning of Yeltsin’s tenure, especially as it became clear through the first war in Chechnya that Moscow would use force to stop Russia from disintegrating. In light of this understanding, the Tatar elite led by then President Mintimer Shaimiev proposed several models of moderate Tatar nationalism, providing the ideological framework for Kazan’s collaboration with Moscow.
Following this design, Shaimiev propagandized the notion of a peculiar “Bulgarian civilization,” proclaimed to be as important as any other ancient civilization. It was stated not only that the Bulgar Kingdom – the ancient Turkic state on the territory of modern Tatarstan – was founded by Alexander the Great but was also converted to the Islamic faith directly by associates of the Prophet Muhammad. Several local historians studied the Bulgarian civilization, with direct support from the authorities. In their interpretation, the Bulgarian Kingdom had emerged in parallel with the Kievan Rus’, considered the civilizational ancestor of Russia as well as Ukraine and Belarus, and the peaceful coexistence between the Bulgarian and Kievan states was clearly implicated in the narrative. Thus, the Orthodox and Muslim civilizations were viewed not as antagonistic but rather “complimentary” and existing in some sort of Gumilevian “symbiosis.” Unsurprisingly, Kremlin ideologists were pleased with such interpretation of history especially as Shaimiev insisted that Islam and Orthodox Christianity, and consequently Russians and Tatars, had lived in beneficial “symbiosis” for centuries.
However, this ideology and even more so its practice increasingly became challenged by some segments of the Tatar population who want complete independence. In addition, the ideology of jihadism started to spread in Tatarstan. This was not missed by the leadership of the North Caucasian resistance who increasingly cooperate with Tatar nationalists and jihadists alike, extending their armed struggle far beyond the North Caucasus, apparently with substantial help from Volga jihadists. The process started in the late Yeltsin era or even earlier, when Tatars became exposed to the influence of foreign Islamists. The spread of Islamism has corresponded with the spread of Tatar nationalism, which has not opposed, but rather embraced, jihadism. Indeed, common animosity toward Moscow has increasingly encouraged an amalgamation of Tatar jihadists and hardcore nationalists.
IMPLICATIONS: Events in the North Caucasus have strongly influenced developments in Tatarstan. The first Chechen War, mostly waged under nationalist slogans, was appealing to Tatar nationalists who saw in the Chechen resistance a template to follow in Tatarstan. One prominent example is the Tatar activist Rafis Kashapov, who was handed a suspended sentence in 2009 for articles protesting the russification of Tatarstan and was initially presumed to have been killed during an October 24 shootout in Kazan between law enforcement and suspects of the July attacks. However, it turned out he was confused with a killed suspect with the same surname. Kashapov has hardly been alone in praising the Chechen resistance. An activist holding similar views is Aidar Khalim, a nationalist who promoted separatist ideas in writings such as the book “This is Unvanquished Chechen or You Shall Repent Russia!” (Etot nepobedimyi chechenets, ili kaisia Rus’!), which praised the Chechen resistance.
Yet, the interaction between Tatar and North Caucasian Islamists increased as well and by 2006, the latter’s leader Dokku Umarov appointed a new commander for the Volga and Ural fronts. In 2007, Umarov proclaimed the “Caucasian Emirate” based on internationalist jihadism, which also encouraged Tatar jihadism and cooperation between Tatar and North Caucasian jihadists. As time progressed, the North Caucasian jihadists increasingly became the leading force in formatting the jihad in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. At the same time, the logic following from the conflict with Moscow has also led North Caucasian jihadists to embrace Tatar nationalists. In fact, they support nationalism in the Tatar setting as a force directed against the Kremlin – the ultimate enemy of the North Caucasian resistance.
In 2011, Umarov proclaimed that Caucasian Islamists shall move to the Volga region to incite local Tatars to jihad. The role of the North Caucasian resistance as an inspirational model for Tatarstan jihadists was later confirmed by a certain Saliaf, a North Caucasian jihadist interviewed for the internet publication APN. According to Rais Suleimanov, a leading pro-Moscow expert on Islam and nationalism in Tatarstan, the influence of North Caucasian jihadists can easily be recorded in Tatarstan mosques, while Tatar youth has sought to imitate “Caucasians” and were fascinated by the “video preaching of Said Buriatskii” and similar individuals. Indeed, according to some reports by Suleimanov and others, jihadists from the North Caucasus have become the teachers of jihadists in Tatarstan and ten percent of Tatarstan’s jihadists are motivated to take up arms.
While jihadism has a strong internationalist underpinning in the context of the North Caucasus, the situation is quite different in Tatarstan where internationalist jihadism has become interwoven with Tatar nationalism. Indeed, one could see an invocation of Tatar nationalism in Umarov’s early calls for jihad in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. He called the region “Idel-Ural,” a name used by Tatar nationalist Gaiaz Iskhaki (1878-1954), who dreamed of creating an independent Tatar state which borders largely corresponding to the Kazan Kingdom.
Besides encouraging jihadism as an ideology, North Caucasian fighters have provided their Tatar counterparts with military training and advice. Some of the Volga region’s jihadists, upon receiving training or apprenticeship either in the North Caucasus or abroad, have returned to Tatarstan. This seems to be a most troubling development for the local law enforcement. Indeed, according to Tatarstan’s chief of police, the region’s greatest security problem stems from individuals who received military training in Dagestan, Pakistan, or other countries.
While the North Caucasian resistance provides an important impetus for Tatar jihadism, the partnership goes both ways. Some young Tatars who departed to the North Caucasus for military training never returned to Tatarstan but instead became active participants in the North Caucasian resistance who fought in the second Chechen War (1999-2001) and later engaged in suicide terrorism. It is quite likely that North Caucasian jihadists were behind the summer terrorist attacks, signifying the increasing symbiosis between ideologically different violent forces united in their opposition to the Kremlin.
CONCLUSIONS: Tatarstan is a secularized Muslim enclave in Russia. In the beginning of post-Soviet era, many Tatars held nationalist sentiments which elites in both Moscow and Kazan sought to transform into the benign pro-Moscow neo-Eurasianism. Yet, the conflict between Tatar nationalists and Moscow provided for ties with the North Caucasian resistance. The radical Islamism on the part of some Tatar nationalists emerged not as an ideology opposing nationalism but actually reinforcing it in the peculiar context of the Volga region. As a result, a peculiar alliance is being shaped between North Caucasian jihadists, Tatar jihadists and Tatar nationalists. In fact, this symbiosis between Tatar nationalists and jihadists could possibly evolve into cooperation between jihadists and certain segments of the hardcore Russian nationalists, provided the latter’s hatred of the regime outweighs their antipathies toward people of “Caucasian nationality.” Jihadists have proven to be quite flexible in their alliances and Kavkaz Center frequently praises either directly or indirectly Russian nationalists and other nominally opposed groups, for their confrontation with Moscow.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.
