NAZARBAYEV APPOINTS NEW PM AND CHIEF OF STAFF AMID GROWING FEARS OF INSTABILITY
On September 24, President Nazarbayev accepted the resignation of his Prime Minister Karim Massimov’s government formed in the wake of the early presidential elections in April 2011. By another presidential decree, Massimov was appointed as a new chief of the presidential administration thus replacing Aslan Mussin who has headed this key political institution since October 2008. A reserved and even secretive politician, Karim Massimov was the longest-serving head of the Kazakh government (since January 2007) whose consecutive terms coincided with the most difficult periods of economic crisis and turmoil on financial and energy markets. When speaking of his Prime Minister’s work before the two chambers of Parliament, Nazarbayev praised his professionalism and even recalled that Massimov had already submitted several letters of resignation, citing fatigue and personal circumstances.
According to most political observers, Massimov’s new job has confirmed his special status in Kazakhstan’s domestic politics, as he will continue to enjoy the same high level of access to the president and is hence in charge of overseeing the implementation of the whole range of policies, from foreign affairs to agriculture. Karim Massimov’s career in government started in 2000, when he was appointed minister of transport and communications. One year later, he already moved up the ladder after his appointment as deputy Prime Minister in the Tokayev Government. Since the early 2000s, Massimov has been largely associated with Nazarbayev’s middle son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, known for his family’s control of Kazakhstan’s largest private bank and extensive business interests in the oil and gas sector.
Massimov’s successor as Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister is his former deputy Serik Akhmetov who previously spent almost three years as a regional governor. In the context of acute inter-elite struggles for influence, especially with the progressive strengthening of Nazarbayev’s chief of staff Mussin during the last 18 months, Akhmetov’s candidacy has been considered a compromise solution. Known for his responsible attitude towards professional duties and outspoken political neutrality, Akhmetov thus joins the Kazakh leader’s close circle which also includes the current chairman of the National Security Committee Nurtay Abykaev.
The appointment of a new minister of economic development and trade, Yerbolat Dossayev, who is also regarded as a prominent member of Kulibayev’s team, is another sign of improving relations between the president and his son-in-law. Last December, Timur Kulibayev was dismissed from his chairmanship of the Samruk-Kazyna Sovereign Welfare Fund, Kazakhstan’s largest holding company presumably controlling over 60 percent of the country’s GDP. This dismissal followed several days of bloody demonstrations in the western town of Zhanaozen where striking oil workers staged violent protests, leading the Government to use brutal police force. However, during the last meeting between Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin on the occasion of the 9th Forum on Kazakh-Russian regional cooperation organized in Northern Kazakhstan, Kulibayev was spotted accompanying the president, although neither of his current duties is related to this issue.
Nazarbayev also proceeded to the replacement of his first deputy in the ruling NurOtan party whose responsibilities include the coordination of political activities throughout the country, preparation for elections as well as party propaganda. Previously this position was occupied by Nurlan Nigmatullin who has also served as chairman of the lower chamber of Kazakhstan’s Parliament. Bakytzhan Sagintayev, the now ex-minister of economic development and trade, considered as one of Nazarbayev’s close associates of the younger generation, took over the reins of party leadership. In his welcoming speech before the party’s presidium, Nazarbayev specifically insisted on the importance of social and economic reforms in line with his recently published article “Social Modernization: Twenty Steps Towards A Society of Universal Labor.”
These recent appointments take place in the context of ever-growing domestic instability whose first signals date back to May 2011, when several bombs directed against Kazakh law enforcement authorities went off in several urban centers within a week. While social tensions continued to brew in the country’s western oil-producing regions, another terrorist attack was perpetrated last November in Taraz, Southern Kazakhstan, taking the lives of seven people. However, it was after the Zhanaozen protests that security risks in Central Asia’s most peaceful republic (together with Turkmenistan) have been highlighted as an increasingly serious challenge. The last antiterrorist operation conducted by the National Security Committee was staged in the second week of September near the port city of Aktau, once again bringing into the spotlight the progressive destabilization of Kazakhstan’s western provinces. In late August, an Almaty-based rating agency (Rating.kz) carried out a survey in order to analyze the biggest risks to the country’s political stability. Most respondents referred to continuing struggles between different elite groups and the weakening of the vertical of power. Therefore, Nazarbayev’s staffing decisions partly aim to allay such fears. y that Kyrgyzstan has achieved highly beneficial results from the visit, others note that Russia benefited even more due to the fact that the energy projects and the prolongation of Russia’s military presence meet Moscow’s geopolitical interests in the region. Nevertheless, all agree on one point – there are no guarantees that the signed agreements and intentions will indeed be implemented.
